

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW



JANUARY 1956

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

CHARLES SEYMOUR, President Emeritus of Yale University; editor of "The Intimate Papers of Colonel House;" author of "American Diplomacy During the World War" * * * PAUL H. NITZE, President, Foreign Service Educational Foundation; former Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State; Vice-Chairman of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, 1944-46 * * * CHARLES-ANDRÉ JULIEN, Professor of the History of Colonization at the University of Paris; Counsellor of the French Union; author of "Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord" * * * ABRAM BERGSON, Professor of Economics, Columbia University; member of the Allied Reparations Mission, Moscow, 1945; author of "The Structure of Soviet Wages" and other works * * * HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG, Editor of *Foreign Affairs* * * * EDUARDO SANTOS, President of Colombia, 1938-42; Editor and Publisher of *El Tiempo*, Bogotá * * * WALTER H. MALLORY, Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations; author of "China: Land of Famine" * * * DANKWART A. RUSTOW, Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University * * * ELIZABETH WISKEMANN, author of "Czechs and Germans," "Prologue to War," "The Rome-Berlin Axis" and other works * * * PEDRO G. BELTRÁN, Peruvian Ambassador to the United States, 1944-46; former Chairman of the Board, Central Reserve Bank of Peru; Peruvian delegate at Bretton Woods and many other international conferences * * * JOHN C. CAMPBELL, Director of Political Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; former member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State; author of "The United States in World Affairs," 1945-47 and 1947-48 * * * LLOYD ROSS, lecturer on industrial relations, University of Sydney; formerly New South Wales secretary of the Australian Railways Union.

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The Editors.

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WOODROW WILSON IN PERSPECTIVE

By Charles Seymour

TOWARDS the close of Woodrow Wilson's campaign for reelection to the Presidency of the United States, at a moment when prospects seemed unpromising, he remarked: "As compared with the verdict of the next 25 years, I do not care a peppercorn about the verdict of 1916." When those 25 years had passed, the verdict, if taken, would have been blurred by our intervention in the Second World War. How far has the situation been clarified at the present moment, 32 years after Wilson's death, 100 years after his birth? In the case of Abraham Lincoln, the perspective of far less elapsed time authorized his admission to the Valhalla of American greatness. The same is true, with varying emphasis, of the founding fathers of the Republic. But since the death of Lincoln, no clear-cut agreement on immortal greatness in the case of any American President has been achieved.

The claims of Wilson to inclusion in the select group cannot be summarily brushed aside. The significance of the reforms he advocated in vital phases of American life is hardly disputed. The nation has soberly accepted the purposes and the policies which at the time that he first urged them aroused a spirit of bitter controversy. This is true of his educational leadership and of the legislative program of his first term as President of the United States. The tide of history has made it true of the last phase, Wilson's heroic effort to bring the United States into a system of international coöperation. With little dissent, Americans have come to take it for granted that the counterpart of the League, the United Nations, is to be what Allen Dulles has called "our workshop of peace." Whatever the rebuffs at Princeton and in the United States Senate, succeeding years have vindicated his vision and his policy.

Thus it is eminently fitting that as political passions have cooled and personal prejudice softened, fresh consideration should be given to the position in American history that belongs to Woodrow Wilson. The verdict of public opinion as well as of the historian has not yet been rendered in unmistakable form. In what category and at what level is he finally to be placed?

The importance of Wilson as educational leader has become definitely established with the passing of the years. That leadership has not attracted the public attention in like degree with his direction of the movement for international organization. But in itself, and if he had never entered politics, it would have assured him permanent distinction. He brought an educational ideal to the college world at a moment when Princeton and the nation most needed it. It was not original with him, but there was no one who expressed it so clearly and persuasively. His courage in the rejection of the free elective system was matched by his insistence upon teaching quality which would stimulate the student to sincere interest in and positive enjoyment of study. Thus the main circus was to regain its dominance over the extracurricular side-shows. His preceptorial plan was only one of various methods by which the curiosity and intellectual effort of the student might be aroused. But it caught the imagination of the academic world. The enthusiasm of the young preceptors aroused their colleagues in other institutions. The power of Wilson's provocative arguments for the serious values of college life was infectious. Hence the influence of the Princeton experience served impressively in the general recrudescence of literary and intellectual interest on the American campus.

The controversies which Wilson encountered at Princeton would doubtless have been accepted by most college executives as an inevitable irritation incidental to the office. What seemed to him as defeat, however, coincided with the opportunity to enter politics, his early dream. Thus began, with his success in New Jersey and his astounding advance to the Presidency of the United States, the second phase of his public service. As at Princeton, the earlier aspects of his national political leadership were characterized by almost unbroken success. Indeed, no period of his career since his teaching days has aroused so little controversy and so much praise among historians. They are agreed upon the courage and skill with which he translated an ambitious program of reform into legislation.

In his formulation of the principles of the New Freedom, as well as in his successful demand upon Congress for their immediate political application, Wilson closely approached his own ideals of leadership as laid down in his essay of 1890. His sensitive ear caught the tone of national needs and the trend of popular hopes, which were given form and direction by his persuasive rhetoric. The program was progressive in its farewell to *laissez-faire*; it was conservative in its antisocialistic insistence that the authority of government should be used not for the operation, but for the liberation of business. Governor Stevenson points out that "he taught us to distinguish between governmental action that takes over the functions formerly discharged by individuals and governmental action that restores opportunity for individual action." Hence the significant subtitle of his collected campaign speeches: "A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People." He sought in the national arena the equality of opportunity which he had enjoined upon Princeton, the enlargement of the frontiers of freedom which was to be the watchword of his international crusade.

The legislation of the first two years of his Presidency dealt with crucial and contentious issues: the tariff, currency reform, the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission, the Clayton Antitrust Act. Wilson's success in achievement in the face of bitter opposition astounded his contemporaries. "This man who was regarded as a pedagogue, a theorist," said Chauncey Depew, "is accomplishing the most astounding practical results."

Of greater historical importance than any contemporary estimate is the almost complete endorsement, over the years, of Wilson's reform program, one that went far towards creating a new social and economic atmosphere. The Federal Reserve is universally taken for granted as the pediment of our national financial structure. The use of federal authority to assure competitive conditions in trade has become a permanent aspect of our economic life. Public opinion has come to accept emancipation of labor, in its organization for the betterment of working conditions, from the restrictions designed to control monopolistic tendencies of capital. The solid permanence of Wilson's legislative achievement is impressive.

The march of events has brought it about that Wilson's position in history would be determined not by the contribution he made to American legislation, important as that was, but rather by the

rôle he played on the international stage. There were three well-defined acts in the drama which began with the outbreak of the European War in August 1914. The first covered the period of American neutrality, the second that of the active participation of the United States in the war, the third that of the Peace Conference and its aftermath. Wilson's attitude and tactics underwent considerable change during the course of these three periods. But from beginning to end his main purpose was not altered. He was determined to bring the conscience and the power of America into a coöperative effort that would everywhere secure the liberty of all peoples. Whether as a neutral or belligerent or a peace commissioner, Wilson looked upon himself as leader in a crusade for international freedom.

A sense of responsibility to the rest of the world underlay his policy of determined neutrality. His emotions boiled with protest at the suggestion that he chose neutrality merely as the road to safety. It was imposed upon us, rather, in fulfillment of our duty as the only great neutral at peace, "the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend." His insistence was constant, and today it is recognized as sincere, that we would serve better by remaining outside the conflict. His determination to protect the rights of America against the attacks of the German submarines and the infringements of the British blockade led him finally to espouse the movement for national preparedness. But his call for military armament stressed not merely our rights, but our responsibility for the salvation of the equipoise of the world and "the redemption of the affairs of mankind."

Hence his persistent eagerness in the search for effective methods of mediation, and his constant encouragement to Colonel House in the effort to discover some basis for a compromise peace. Wilson's personal sympathy for the cause of the Entente Allies did not at any time during the period of our neutrality disturb his conviction that such a peace would prove the only sure basis of a permanent settlement. This conviction was at its firmest and clearest as he came to discuss specifically conditions essential to international security, immediately before the break with Germany, in January of 1917. His public suggestion of a "peace without victory" proved offensive to the belligerents and a diplomatic impossibility. But Wilson was quite right in maintaining that a

victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished would be "accepted in humiliation, under duress . . . and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand." The quality of Wilson's foresight was amply borne out in the years that followed the Peace Conference and led to the Hitler régime.

There are few who would suggest today that our interests called for intervention in the war previous to the declaration of the intensive German submarine campaign. On the other hand, the band of critics who in later years assailed Wilson as responsible for unnecessary and ultimately disastrous participation in the war has diminished to the vanishing point. That criticism was most strident 20 years ago. It was stimulated by the sense of betrayal that captured American liberals after the Peace Conference as well as by the ill-documented propaganda emanating from the Nye Commission and culminating in the neutrality legislation of the mid-thirties. But it was short-lived. Even those who today believe that only a compromise peace would have provided the base for a permanent settlement admit that Wilson's hand was forced and that the Germans left him no alternative but to enter the war.

Contemporary criticism of the process by which a peaceful, ill-prepared nation was transformed into a fighting machine has been replaced by enthusiastic recognition of the quality of Wilson's leadership in the war. The unity of national effort which he inspired made possible the astounding contribution of American manpower, finance and supplies which turned the tide of battle in Europe. But his outstanding demonstration of leadership lay in the war of ideas. Inevitably the attitude of the President towards the belligerents was radically altered by our own belligerency. He could no longer imply that the war aims on either side were the same. It was not difficult for him to frame his indictment against Germany as an international criminal since he had been profoundly shocked, in a personal sense, by the declaration of submarine warfare. Against such a criminal it was necessary to use force without stint or limit. Henceforth he was unwilling to accept any peace except one based upon the absolute defeat of German militarism.

While Wilson as war leader cast his denunciatory and destructive thunderbolts against the German Government, he did not fail to stress constructively the ideals of his crusade for freedom, which

he inherited from the period of neutrality and which he led on behalf of all peoples. In his Flag Day address of June 14, 1917, perhaps in itself the outstanding example of his wartime rhetoric, he drew the distinction between the "military masters of Germany [who] denied us the right to be neutral" and the German people, "themselves in the grip of the same sinister power that has . . . stretched its ugly talons out and drawn blood from us." He went on to reiterate his ultimate war aims: "This is the People's War, a war for freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, a war to make the world safe for the peoples who live upon it . . . the German peoples themselves included."

So also in his speech of the Fourteen Points, Wilson forged a weapon of psychological warfare at the same time that he drafted a charter of peace. The address failed in its primary purpose of dissuading Russia from negotiations with the enemy. But it drove a deeper wedge between the German Government and people and it presented the latter with the possibilities of an attractive program once their hopes of military victory faded. Germany was offered a place of equality and a guarantee of friendship, "if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing." Small wonder that when they were confronted with an imminent military collapse, the Germans turned to Wilson, invoking the Fourteen Points and the succeeding speeches couched in similar terms.

Wilson's program as an instrument of political warfare thus achieved resounding success. It became a determining factor in Allied military victory in 1918. It gave to Wilson himself a moral position of such strength that willy-nilly the British and French leaders in their negotiations with House were compelled to endorse that program. But the Fourteen Points, a powerful weapon of war, were not so well fitted to serve as the design for an international peace settlement. They were at once too general in their statement of abstract principles and too specific in various geographical details. Furthermore, the very success of Wilson's psychological campaign enforced the nationalistic aspirations of the European peoples and thus raised powerful opposition to his international ideals.

Wilson went to the Peace Conference pledged to the fulfillment of a threefold and interlocking concept: the liberation of peoples,

justice for all without distinction, the assurance of peace through international organization. In his mind, freedom and justice outweighed in their importance the assurance of peace; he always believed that "the right is more precious than peace." But it was clear that an organized system of security would be essential to the maintenance of a régime of freedom and justice. All three principles must be worked out together in a world-wide association of nations: "A universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free."

Wilson's chief difficulty lay not so much in the opposition of Allied leaders in Paris, for few would dare openly to oppose such ideals, as in the inherent difficulty of applying general principles to concrete issues. For lack of an explicit program, there was at Paris a high degree of improvisation and of confusion in the effort to solve specific problems in the light of abstractions which were difficult to define.

The recurrent leitmotif of Wilson's policy lay in his ideal of freedom, whether of the individual or of the national group. But this ideal he found it impossible to formulate at Paris in terms that might find exact expression in an international agreement. The principles of self-government were rather vaguely considered in nineteenth century concepts, without any clear attempt to re-interpret them in contemporary terms or in the light of political and industrial conditions of Central and Southeastern Europe. The doctrine of self-determination, expressive of national freedom, Wilson soon discovered to be an untrustworthy guide, incapable of universal application. How was he to decide the validity of conflicting aspirations? Linguistic statistics often proved as unreliable a criterion as the rhetoric of partisan leaders. In various areas he found the principle of self-determination to be in clear conflict with other Wilsonian doctrines. It would seem to justify the separation of the German Sudetenland from Bohemia, an obvious disaster to the Czechoslovak state, itself founded upon the principle of self-determination. Its strict application would have cut in two an economic entity such as the Klagenfurt Basin.

In the approach to these and similar problems Wilson hoped for guidance from the application of the principle of justice, which he had stressed equally as an essential foundation of a liberating and a lasting peace. "It must be a justice that seeks no favorites

and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned. No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all." As a principle this seemed indisputable.

But when he came to cases at Paris he discovered that there was a conflict of rights as well as of interests. Every government was bound to feel that justice to its own people demanded a protection of national security that often could be achieved only at the expense of another. Even the impartially-minded Americans could not with any confidence apply the principle of justice to specific problems. Crossing to Europe on the *George Washington*, Wilson had said to the members of The Inquiry: "Tell me what's right and I'll fight for it. Give me a guaranteed position." But whatever position they might try to guarantee on the basis of justice, a case could be found with which to dispute it. How did the justice of the Polish claim to the Corridor compare with the injustice done to Germany in its establishment? Was the separation of the Saar from the Reich a justifiable reparation for the wanton damage inflicted by German troops on the coal mines of Lens and Valenciennes? As Wilson met Allied leaders day after day, despite the personal irritation of debate, his own attitude towards the strict application of the principle of justice became more fluid.

Wilson's expanding appreciation of the inexorable realities of European politics was manifest in his changed outlook upon the problem of security. This is not to imply that he ever wavered in his conviction that the old system was bankrupt and that the new must be based upon the principle of collective security as expressed in the League of Nations. To that cause he devoted his most impassioned efforts. At the opening of the Conference it seemed doubtful whether he could withstand pressure for postponement of the League in favor of the "practical" aspects of the settlement; whether, also, he could secure incorporation of the Covenant as the first and essential portion of the treaty with Germany and the others to follow. His triumph was clear-cut. The League became the cornerstone of the treaties. It would serve, Wilson believed, not merely to safeguard the peace but to correct the inequities that were bound to creep into any settlement.

But in the intimate discussions of the Council of Four he came to realize the justified anxiety of the French as to security and the validity of their demand for special guarantees of protection, at

least until the League had demonstrated its effective authority. One must read the recently-published notes of Professor Mantoux¹ in order to appreciate the emotional and the logical force of the appeal from Clemenceau. The latter's concept of "strategic security," based upon a demilitarized Rhineland and the fortified bastion of Bohemia in the hands of the Czechs, was recognized by Wilson not as a substitute for but as a regional supplement to collective security. And Wilson was further willing to buttress the defense of France by the agreement that the United States would join with Great Britain, in case of attack by Germany, to defend the French frontier.

These departures from ideological perfection have been pictured as constituting a moral and political surrender by Wilson. But he was indebted to Clemenceau for his acquiescence in the League of Nations and he had to acknowledge that conditions in Europe went far to justify the latter's policy. Indeed, that policy, properly implemented, might have sufficed to contain Hitler. The same sort of defense can be offered in behalf of various other compromises that Wilson accepted. They were, in his opinion, essential to the completion of the treaties, upon which the revival of the economic as well as the political life of the world depended. Whether Wilson might have salvaged more of his original program is a question still in doubt. On the whole, historical opinion has come to the conclusion that the settlement as agreed upon, had it actually been carried into effect, would have proved practicable and enduring.

The decision of Wilson to adjust to circumstances which he could not alter was made to appear in certain quarters as the bankruptcy of his entire program. The indictment against him was in part the expression of partisan prejudice; but it was chiefly inspired by disappointment. He had aroused hopes that his vision of Utopia could obliterate political facts. He now paid the price for the enthusiasm his program had evoked while it was still in the stage of generalities. His position would doubtless have been stronger had he not attempted to rationalize the compromises into such a form that they would fit into the design of his abstract principles. He thereby opened himself to the charge of hypocrisy and to the attack of perfectionists who joined with American isolationists in denunciation of the Versailles Treaty.

¹ Paul Mantoux, "Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatre (24 mars-28 juin 1919)." Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1955, 2 v.

But his prestige on the return to Washington in July of 1919 was still sufficient to assure ratification of the Treaty and American participation in the League, assuming a reasonably sagacious political approach. At that time Senator Lodge himself, determined that the Republican Party should not be split in two, hardly hoped for more than the reservations that would enable him to insist that he and his Party had saved American independence from Wilsonian internationalism. But ratification depended upon conciliation of the Republican mild reservationists in such numbers as would compel Lodge to compromise.

The President could not bring himself to make the necessary concessions. His determination was hardened by the psychological effects of his illness and by his isolation from experienced political advisers. When it became clear that a two-thirds vote in the Senate could not be secured except upon the basis of the Lodge reservations, he would have been wise, without endorsing these reservations, to permit his followers to accept them and thus assure ratification. Historical opinion has tended towards the conclusion that since he had compromised in Paris he made a fatal mistake in refusing the compromises in Washington necessary to ratification. It was fatal, at least, in the sense that he thereby destroyed the crowning success of his policies, so nearly achieved, and his own immediate glorification. The action of the Senate, fortified, as it was made to appear, by the election of 1920, not merely kept the United States out of the League but apart from the close participation in European affairs upon which the Versailles Treaty was predicated. The consequences of that withdrawal upon the authority of the League were momentous; no less so upon the relationships of the Great Powers with Germany and among themselves. In the débâcle of the thirties, Europe and ultimately the United States paid a heavy price.

Woodrow Wilson completed his term as President in the shadow of political disaster. The endorsement of his program for which he called in the election of 1920 was refused him by an overwhelming vote. The dignity of his attitude in retirement and the pathos of his physical collapse assured him nation-wide sympathy. But his dream of American leadership in world organization was dead and in a practical sense forgotten. Comfortably and blindly the United States fell back into the spirit of isolationism.

Abroad, the reputation of Wilson has never recovered from the reaction that followed the Peace Conference and the political

disappearance of its leaders. His memory was summarily dismissed by conservative impatience at his attempt to inoculate Europe with his visionary principles and by liberal disappointment consequent upon his readiness to compromise them. Only in Geneva was adequate honor still paid him. The rise and fall of his hold on popular affection may be traced in the streets and squares that were named in tribute to his efforts on behalf of freedom, only to be renamed for some subsequent hero.

On this side of the Atlantic the upswing of opinion in Wilson's favor has been definite. But it has not yet become universal. He has suffered from the clash of contradictory elements in his temperament which affected not only his political career but the later judgement of history. It is by no means easy for the analytical historian to reach clear-cut conclusions in an estimate of Wilson in view of the fact that his political defects proceeded largely and often directly from his personal talents.

His outstanding characteristic as leader was an almost uncanny genius for persuasion, whether by the written or by the spoken word. In both respects Wilson greatly excelled. Through his peculiar and abiding influence upon individuals and upon small groups of high intelligence he exercised unheralded and permanent power in the nation. His outstanding capacity for persuading mankind in the large accounts in chief measure for the emphatic success of his legislative program on behalf of the New Freedom. But there was always the danger that by the very magic of his eloquence he would, like less distinguished evangelists in the religious field, bring his congregation into a process of conversion that was not to prove permanent. Thus he won the enthusiastic support of the people for the League as the chief buttress of American foreign policy; it was a revolutionary but a temporary achievement. Popular devotion to Wilson's great ideal turned out to be merely skin-deep and was soon lost in the other issues that beclouded the ill-fated election of 1920.

Another paradox in the public life of Wilson, when one comes to making up the main account, lies in the fact that his noblest attribute, an undeviating faith in principles, became a primary factor in the miscarriage of his plans for establishing them as a directive influence in the affairs of the world. No statesman has given to mankind a more cogent and elevated exposition of the infinite power and the enduring righteousness of justice and freedom. But his illusion that such ideals could obliterate the stub-

born facts of political life unsettled his policy at Paris and led directly to the disaster which he suffered at the hands of Senator Lodge.

Wilson's reputation has inevitably been heightened by the events of the quarter-century that followed his death. The world received a terrible confirmation of his prophetic vision of the cataclysm which the League of Nations was designed to avert. The establishment of the United Nations consecrated the validity of his leadership, which had been mutilated at Paris and spurned by the United States Senate. Thus the defeat of 1920 became a sacrificial step towards his ultimate justification, and the failure of his League "a necessary part of the stumbling process," as Secretary Dulles puts it, "by which humanity develops the means for its own self-preservation."

But it would be a grievous error to permit the historical position of Wilson to depend upon the fortunes of any single institution no matter how impressive. It rests rather upon an invincible idea "so greatly conceived and set forth," as Edwin Alderman insisted immediately after Wilson's death, "that it must continue to grow into new and finer form and his fame must grow with it." Entirely apart from his contribution to a tangible instrument of political idealism, whether permanent or fugitive, Wilson is justified by faith. Magnificent in his leadership, he was too far in advance of his time. Men were not ready for the sacrifice of self-interest, the revolution in national outlook which his ideals demanded. But the inspiration of those ideals is permanent and no one has issued a more compelling call than Wilson's to devotion in their behalf, or more moving an example of undeviating faith in their nobility. Regardless of the ebb and flow of political and historical opinion, he stands forth as among the greatest of all prophets in the cause of international justice and freedom.

Long before entering active politics, in his address on Leaders of Men, Wilson provided a clue to his own future claim to immortality. "Great reformers," he said, "do not, indeed, observe times and circumstances. Theirs is not a service of opportunity. They have no thought for occasion, no capacity for compromise. They are early vehicles of the Spirit of the Age. They are born of the very times that oppose them . . . theirs to hear the inarticulate voices that stir in the night-watches, apprising the lonely sentinel of what the day will bring forth."

ATOMS, STRATEGY AND POLICY

By Paul H. Nitze

AFTER much use in political debate, words tend to become leathery and pliable in the meanings they suggest. Perhaps they gain something in richness of implication but they lose in precision. For example, the word "policy" is used in two related but different senses. In one sense, the *action* sense, it refers to the general guide lines which we believe should and will in fact govern our actions in various contingencies. In the other sense, the *declaratory* sense, it refers to policy statements which have as their aim political and psychological effects.

Much of the discussion of recent months concerning Western atomic policy has been on the issue of "massive retaliation" versus "graduated deterrence." The phrase "massive retaliation" has been used by Secretary Dulles to describe a policy of relying for our security "primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing." The phrase "graduated deterrence" has been used by a number of people on both sides of the Atlantic. Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, formerly Director of British Naval Intelligence, recently described it as a policy of "limiting wars (in weapons, targets, area and time) to the minimum force necessary to deter and repel aggression." Although many confusing subsidiary points have been raised, the main point at issue between the two concepts is the reliance which should be placed upon the capacity to bomb centers of population and industry with nuclear weapons.

The discussion of the two concepts would attain greater clarity if a distinction were maintained between the two meanings of the word "policy."

Our action policy has been, is, and, I believe, will continue to be one of "graduated deterrence." We do not wish or intend to use means beyond those which are necessary for the achievement of any given objective. It is obviously to the interest of the West that war, and especially atomic war in any form, be avoided if that is possible without submitting to even greater evils. Furthermore, it is to the West's interest, if atomic war becomes unavoidable, that atomic weapons of the smallest sizes be used in the smallest area, and against the most restricted target systems

possible, while still achieving for the West the particular objective which is at issue. Judgments can differ as to the importance of various objectives, the military requirements for defending or achieving these objectives, and the feasibility of both sides maintaining in actual combat restrictions on the geographic extent of the fighting, the types of weapons used or the character of the targets attacked. The basic point remains, however, that it is to the interest of the West that the means employed in warfare and the area of engagement be restricted to the minimum level which still permits us to achieve our objectives. Our basic action policy must therefore be one of "graduated deterrence."

But how about our declaratory policy—the statements of policy which we make for political effect? There may have been very good reason for leaving the Soviet leaders in no doubt that we do not propose to be nibbled to death; that they cannot blithely choose areas and means of aggression as they see fit without running very real risks that we will be forced to expand the means or area of action as may be necessary to redress the aggression. The difficulty with the "massive retaliation" statement, however, was that to many people on our side it suggested that we would no longer take the measures necessary to contain local aggression with graduated means but would choose unlimited city-to-city atomic retaliation the moment we were given an excuse. Some people, in reaction to the massive retaliation statement, are urging that we declare our firm intention not to use hydrogen weapons except in retaliation for their prior use by an enemy. Some are suggesting other forms of self-limiting declaration. Others are persuaded that while we maintain a stiff upper lip and give the Russians no reason to believe we would lack the will to meet a crisis they will never test that will.

The difficulty with declaratory policy is that it tends to be ineffective in its political and psychological consequences if it deviates too far from action policy. To be clear as to the wisdom of a declaratory policy, one must be sure first that the action policy it suggests is one which is, and will continue to be, in conformity with our interests and with basic realities, and secondly that the political and psychological consequences of the declaration will in fact be favorable.

Let us go back, therefore, and examine some of the developments in the weapons field and their impact on both military and political strategy to see whether this throws any light on the type

of action policy we can live with. Later we can look at the problem of what it might be wise to declare about it.

II

Many writers have suggested that an "atomic stalemate" has developed or is about to develop. The thought seems to be that as the Russian stockpile of atomic weapons grows both sides will realize that in an all-out nuclear war neither side can "win" and that therefore atomic peace (aside from some irrational action) is assured. I would suggest that the situation is more complex.

In the first place the growth of the Russian atomic stockpile and delivery systems (the bases, planes, missiles, crews, radars, etc., necessary to deliver them on target) does not tend to inhibit action by the Soviets. It merely inhibits the possibility of action by ourselves. If the Western monopoly was for many years a force for peace it is hard to see how the loss of that monopoly can, by itself, be a force for stability. It would seem much more plausible to look to the other development which has been proceeding concurrently with growth of the Russian stockpile—that is, to the great general advance in atomic weapon systems technology—for those forces in the weapons field which may be tending toward increasing stability.

During the past five years the power of individual weapons, the number of weapons available and the variety and flexibility of means for their delivery have expanded more rapidly than anyone at the beginning of that period thought possible. Power, numbers and deliverability are not just additive factors. It is not their sum but their product which gives an index of offensive potential. And the developments of recent years have raised their product to an entirely new order of magnitude. It is this change in the order of magnitude of offensive potential which increasingly raises the question as to whether any one can "win" an all-out nuclear war.

But the word "win" is another of our leathery words which can stand reëxamination for precision of meaning. In one connotation the word "win" is used to suggest a comparison of the immediate postwar position of a country with its prewar position. In this sense none of the initial contestants "won" in the First World War or in the Second World War. It is probable that no one could "win" a third world war, in the sense of being richer, happier or better off after such a war than before it, even if no atomic weap-

ons were used. If atomic weapons were used in all-out, city-to-city attack by both sides the conclusion is certain.

In another connotation the word "win" is used to suggest a comparison of the postwar position of one of the adversaries with the postwar position of the other adversary. In this sense it is quite possible that in a general nuclear war one side or the other could "win" decisively. Even a small initial imbalance in relative capabilities, other things being equal, could grow rapidly into a decisive imbalance as the war progressed.

Air warfare in general and atomic warfare in particular tend to be comparable more to naval warfare than to land warfare. In classical naval warfare, it has generally been true that if the main opposing forces became engaged, an initial superiority was progressively translated into complete and decisive victory, resulting in full control of the sea lanes for the victorious side. In land warfare, on the other hand, the side having the initial advantage often has become overextended as its forces advanced, as its lines of communication lengthened and as the population and forces of the defender were stimulated to greater efforts. A very great margin of superiority, often established only after a counter-attack, has usually been necessary for decisive victory on land.

In the last war, establishing control of the air took time, and that control was sometimes less surely established than was control of the sea in the days before the development of airplanes. But the addition of atomic weapons, with the prospect that hundreds of airfields could be permanently destroyed in a single day, make it probable that in any future war the process would be speeded up and be even more clearly decisive.

Some have argued that the destruction in an all-out nuclear war would be so great that nothing would remain, that life on this planet would be impossible, and that there would be no one left to "win," even in the second sense of the word. This is technically conceivable. The number of high-yield thermonuclear weapons which can be exploded in a short space of time without producing general lethal contamination of the atmosphere is finite. But it is a large number, one not likely to be reached unless the war is fought in an entirely irrational way.

If the above line of reasoning is correct, then in a nuclear war fought with some degree of reason one side may very well "win" in this second comparative sense and the other side lose. The victor will be in a position to issue orders to the loser and the loser

will have to obey them or face complete chaos or extinction. The victor will then go on to organize what remains of the world as best he can. Certainly he will try to see to it that there is never again a possibility that the loser possesses nuclear weapons.

These two meanings of the word "win" epitomize the two main lines of considerations which flow from the present state of atomic technology. The first meaning brings out the horror and destruction which both sides in the contest, and mankind as a whole, would face in an all-out nuclear war—horror and destruction having as its upper limit the destruction of all life on this planet and as its lower limit such great losses even for the "victor" as to make any meaningful comparison with his prewar status impossible. It is this meaning of the word which brings out the reasons why it is of the utmost importance that nuclear war should not occur. We could not possibly "win" in this first sense. And we hope the enemy also realizes that he could not "win" in this sense either. The second meaning of the word "win," the comparison between the postwar position of the victor and the defeated, brings out why it is also of the utmost importance that the West maintain a sufficient margin of superior capability so that if general war were to occur we could "win" in the second sense. The greater that margin (and the more clearly the Communists understand that we have a margin), the less likely it is that nuclear war will ever occur. The greater that margin, the greater are our chances of seeing to it that nuclear war, if it does come, is fought rationally and that the resulting destruction is kept to the lowest levels feasible.

III

Now is it possible for the West to maintain a position of sufficient superiority so that it could "win" in the second sense if the necessity arose? The answer would seem to be in the affirmative provided we take the necessary measures. This would be so even if we assume that technology, both in nuclear processes and in delivery systems, will tend in the long run to equality between East and West.

As the number of weapons possessed by the Soviet Union increases, the importance of mere superiority in numbers diminishes. As the significance of superiority in numbers diminishes, the importance of superiority in delivery systems increases. As the Soviets approach closer to equality in delivery systems, the

significance of superiority in this factor also decreases. But if one assumes the existence of roughly equivalent capabilities in delivery systems, the significance of the geographic factor increases.

The United States is vulnerable to direct attack only from bases on the Eurasian land mass and from submarines. The U.S.S.R. is vulnerable to attack not only from North American bases but also from bases closer in on the periphery of the Eurasian land mass itself and from seas controlled by the navies of the West. Given anything approaching equality in numbers and quality of planes, missiles and the other elements of modern delivery systems, the geographic factor should give the West the possibility of a continuing and decisive margin of superiority. The very important emphasis which the Soviets are placing on this factor both in their diplomacy and in their propaganda indicates that they also recognize its importance.

On this line of reasoning, the controlling question is whether the West's geographic advantage can in fact be preserved in peace and asserted in the event of war. Can the West maintain, even in the face of smiling Russian tactics or renewed Soviet pressure and threats, sufficient cohesion in its alliances to make the geographic factor really count? The land bases ringing the U.S.S.R., close in, are subject to the sovereign control not of the United States but of the countries on whose territory they are located. A military policy which contributes to neutralism in those countries may rob the West of that geographic advantage which is potentially its greatest strength.

IV

The full significance of the geographic factor becomes evident only if one also bears in mind two other sets of considerations. One of these concerns the probable target systems in the initial period of a nuclear war. The other concerns the element of surprise.

A strong case can be made that no rational body of men would initiate a general atomic war unless they believed that the power of their initial atomic attack and its immediate effects on the enemy would be so great as to assure that the subsequent phases of the war would be substantially one-sided. In order to achieve such a one-sided result, the attacking side (either Russia in an initial attack, or the West in response to an aggression by Russia or China which could be met only by general war) would logically

concentrate the full power of its initial atomic attack on the military—primarily the retaliatory—capabilities of the other side. The attacker's object would be to destroy, in the initial blow, a large proportion of the base structure from which the defender must launch his retaliatory action (including the planes or missiles on the bases and the submarines and carriers which might support the main retaliatory action). The attacker would attempt to destroy a sufficiently large proportion of this base structure to reduce the power of the defender's retaliatory action to a level which the attacker's own defense system could contain. If he should succeed in this attempt he will have assured that the remaining phases of the war will be substantially one-sided. Once he has gained effective control of the intercontinental air space, then his adversary's entire country, including cities, industries, means of communication and remaining military capabilities, will lie open to his will. He will presumably have much in mind the postwar problem of building a world which he can control and manage. He will want destruction of that world to be held within reasonable limits. He will wish his own country to be spared as far as possible. He will also want to destroy only as much of the enemy territory as is necessary for him to impose his will and get on with the job of making of the world what he wants and can make of it.

The side which has lost effective control of the intercontinental air spaces will face a truly agonizing decision. It may still have the capability of destroying a few of the enemy's cities. But the damage it could inflict would be indecisive and out of all proportion to the annihilation which its own cities could expect to receive in return.

Whether one side or the other could hope to achieve substantial control of the air during the initial phase of the war depends further on a number of factors additional to those already mentioned. One of these is base dispersal—the number and geographic distribution of air, missile and supporting bases. Another is air defense capability.

If the bases from which a Western strike can be mounted are 30 in number, the enemy will have a far easier task in establishing air control than if those bases are 300 or 3,000 in number and if they are geographically well dispersed and varied in character.

Of equal importance is the factor of air defense. If the Western early warning, radar, interceptor and defensive missile system is

such that it can contain a coördinated Soviet surprise attack of 1,000 planes, that is quite a different thing than if it can contain a coördinated attack of only 100 planes. The point is that the technology of defense has also been making strides in recent years. From the technological standpoint, it is quite possible to conceive air defense systems which will have a very high probability of destroying all, or nearly all, planes of a small-scale attack. The problem is to design one that could stop a very high percentage of a large coördinated attack. This problem may not be insoluble. It is possible to foresee defenses even against intercontinental ballistic missiles, as Secretary of the Air Force Quarles recently announced.

This brings us to a discussion of the element of surprise and the advantage accruing to the side which strikes the first blow. If side A's base structure consists of a small number of bases and if side B's air defense system is able to contain a fairly substantial enemy retaliatory attack, then the advantage to side B of striking the first blow may be very great indeed. For the West to permit such a situation to develop in favor of the U.S.S.R. would be to encourage a dangerous instability in the air-atomic situation.

Sheer geographical extent is one of the elements necessary both for adequate base dispersal and for a comprehensive air defense system. This would seem to reënforce the point made earlier that the West has every prospect of being able to maintain a superior position in the nuclear attack-defense equations, but only if its available geographic advantages can be maintained as a vital element.

There are two further military strategy points which deserve mention.

If one studies the impact of weapons technology on military history, one finds that advances in mobility have generally favored the offense, and advances in firepower have generally favored the defense. It is quite probable that general availability of tactical atomic weapons, with the very great increase in firepower which they give, would tend to favor the defense in a war limited to a single theatre and in which long-range planes or missiles were not used. If so, significant advantages from modern weapons will accrue to the offense only if the nature of the conflict permits the full mobility and range of aircraft or long-range missiles to find play.

This consideration is obviously of importance only if approxi-

mate technological equality between the two sides is assumed. And even then there are limits to its significance. A superiority of forces in being of three to one has generally been assumed to be necessary for the offense on land. If so, then a technological situation favoring the offense may reduce this to two to one, while a technological situation favoring the defense may raise it to four or five to one.

Colonel George A. Lincoln of the West Point faculty makes the further point that whether or not atomic weapons are ever again used in warfare, the very fact of their existence, the possibility that they could be used, will affect all future wars. In this sense Korea was an atomic war even though no atomic weapons were used. In this sense even the cold war is an atomic cold war. The situation is analogous to a game of chess. The atomic queens may never be brought into play; they may never actually take one of the opponent's pieces. But the position of the atomic queens may still have a decisive bearing on which side can safely advance a limited-war bishop or even a cold-war pawn. The advance of a cold-war pawn may even disclose a check of the opponent's king by a well-positioned atomic queen.

v

What action policy do these considerations suggest for the United States? To me they suggest the following:

(a) It is important that the West maintain indefinitely a position of nuclear attack-defense superiority versus the Soviet Union and its satellites.

(b) It is within the reasonable limits of what is physically possible for the West to maintain such a position indefinitely.

(c) To do so, the West will need to maintain at least equality, and if possible superiority, in atomic and weapons technology. It will need to maintain at least equality, and if possible superiority, in the manifold elements of effective atomic offensive and defensive weapons systems.

(d) In order to maintain a sufficient margin of superiority, so that even a surprise attack would give the enemy no prospect of achieving a one-sided result, the West must realize its geographic potential. Three corollaries flow from this proposition. We should develop an air defense system which makes full use of the West's geographic advantages. We should develop that widely dispersed base system which the West's geographic situa-

tion makes possible. But, above all, we must maintain in full working order the system of alliances and those working relations with our allies without which the West will have no geographic advantage at all.

(e) In order to maintain the Western system of alliances we must, among many other things, develop a policy with respect to the conditions under which we would use atomic weapons in war—an action policy which we really intend to follow—which is consistent both with our own interests and those of our allies.

What might be the important elements of such a *use* policy, consistent with both our own interests and those of our allies? Its starting point would be our common interest in collective security. An attack on one ally must be considered an attack on all. We must not permit any ally who actively resists aggression to be overrun. We must have developed and be willing to use the strength necessary to restore the situation in the event of aggression. The elements of a common policy governing our use of atomic weapons might be the following:

(a) We should endeavor to meet aggression and restore the situation without the use of atomic weapons wherever this is possible.

(b) We should extend hostilities to other areas only if there is no other way effectively to restore the situation.

(c) Even if it becomes necessary to engage the U.S.S.R. in atomic warfare, we should limit ourselves to military objectives, primarily to those which are necessary to achieve control of the air. We should not initiate the bombing of industrial or population centers.

(d) We should attempt to build non-atomic elements of strength and to encourage our allies to do likewise so that the residual reliance which must be placed upon atomic weapons for our common security is reduced as far as may be feasible.

VI

Let us now discuss a few of the objections which might be raised to such an action policy.

Would we have any assurance that the enemy would not attack the cities of the West first? Obviously we would have no absolute assurance on this point. But assuming a maintenance of Western nuclear attack-defense superiority, it would seem wholly irrational for the enemy to do so. Every weapon he wasted

on a city would be a weapon he could not use against our dispersed retaliatory base structure and a further contribution to the overwhelming destruction of his own cities which his attack would have invited.

Could we be sure that during the period that it took us to gain effective air control, and before the enemy had accepted defeat, he would not lash out to do what damage he could to our cities? Obviously we could not be sure. But the more thoroughly we had concentrated on his air-atomic capabilities, the greater the prospect that his attack would be disorganized and reduced to a scale which our air defense system could contain.

Is it possible to draw a distinction between industrial and population centers and air-atomic bases? Such a distinction presents real difficulties, but the importance of overcoming them is so great that it should be possible to do so. There is no reason why we, and the enemy as well, cannot locate military air bases more than a given distance, say 20 miles, from major population centers. There is no reason why high-yield thermonuclear weapons need to be used against base targets. Certainly, smaller population centers might be destroyed by near misses or other accidents. But is this not wholly different from the purposeful mass destruction of the urban populations of the world?

Would it not be expensive to create and maintain the military establishment required for air-atomic superiority in this sense? Certainly it would be expensive, but it would not be more expensive than we should and can afford. Today the West's expenditures for defense and gross capital formation are under 25 percent of gross national product. The Soviet expenditures for these categories are over 40 percent. Certainly the West could afford to allocate an additional 2 to 5 percent of its gross national product to defense if this is essential to survival. An effort short of what is adequate may obtain no useful results at all. The last 10 to 20 percent of the resources expended may be the ones that really count and validate the entire investment.

Would it not be even more expensive for us and our allies to carry, in addition, the costs of non-atomic defenses required to reduce the pressure on our atomic defenses? It would be. Europe, for instance, probably cannot carry the full costs of both atomic and non-atomic defenses.

In order for Europe to acquire an adequate defensive posture within its means it will probably have to rely on the help that

tactical atomic firepower gives to the defense as well as on the backing of the strategic air power of the United States. But if we expect NATO to continue as a vital organization we should lose no time in spreading the air defense system to Europe. Nike batteries would offer substantial protection now, and later technological developments should improve it. And, above all, Europe must understand that war is not synonymous with Armageddon. We should make it clear that, if we all stick together, war is unlikely—that city-to-city air attacks are not part of our policy—and that, even in the event of atomic war, Soviet attacks on metropolitan centers would be only a final act of desperation and irrationality against which as effective defenses as are technologically possible will have been provided.

Would an action policy as described above serve to defend Asia and the Middle East? If we were clear in our minds that there is no easy way of defending Asia and the Middle East merely by statements threatening “massive retaliation,” we might find it easier to address ourselves to the realistic actions which would in fact strengthen those areas. But when all is said and done, we probably must continue to rely in part on our nuclear attack-defense superiority. The Soviets must be left in no doubt that if there were to be an outbreak of massive military aggression in either area, and if the situation could not be restored by mobilization of the non-atomic strengths available, rather than accept defeat without fighting, we will fight and from a superior nuclear attack-defense position.

VII

If some such action policy is one with which we could live, what should our declaratory policy be? This question should be decided only after we had taken the necessary measures to make our action policy operable and had fully consulted with our allies. It is quite possible that taking the actions necessary to implement such a policy would be more impressive to the Russians than any declaration we might make. The more we can bring our action policy and our declaratory policy into line with each other the more effective both become.

MOROCCO: THE END OF AN ERA

By Charles-André Julien

THE Moroccan crisis, which reached its climax in the period between the overthrow of the Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef on August 20, 1953, and the recognition by the French Government of his restoration on November 6, 1955, has in reality existed in a more or less acute form for the past 20 years. In 1934, the year in which France completed her occupation of Morocco, a group of native intellectuals drew up a "Plan for Moroccan Reforms" which they submitted to the French Premier. In it they denounced the Protectorate policy as racially and fiscally unjust, obscurantist, anti-liberal, colonialist and assimilationist. They demanded that the system of direct administration be abolished, that the country be administered "in the spirit of Moroccan unity" and that substantial numbers of Moroccan natives be included in all administrative councils. They proclaimed that the rôle of the protecting Power should be limited to that of technical adviser until such time as the protected country should be capable of governing itself.

These demands were regarded as revolutionary and their advocates as seditious. Yet in reality they did no more than seek to restore the true purpose of the Protectorate, which had legally established control but not direct administration. Propaganda in favor of reform, limited at first to the middle classes in the cities, spread to the workers and thence throughout the country to the farthest reaches of the Berber mountains. The administration, instead of trying to canalize the movement by satisfying at least some of its demands, chose to regard the "évolués" (the term used to describe the more advanced native elements) as upstarts without a following, and proclaimed itself the defender of the real interests of the Moroccan people, disregarding political reality and limiting itself to purely material considerations.

But the social conditions under which the country had been colonized made it just as impossible to satisfy its material as its political aspirations. This situation had its roots in the basic structure of the Protectorate. The traditional régime which Lyautey had found in Morocco in 1912 was in perfect consonance with his own profoundly royalist, aristocratic convictions: a theocratic sultan whose authority was undisputed, a hierarchic society in

which all power was in the hands of a hereditary ruling class from whose wealthy ranks were drawn the members of the *Makhzen*, as the government was called. He was determined that "people and things should remain as they were, that those born to power should continue to command and the rest obey." The *Makhzen* remained a tightly-closed caste, and the feudal régime of the caids and pashas continued in force throughout the country. The great caids of the Atlas, notably el Glaoui, were able to assure France of the adherence of the South, thanks to the almost regal powers they exercised over immense territories and their right to coerce, imprison or even execute their subjects with impunity.

The flaws in the system did not show as long as the magic of Lyautey's personality dominated the scene. But once he was gone, the reality became apparent. The European economy had upset the traditional economy of the Moors. European colonists had availed themselves of the best land and crowded the tribes back to the rocky edges of the plains. Free trade had broken up the former corporate structure and deprived the artisan class of its livelihood. Berbers from the mountains were streaming into the cities, where they were soon concentrated in the leprous suburbs called *bidonvilles* that sprang up in the shadow of the imposing buildings housing the great financial enterprises. The absolutism of the Sultan had been replaced by that of the Resident, the authority of the pashas and caids by that of the Native Affairs Officers and Civil Controllers. "The Frenchman," said Lyautey, "has direct administration in his blood." Officers and civil servants from metropolitan France monopolized even the lowliest functions, leaving to the Moroccan officials only license to exploit those under them and the shame of their subservience. The *Makhzen* opposed any innovation that might encroach upon its own privileges and rigorously excluded from its ranks the new élite that was being educated in the French universities.

Looked down upon by the French and deprived of an outlet for their energies, the native intellectuals lent a willing ear to the appeals of Cairo. The aims of Pan-Arab modernism were not limited to a return to the original purity of Islam unencumbered by the thaumaturgical trappings accumulated over the centuries. Rather, it called upon Moslems everywhere to work for the independence of their countries as a first step toward the establishment of a universal Islam, utilizing all the resources of Western scientific development. Thus it encouraged the Moroccans not

only to resist the authority of the protecting Power but to seek the overthrow of the internal structure of Moroccan society. It denounced with equal vigor the tyranny of the pashas and caids who served the French administration and the exploitation of the people's credulity by the religious brotherhoods and marabouts who docilely lent themselves to the purposes of the Residency.

Despite repression, nationalism continued to grow in strength until the outbreak of the war, when the defeat of France quickened the hope that liberation was finally at hand. The nationalist movement put its faith in God and ben Yussef, Sultan Mohammed V. Taking advantage of the opportunity which the state of war offered him, the young sovereign had asserted his true personality. Calm, self-contained, reflective by nature, exercising the divine authority vested in him as a *sherif* or descendant of the Prophet, he was regarded as the defender of the aspirations of his people. In him they saw the Sherifian authority restored to its rightful dignity with the support of the qualified representatives of the nation. When the war was over, the protecting Power found that although it was no longer confronted with the people's open opposition (which had been officially disavowed by the Sultan) the palace was nevertheless actually in sympathy with the prevailing mood. The battle-lines had been drawn, and there could now be no turning back.

On one side the Residency, supported by the French colonists, jealously defended the prerogatives of these latter; on the other side the Sultan, symbol of the Moroccan people, propounded the right of his country gradually to attain the status of a free and sovereign state. The colonists, convinced that "the only thing a Moor understands is force," could not conceive of any régime but an authoritarian paternalism doling out such meagre concessions as were compatible with their own privileges. The wealthy landowners, who kept their farmhands on starvation wages and paid mere token taxes to the Government, were the most intransigent of all. A promising experiment in peasant organization through the use of tractors owned collectively by the tribe aroused the opposition of the Europeans in the Meknes region, who feared to see the living conditions of the fellah improved, and so had to be abandoned in 1949. The majority of businessmen resisted any changes that might jeopardize their investments. The Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, which has such an influence over the entire Moroccan economy, threw its weight on the

conservative side. Only in the mining industry was there any realization that concessions must be made, and it was consequently regarded as a traitor to the French cause. The city-dwellers, coming from metropolitan France or Algeria, showed open contempt and hostility toward the Moroccans, the worst offenders in this respect being the "petits blancs" from the Mediterranean coasts; these hated the natives all the more because they resembled them in their poverty. Free from the restraints of any regular political authority, the French in Morocco obeyed only those instincts of self-preservation which led them in all good faith to identify their privileges with the general welfare. Only the administration could have introduced order and moderation. However, it was thoroughly imbued with the local prejudices and became helpless in the face of demands which it could neither understand nor satisfy. It could not adapt itself to the changing situation. Gradually it lost faith and turned to the police régime as its only safeguard.

The nationalists, gradually building up their anti-colonial organization, looked to the United States for support. But their hopes were doomed to bitter disappointment, and they came to have as little faith in the Americans as in the United Nations. Finally they reached the conclusion that they, like the Syrians and Lebanese, could not count on any efforts but their own. In December 1943 they formed the Independence Party (Hizb el-Istiqlal), composed primarily of intellectuals and businessmen with a small number of workers and peasants. Basing itself on the Atlantic Charter, the Istiqlal demanded "the independence of Morocco in its territorial integrity, under the leadership of H. M. Sidi Mohammed ben Yusef, whom God glorify," and called upon the Sultan himself to establish "a democratic régime comparable to the régimes adopted in the Moslem countries of the Orient, guaranteeing the rights of all elements and classes of Moroccan society and defining the duties of every citizen." At the same time another party was formed, the Democratic Independence Party (P.D.I.), which had a similar program but did not rule out all contacts with the authorities. The nationalist demands were supported by public demonstrations and riots and these were followed by mass arrests. The situation was all the more serious in that nationalist sentiment was taking its directives and obtaining its resources from the palace of the Sultan himself, which was for the most part not subject to surveillance.

Mohammed V, born in 1910, was proving himself to be a statesman of the first order. Modern in his Arabism, exemplary in his piety, and given by nature to meditation, he condemned the innovations of the religious brotherhoods and maraboutism. He was deeply interested in scientific progress, and expressed to President Roosevelt his regret that his own country had not produced more engineers and technicians. Convinced that if a modern sovereign is to be able to resist pressure from the Western Powers he must have a sound European education, he sent his children to study in French schools. The eldest of his four daughters has taken an active part in the campaign for the emancipation of women, making radio addresses in which she urges the women of Morocco to seek "an education at once traditional and modern," dispensing with the veil, going about freely in public and engaging in sports. The imperial family by its attachment to the legacy of the past coupled with its bold modernity of outlook has become a symbol of Morocco; in that symbol the Berber in the mountains and the Arab in the plains recognizes his own image. It was from this unanimous trust that the Sultan drew the strength to demand the end of the Protectorate and propose a firmer and sounder basis for Franco-Moroccan relations.

The French Government refused all concessions, and Mohammed V was accused of seeking to restore the despotism of medieval times. To put an end to the conflict, Foreign Minister Bidault replaced the liberal Resident with General Juin. The latter, born in Algeria in humble circumstances, shared congenitally, so to speak, the prevailing prejudices about the ineptitude of the Arabs and the need for stern rule. Lacking a sense of politics, he was incapable of arriving at an honorable compromise between the two sides. He tried to break the Istiqlal by muzzling the Arab press, imprisoning the more active members of the organization and expelling from the Grand Council (elected representative assembly) those who did not share his opinions. But there was still the Sultan, who refused to bow to the General's demands. Determined to break his resistance, the Resident turned to el Glaoui, the great caid of the Atlas who was ever ready to do the bidding of the administration. A singular "friend of France" indeed was this feudal lord who ruled arbitrarily over nearly a third of the population of Morocco. He expropriated the tribes which did not pay him sufficient tribute and left his subjects only the choice between poverty and exile. Suddenly this righteous caid,

at a signal from the General, felt the stirrings of the apostle's vocation in his breast. He it was who must defend the orthodoxy which had been made a thing of mockery by the Imam of Imams. In a talk with Mohammed V on December 21, 1950, he shouted at him, "You are not the Sultan of Morocco, you are the Sultan of the Istiqlal, and you are leading the empire to catastrophe!"

The General, failing to elicit from the Sultan any condemnation of the Istiqlal, decided to play his hand. At his orders the Civil Controllers, several of whom acted reluctantly in this case, summoned the horsemen of the tribes to Fez and Rabat under one pretext or another. This mobilization was hailed by the Resident as "a genuine manifestation by all Morocco of the trend of opinion among the noble Moroccan people." A replacement for the Sultan had even been prearranged in the person of Moulay Arafa. Under duress and because he wanted to avoid bloodshed, Sidi Mohammed signed a statement condemning "the subversive ideology of violence" and rendering homage to "the generous action of the French Republic." The Grand Vizier denounced the Istiqlal by name. As soon as the Sultan's signature had been obtained, the tribesmen, totally ignorant of what had happened, were disbanded and sent home. In the days that followed the Sultan received a flood of petitions, whose spontaneity was about as genuine as that of the "demonstration," all excoriating the Istiqlal. But the position of the Resident was still precarious. The Sherif had suffered a humiliation which was resented by Moslems the world over, and his prestige was actually enhanced by the experience. The denunciations against the Istiqlal did not have the slightest effect on public opinion. Soon the leading French colonist in Meknes was reproaching the Resident for having left the job half finished, and the opinion was widely expressed among the settlers that the way to insure peace for the next 20 years was to overthrow the Sultan and take stern measures against tens of thousands of Moroccans. Everywhere among the French there was regret that the coup had been abortive.

General Guillaume, who succeeded General Juin in August 1951, failed completely to persuade the Sultan to sign the *dahirs* in which the Residency set forth the limited reforms it was willing to admit. As a result, the press in France and abroad accused Mohammed V of being stubbornly opposed to the evolution of Morocco. Actually the question was not as simple as that. The French Government proposed the creation of municipalities in

which the French, who were foreigners under the law, would have enjoyed the same status as Moroccans. There was no guarantee of the fairness of the elections. The Sultan knew very well that in Algeria democratic representation was a mere façade, that outside the big towns native elections were decided by the officials, who saw to it that the candidate of their choice was put in office regardless of the votes cast. In the absence of any native control over the election machinery, the voting became a farce. In the legal sphere the Residency proposed certain favorable measures but refused to abolish the judicial right of the pashas, who were officials of the administration, to condemn to three months' imprisonment any suspect named by the Civil Controllers. As regards the labor unions, it was stipulated that their secretaries must be French. The Sultan's rejection of these "reforms" was based on the conviction that they constituted a step backward for Moroccan autonomy and a recognition of co-sovereignty to which he could not consent.

Mohammed V did not, however, refuse to study new agreements which would establish bonds of interdependence between France and Morocco. In March 1953 he asked me to approach the French Government unofficially with a proposal that his eldest son, Prince Moulay Hassan, should undertake negotiations on this matter. On March 18, accompanied by the President of the Assembly of the French Union, I transmitted these suggestions to the Premier, René Mayer. No answer was received. The Residency was particularly opposed to such a plan because from January 1953 on General Guillaume was convinced that the only possible solution would be the replacement of the sovereign. In his opposition to the Sultan he was supported by the two reactionary forces of feudalism represented by el Glaoui and of maraboutism represented by the Sherif el Kittani, leader of the brotherhood. A "repeat performance" of the Berber manifestation of 1951 was organized, and the Government was persuaded that a civil war between the city-dwellers and mountaineers was imminent.

The Sultan expressed his uneasiness in a message dated August 11 to the President of the Republic in which he denounced "the subversive dealings in which certain agents of the authorities were engaging in Morocco." He further drew the attention of the French Government and of public opinion to the encouragement given by "certain French authorities in the Protectorate to a factitious, so-called Francophile opposition directed against the Im-

perial Palace on both the temporal and the spiritual level." But the die was cast. In vain did Sidi Mohammed on August 13 accede to all the proposals of General Guillaume, including the participation of the French in the Sherifian administration. The high officials of Morocco, executing the will of Marshal Juin and the powerful *colons*, were already preparing for the final scene of the drama. At their instigation el Glaoui gathered together at Marrakech the pashas, caids and notables of the tribes for the proclamation of a new Sultan. Foreign Minister Bidault issued formal orders to invite el Glaoui to remain calm and avoid any kind of pronunciamento, but no heed was paid to these directives. Instead, on August 20, at the siesta hour armored cars surrounded the palace in Rabat. The Sultan and the crown prince, dressed in pajamas, were taken as prisoners to the nearest airplane and flown to Corsica, there to await transfer to Madagascar. The Council of Ministers, confronted with a fait accompli, ratified it. M. Bidault not only refused to punish the guilty parties, but in fact now became the defender of the very measure which he formerly so vigorously opposed. A hasty summons was sent to ben Arafa, who had been selected for just such a contingency two years earlier. But his nomination would not be valid unless approved by the Council of Ulemas, the learned doctors of Fez, who were favorable to ben Yussef. To obtain their consent, the Residency had them locked up until they should sign the necessary document. The most venerable among them, a man 78 years old, refused. He was exiled to the far south, but his opposition rendered the decision void, for Moslem law requires unanimity in such a case. The French population of Morocco almost without exception exulted. In France, apart from the deputies of the left and a few intellectuals, among them the Roman Catholic writer François Mauriac, public opinion was convinced by the press that the act had been justified and would be beneficial.

The new Sultan was a respectable, timid, characterless old man, ready to sign without reading them the *dahirs* presented by the Resident. He was regarded by the people as a usurper. The faithful refused to pray in his name and the mosques were deserted, in spite of police pressure. Thus the Moroccans became accustomed to dissociating the religious power of the Sultan in his capacity as Imam, which they did not recognize, from his temporal power, which he was unable to exercise. The Residency might have tried to invest ben Arafa with a certain prestige by

having him ratify social measures that would have been popular. But those who had overthrown ben Yussef allegedly because he was opposed to reform were the very ones who, firmly anchored in their privileges, had no desire to see any concessions made. The only effective measure taken was the setting up of a council of viziers and directors, which actually transferred the powers of the Sultan to the administration. Morocco was falling back from the status of a protectorate to that of a colony. The Residency arrested thousands not only of the Istiqlal but of the Moroccan intelligentsia. An investigator sent by M. Mendès-France found children eight years old in jail. The majority of those whose education or economic status might have permitted them to make some fruitful contact with France were in prisons or concentration camps. The only ones left at large to manifest their sympathy with the dethroned Sultan were the *lumpen proletariat* of Casablanca, and it was unquestionably among them that terrorism, the infantile expression of nationalism, was born.

Thus a new form of resistance, revolutionary and xenophobic, made its appearance. Its fury was directed primarily against Moroccans in the service of the Protectorate, especially the police. On March 5, 1954, the "Sultan of the French" was wounded by a grenade hurled at him in a mosque in Marrakech, the city of el Glaoui. From then on ben Arafa lived immured in his palace, forced to remain on the throne by those who had made him Sultan. Next, well-known Europeans were assassinated, and certain French groups began to organize a counterterrorism. After executing nationalists who were still at liberty, they killed a French industrialist, M. Lemaigre-Dubreuil, who was guilty of establishing a newspaper advocating a Franco-Moroccan rapprochement. This occurred in Casablanca on June 2, 1955. A wave of indignation swept France. An investigation conducted by the Sûreté Nationale led to the arrest of a former police inspector and other suspects who confessed that they had belonged to a gang responsible for several outrages. The Government finally recognized the necessity for reestablishing order and revising an administration which had rigorously punished the natives but had done nothing to restrain the French terrorists. On July 14, one week after the arrival of the new Resident, Gilbert Grandval, six Europeans were killed and thirty wounded by a bomb set off on the terrace of a Casablanca café. Passions were now aroused to the highest pitch. The colonialists opposed to Grandval, a man

of character and strong will, refused to recognize him as a Frenchman because he was Jewish. They called him a traitor in the pay of ben Yussef because the Moroccans had acclaimed him on his arrival. On his way to an official ceremony in the cathedral veterans barred his entry and he had to push aside the flags which were thrown across his path. The French crowds insulted him, spat in his face and tore the epaulets from his uniform, in full view of the police. In many towns which he visited, the police fired on the crowd as it linked his name with that of ben Yussef. But the Resident did not weaken in his efforts, and he would undoubtedly have succeeded if the government whose orders he was carrying out had not abruptly disowned him.

Premier Edgar Faure is one of those statesmen who believe that everything can be settled by adroit manœuvring. Confronted with a reactionary majority in the National Assembly fiercely devoted to the colonialist cause, he chose to sacrifice a loyal and courageous official rather than risk the downfall of his government. Grandval proposed the abdication of ben Arafa with the latter's consent, the constitution of a regency council with the approval of Sidi Mohammed, and the exiled Sultan's return to France and renunciation of the throne. He wanted to solve the crisis before the anniversary of the overthrow of the Sultan, for, as he declared to the Government, "Time is blood." The tragic events that followed proved him more right than Foreign Minister Pinay, who did not admit the necessity for a time limit. August 20 was marked by a revolt of the Berbers of Zayan in the Middle Atlas, who killed 50 Europeans at Oued Zem. On the same day sanguinary riots broke out in Algeria. The delays and evasions in Paris were paid for in hundreds of deaths. The French of Morocco, shrugging off their own responsibility, blamed everything on Grandval and loudly demanded his recall. Premier Faure sought a way out of the impasse by summoning a committee of five ministers to meet at Aix-les-Bains on August 22 and hear the representatives of French and native opinion. In the end they were obliged to accept Grandval's plan, even though a new Resident, General Boyer de Latour, was named to replace him.

Hostile to the policies of Grandval and the Government, the General took the part of the *colons* as represented by the excitable group which called itself "Présence Française." He restored officials dismissed by Grandval, cancelled many of his appointments, permitted the release of the majority of Frenchmen ar-

rested on presumption of crime and hesitated to carry out the orders received from Paris. The result was a most extraordinary tragicomedy. Certain ministers began giving the Resident orders contradicting those of the Premier, who did nothing to stop them. Influential deputies hurried to Rabat to incite ben Arafa to resistance. A camarilla in Paris headed by General Juin in alliance with "Présence Française" drew up the protests to be uttered by el Glaoui and organized resistance to the Government's policy. The Minister of War, General Koenig, did not hide the fact that he was hostile to that policy. Diplomats in Rabat who tried to carry out the instructions of the Government were disavowed by the Resident and insulted by the generals. "Présence Française" gave orders to the Residency and organized a military guard around the palace. The authorities loyal to the Government had to resort to elaborate ruses in order to reach the presence of the Sultan.

Ben Arafa, whose only wish by this time was to depart, finally arrived in Tangier on October 1. General de Latour, however, contrary to the decision of the French Government, made the retiring Sultan sign a statement merely delegating his powers instead of, as expected, nominating a regency council. In this way he retained his prerogatives as sultan and made any understanding with ben Youssef impossible. Other difficulties arose within the Cabinet and between it and the Residency when the Government persisted in requiring the establishment of the regency council. General de Latour wanted to weight it on the side of the traditionalists under el Glaoui and exclude the former Pasha of Sefrou, Si Bekkai, a onetime officer of the French Army who had lost a leg in the Battle of Verdun. His unforgivable crime was that he had resigned rather than serve under ben Arafa. A compromise was painfully arrived at on October 15.

Everyone thought the worst was over when suddenly like a clap of thunder the news came on October 25 of el Glaoui's switch to the former Sultan. The astute caid who had so long served the interests of the French administration knew that he could not risk further the hazards of opposition from his own forces. He realized that the game was up, and wanted at all costs to preserve for his family their lordship over the tribes, now entirely rallied to the side of ben Youssef. His recantation was enthusiastically hailed by the Moroccans, who did not fail to grasp its significance. For it dispelled once and for all the legend

of the two Moroccos, the fiction of the loyalty of the great caids and the importance of the religious brotherhoods. Pashas, caids and religious leaders with el Kittani at their head fell over each other in their haste to render homage to ben Yussef.

Back in Paris, ben Yussef was able to savor his triumph to the full. No longer was there any question of renouncing the throne. Instead, General de Latour himself was urgently calling for his presence in Rabat, hoping it would counteract the Spanish-encouraged uprisings in the Rif. His claims, so lately called subversive, were now recognized as constituting solid grounds for discussion. The French Government agreed that Morocco should become a sovereign state linked to France by bonds of interdependence. French officials in Morocco threw themselves on their Moorish friends and begged them to testify to the purity of their dedication to ben Yussef. "Présence Française" was the first to declare its adherence. Hundreds of Moroccans who had never left the country before, many of them elderly, flew to France to render homage to their sovereign. The most zealous among them were the great caids and religious leaders who had been so deeply implicated in the plots against him. El Glaoui himself, after cooling his heels for an hour in an antechamber among hoards of other visitors, was finally admitted for a three-and-a-half-minute audience. Crawling on his hands and knees to the feet of the Sultan, he kissed the toe of his *babouche* under a merciless barrage of 30 cameras. Then he invoked the curse of heaven against those who had led him astray. The Sultan smilingly pardoned him; but he refused to receive the Sherif el Kittani.

Throughout, the Sultan has displayed an unruffled serenity. He refuses to speak of the past, wishing rather to concentrate on restoring the unity of Morocco and establishing a lasting friendship with France. The events of the past two years, however, have not yet run their full course. Seldom has a colonial policy received such a setback. The French Government, instead of negotiating with ben Yussef when it still held the trump cards, as many informed advisers recommended, stubbornly pursued a negative and futile course. At the same time its representatives allowed ben Arafa to be discredited. The bankruptcy of its policies is plainly revealed, especially those recommended by the generals trained in the school of native affairs. French public opinion has become aware for the first time that the real rulers of Morocco were not the ministers or the Resident but the highly-placed

local officials and the great economic interests of which they were the spokesmen. For the first time a colonial question will be a primary issue in the elections.

Even more important is the transformation taking place in Morocco itself, where the crisis has caused a nation to catch up on a century of experience in two years. The unveiled women filing past the coffin of Lemaigre-Dubreuil were one sign of that revolution. Women were on the verge of taking part in the fighting on the streets, and it will be difficult indeed to force them back into their old position. The Sultan has realized the necessity for establishing a constitutional monarchy, but his task will not be easy. The pardon he has granted to his enemies will not sit well with the members of the Istiqlal who paid for their own loyalty by going to prison and who have seen many of their comrades die. The habits instilled by terrorism will not easily be given up by the young people, especially if Cairo urges them to intransigence. The Democratic Independence Party, seeking to offset the numerical superiority of the Istiqlal, is enrolling the former Arafists *en masse*. The support of the powerful caids, encouraged by high French officials, will tend to prolong the old feudal system; but this is quite unacceptable to the younger generation.

The negotiations aimed at establishing sovereignty and interdependence will doubtless be thorny. When the shock of recent events is abated, the French diplomats will be tempted to have recourse to juridical quibbling in the hope of impeding the execution of the general commitments entered into by the Government. Internationally, Spain is equally the loser. She supported ben Yussef as a means of opposing France. But the establishment of an independent Morocco will lead the Sultan to claim Spanish Morocco, of which he is also the sovereign. It is fortunate that in such circumstances the central figure is a man who is firm in his convictions and cannot be bought by the highest bidder. In the days to come the prestige of ben Yussef will doubtless be unequalled in the Moslem world. If France is willing to play fair and aid him in his task, at the same time adopting a bold policy in Algeria, peace may well be restored not only in Morocco but throughout North Africa.

THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY SINCE STALIN

By Abram Bergson

STALIN'S successors began their tenure with an unusual economic inheritance. Under the dictator's five-year plans, the Russians had achieved very uneven results. Most notably they created a great industrial establishment, but were able to obtain only limited material rewards. Although Stalin meant us not to know many of the magnitudes, I believe we can gauge the main trends. In 1952, the dictator's next-to-last year, Soviet industry produced about 6.5 times as much as it did at the beginning of the five-year plans in 1928. In heavy industries the gains were even greater. Steel production increased eightfold to 34.5 million tons, coal 8.5 times to 301 million tons, and electric power 23 times to 116 billion kilowatt hours. In a quarter-century the U.S.S.R. became the world's second industrial Power.

Although the increase in industrial output consisted chiefly of "heavy" goods, the Russians probably produced more manufactured consumer goods per capita in 1952 than in 1928. They produced much more paper, soap and numerous other products. But the ordinary Russian still had to clothe himself mainly in cotton (only one yard of woolen cloth was produced per capita in 1952) and could buy only 1.1 pairs of shoes yearly. The Russians are accustomed to hearing from their government complaints about the inferior quality of these goods.

In Stalin's last years the average Russian ate a good deal more fish than he did in 1928, and more potatoes and perhaps more grain. He ate a good deal less milk, meat and other animal products. Of these, he had eaten little enough to begin with. Allowing for an increase of 20-25 percent in the population, we can see the trends in the consumption of animal products from the famous livestock figures reported by Khrushchev in 1953:¹

SOVIET HERDS, IN MILLIONS

	<i>Jan. 1, 1928</i>	<i>Jan. 1, 1953</i>
Cattle	66.8	56.6
Hogs	27.7	28.5
Sheep and goats	114.6	109.9

¹ Khrushchev's figures for prewar as well as postwar years refer, I believe, to the livestock herds within the post-World War II Soviet boundaries. Accordingly, the increase in population has been estimated for the same area.

In 1928 the city dweller occupied an average of 7.1 square yards of floor space. In 1952 this living space had shrunk to 4.7–5.3 square yards.

After taxes and bond deductions, the industrial worker with an average money wage could buy 10 percent less goods in 1952 than in 1928. This is in terms of a 1937 “market basket.” In terms of a 1928 “market basket” containing more meat and other goods that later became scarce, the cut in “real” wages was 37 percent.² Many women went to work in industry for the first time under the five-year plans, so relatively more breadwinners supported the urban population in 1952 than in 1928. For this reason, the city dwellers fared better than the figures on “real” wages might indicate.

With the limited total supplies available, if the industrial worker did not prosper the farmer could not either. Moreover, the government had to restrict the farmers’ consumption through an extraordinary exchange. Under the five-year plans, the city population grew apace. In order to care for these people and to meet other commercial needs, Stalin called on his collective and state farmers to provide him with these supplies:

FARM “MARKETINGS”

(in million tons)

	1926–27	1952–53
Grain	10.3	40.4
Potatoes	3.0	12.5
Milk	4.3	13.2
Meat (live wt.)	2.4	5.0

With few if any less mouths to feed in 1953 than in 1927,³ the farmers had to part with much of the additional supplies of potatoes they had been able to produce and practically all or more than all of their increase in grain. (The “marketings,” however, probably covered some grain shipments to deficit farm areas.) The total output of milk and meat increased little if at all. In these cases, therefore, the “marketings” meant corresponding cuts in the farmers’ consumption.

The urban needs for manufactures were relatively high, so the

² Janet Chapman, “Real Wages in the Soviet Union, 1928–52,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, May 1954.

³ The farm population decreased in the prewar years, but the addition of new territories in 1939 and after was an offset. The *rural* (i.e. non-urban) population *increased* from 121,000,000 in 1927 to about 129,000,000 in 1953.

government could offer the farmer only limited quantities of these goods in return for his sacrifices. Necessarily the "terms of trade" turned sharply against agriculture. Under the government's complex procurement system, the peasant could sell generally very limited quantities of produce on the free collective farm market. For these he could obtain terms fully comparable to the greatly increased prices which the government charged in its state shops for manufactures. Most of the marketings were to the government, and these largely on an obligatory basis. For such deliveries, the government held prices far below those for manufactures.

As regards their final status, the industrial worker gained on the farmer in Stalin's last years. Possibly in order finally to honor a long-standing obligation to the proletarian class which was after all the ultimate sovereign, or possibly merely in order to compensate them for excessive wartime suffering—we cannot know the reason—the dictator at the end rapidly increased the "real" wages of industrial workers from levels far below even the limited 1952 standards. He obtained the needed supplies partly from the expanding consumer goods industries and partly through more onerous exactions from agriculture. The increase in "real" wages was accomplished through a series of price cuts. Since the peasant could also buy more cheaply, the exactions were ameliorated in his case by the more favorable terms.

II

Stalin died on March 5, 1953. One wonders what he would have done if he had continued where he left off. His successors have been grappling ever since with problems emerging from the trends that have been described.

In August 1953, Premier Malenkov told the Supreme Soviet that "heavy industry is the fundamental basis of our Socialist economy, for without its growth it is impossible to assure the further growth of light industry, the growth of the productive forces of agriculture and to strengthen the defense capacity of our country." He also declared that "a task that cannot be postponed is to increase sharply in two or three years the population's supply of food and manufactures." Malenkov resigned his premiership on February 8, 1955. "The whole activity of the Communist Party and of the Soviet state," his successor told the Supreme Soviet the next day, "is subordinated to the lofty task of improving by every means the life of the workers. . . . The preferential develop-

ment of heavy industry . . . corresponds to the vital interests of the Soviet state and our people." What policies has the new government pursued?

In their two and one-half years at the summit, Khrushchev and his colleagues have initiated a whole series of measures to increase farm output rapidly. Under Malenkov, they also attempted to accelerate the production of manufactured consumer goods and housing construction. While pursuing these endeavors, they have sought to avoid any undue slackening of industrial growth. If Malenkov had had the opportunity to try to fulfill the consumer goods targets he set for 1956 he might have gone somewhat further than he did in limiting the capital investments needed in heavy industry for future industrial growth. One is free to conjecture that in later years he might have gone still further. In the course of his brief tenure, however, he did not go very far. From Minister of Finance Zverev's annual budget messages of April 22, 1954, and February 3, 1955, and from other official reports, we can surmise that the new government reduced slightly in 1953 and raised slightly in 1954 the share of the national income going to fixed capital investments in the economy as a whole.⁴ In 1953 it reduced little if at all the share of this investment going to heavy industry. It planned in 1954 to cut this branch's share by a few percent, and it may have done so. These were the main trends under Malenkov. Under the financial plan for 1955, which the Government approved the day before Malenkov's resignation, but after it had determined on its post-Malenkov course, the proportion of the national income going to fixed capital investment may have been slightly reduced again. If heavy industry's share of the total was actually reduced in 1954, the cut was to be made good under the plan for 1955.

Over the entire period the government tended to allot to heavy industry about two-fifths or more of its investments in the entire economy. In the United States we have usually devoted one-fourth or less of our total fixed capital investments to *all* industry.

While the Soviet régime has limited its efforts in agriculture in this way, it invested in this branch in 1953 out of its own resources only 12 billion rubles or less than one-sixth of the sum going to heavy industry. No doubt it was able in 1954 to increase sharply its appropriation to this limited claimant, although perhaps not

⁴ I am indebted to Mr. Norman Kaplan for aid in this connection. Reference should be made also to R. W. Davies, "Investment-Consumption Controversy," *Soviet Studies*, July 1955.

to the planned total of 21 billion rubles. Despite Zverev's reticence, I believe the government is continuing its allotments at a fairly high level. The plan for 1955 called in addition for the collective farms to invest out of their resources 18 billion rubles, compared with the 12 billions they had invested in 1953.

With the sums at his disposal Khrushchev has been able to initiate many new projects, including mainly a complex program adopted in the summer and fall of 1953 to raise the output on existing farms; a great campaign begun in March 1954 and accelerated in August 1954 to expand the grain-sown area by the use of virgin and idle lands in the East; and a second great campaign begun in January 1955 to extend the cultivation of fodder corn chiefly at the expense of low-yielding grain crops and grasses.

As new programs have been undertaken, the government has persisted in varying degrees with measures initiated previously. It sharply increased its prices to the peasant in 1953, for example, and has maintained them at their new high levels since, although it is not continuing the efforts begun under Malenkov to increase quickly the output of manufactures that the peasant buys. Under commitments made in 1953, the government has been supplying agriculture with considerable quantities of machinery, but (contrary to the original expectation) much of this is now going to the new lands. By 1954 it had raised the output of mineral fertilizer by 26 percent over the 5 or 6 million tons produced in 1952. In view of Khrushchev's remarks at the conference of South-eastern farm workers on March 19, 1955, one wonders nevertheless whether he is still pursuing the ambitious goal announced in 1953 to increase fertilizer output more than threefold by 1959 and more than five times by 1964: "In order to increase grain production up to the needed amounts under the existing distribution of crops it is necessary to raise the yields sharply. And for this it is necessary to increase fertilizer production by several times, which requires enormous capital investments in the chemical industry. But we can achieve this aim within a shorter period of time and with a smaller expenditure of funds, if we pay particular attention to corn."

The current goal of the new lands program is to increase the sown area by a total of from 69,000,000 to 74,000,000 acres by 1956. The new acreage, which is to be seeded mainly although not exclusively to grain, is equal to more than one-fourth of the total grain area in all of Russia in 1953. The entire wheat area of

the United States at its peak in 1949 was 76 million acres. On September 12, 1955, *Pravda* reported that Russia's farmers already had plowed up 72 million acres under this program. The corn acreage is to increase from 9 million acres in 1953 to 69 million acres in 1960. Nearly 45 million acres had been planted to corn by the summer of 1955.

III

Under his five-year plans, Stalin's overriding concern was industrial growth. Yet, notwithstanding his meager achievements in agriculture, he launched in his lifetime a number of large projects to accelerate farm production. He certainly initiated collectivization chiefly in order to gain control of agriculture, especially the disposition of the harvest; but he hoped also to raise output, and when he was confronted instead with unparalleled losses, he hastily allotted more capital to this branch (possibly to a very limited extent at the expense of heavy industry) in order to ease its distress. Our statistical barometers do not register any similar change in course in the aftermath of war, but the dictator's last years saw the launching and substantial implementation of a great long-term shelter belt project and also some progress under plans for the wholesale reconstruction and extension of the Soviet irrigation system. Stalin had many reasons to merge the 254,000 collective farms of 1950 into the 97,000 of October 1952; no doubt a desire to improve efficiency and raise output played a rôle.

Khrushchev is seeking to continue with accelerated industrialization. He is also striving far more urgently than Stalin ever did to raise farm production to new high levels. Why is he so impatient in this regard? The reasons must be complex. A new government has decided at long last to improve the diet of a people whose numbers are growing by 1.5 percent or 3,000,000 a year. Since it also wishes to continue rapid industrial growth, it must feed a city population that is increasing by 4.5 percent or 3,500,000 a year.⁵ In his report of September 3, 1953, Khrushchev cited "the violation of the principle of material self-interest" as a major factor in the lag in agriculture, and no one at all familiar with the facts will dissent. The government has decided that it cannot continue indefinitely to feed new city dwellers, as Stalin did, pri-

⁵ The total city population was around 80,000,000 in 1953. In his January 25, 1955, report to the Central Committee, Khrushchev revealed that the city population had increased by approximately 17,000,000 in the previous five years.

marily at the peasant's expense. At least for a time, it must try to do this mainly by increasing total output. While endeavoring to feed his people better generally, Khrushchev is also seeking a new agricultural basis for accelerated industrialization.

In trying to raise output, the government initially stressed better terms for the peasant. Although it has maintained the increased prices that were granted under Malenkov, it is now attempting to raise farm output chiefly through other more radical measures. In this way, it may avoid even the limited cuts in investments in heavy industry that Malenkov made. Without undue reliance on imports, light industry in any case might easily outstrip its agricultural raw material base.

We must not read into Khrushchev's sense of urgency any evidence that there is any extreme public destitution. Khrushchev must be more concerned than Stalin was to raise living standards. He is still striving, but in changed circumstances, "to overtake and outstrip" the advanced capitalist countries, "technically and economically." For a time agriculture must participate more actively with industry in the great contest.

Malenkov's New Course might have become newer as it aged; but it was not really very new, and there is now even less reason than before to think that any serious break with the past was ever intended. Under Bulganin the government's path is surely rather old, although there are still novel aspects.

In the great Party debates on economics in the late twenties, the Right Deviation under Bukharin argued that industry could not progress in sharp disproportion to agriculture. The government could industrialize only so far as, through the offering of sufficiently favorable terms, it could obtain from agriculture the market surpluses needed to feed the growing cities. Bukharin was right under his assumption of a market relation between the government and the peasant. But Stalin collectivized agriculture, and Bukharin was wrong in fact. Is Khrushchev nevertheless not confronted with Bukharin's problem in a new guise?

If we turn with heightened interest to consider the recent accomplishments and prospects we must do so cautiously. The government so far has not reduced materially its capital allocations to heavy industry. Even if his present exertions prove unsuccessful, Khrushchev still might have many cards to play before accelerated industrialization could be seriously threatened in agriculture.

IV

We can measure only very roughly the recent trends in Soviet industrial production. Since 1950 output has grown at about these yearly rates (measured in percent).⁶

1950-51	15.0-16
1951-52	8.7-11
1952-53	10.4-12
1953-54	9.4-13

The rate of growth since 1951 probably has been below—although not far below—the extraordinary rates which Stalin achieved under his first two five-year plans. The high 1950-51 increase represents a decline from even higher tempos that were realized in earlier postwar years when reconstruction was in full swing.

In Stalin's last few years, consumer goods industries may have grown a little more slowly than heavy industries. They may have grown a little more rapidly than heavy industries in 1953 and 1954.⁷

The higher of the two figures cited above for the growth of total industrial output for years since 1950 are Soviet official claims, which for a reason just explained in a footnote must be considered more seriously than similar data have been in the past. On February 9, 1955, Bulganin reported to the Supreme Soviet a 1955 goal to increase industrial output by 9 percent. The reduction from previous tempos, I believe, was due primarily to a planned retardation of light industry. The Central Statistical Administration has since claimed an actual increase in total industrial output in the first half of 1955 of 12 percent over the first half of 1954. Through the first half of 1955, therefore, there was no slackening to speak of in the growth of industry generally, although heavy industry must have regained its former superiority over consumer goods.

⁶ The figure cited in Section I on the increase in industrial output under Stalin, and the lower rates shown here for 1950-54, are from Donald Hodgman, "Soviet Industrial Production 1928-51," (Cambridge, Mass., 1954, p. 89, 134). Hodgman's calculations refer to "large scale" industry. On the basis of an unpublished estimate of Richard Moorsteen, I reduced his 1928-37 index by one-fifth in order to make it represent "small scale" industry as well. Hodgman extends his calculations only to 1953. I have obtained the corresponding 1953-54 increase by the use of his methods. For recent years Hodgman had to rely on only a limited sample of Soviet production data for different industries. Soviet official measures of total output show the higher increases shown in the text for the years 1950-54. The Soviet calculations for 1950 and after are now in terms of 1952 ruble prices. For this reason they no longer seem open to the serious criticisms that were raised against them in their earlier "1926-27 ruble" version.

⁷ Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

Stalin's successors have been less frank about agricultural progress under their rule than about that under Stalin's. No doubt they have made limited gains. The Government acknowledges that farm output fell by 3.5 percent in Stalin's last two years. The grain harvest of 1953 reportedly was "close to" that of 1952 and that of 1954 was "higher than" that of 1953. The harvest of 1955 was "significantly greater than in past years," although below plan. Other crops in 1953 were either "approximately the same as" or by unspecified amounts "higher than" in 1952; and the story is much the same for 1954 compared with 1953. From 1952 to 1954 cotton increased an estimated 3 percent.

In January 1953 cattle herds were smaller than in January 1951, while there were more sheep and goats and more hogs. From October 1953 to October 1954 the different herds increased by 3, 7 and (in the case of sheep only) 2 percent. Cow and sheep herds both grew by 6 percent from July 1954 to July 1955, while hog numbers remained the same and other herds are unreported. Partly through an increase in yields, collective farms (which own about one-third of Russia's cows) produced 52 percent more milk in the period October 1954-July 1955 than they had in the corresponding interval two years before. Addressing the people of Sevastopol on October 14, 1955, Khrushchev could report that "the collectively owned livestock is growing and as a result the production and procurement of meat, milk and other animal products have expanded significantly, although there is still rather little of them."

Some new lands in the East already yielded a grain harvest in 1954, and this tended to offset losses in the Ukraine and Volga basin due to a drought. In 1955 the new lands in turn experienced a drought. The harvest in the U.S.S.R. as a whole increased again despite this.

We do not know how the government has divided the recent gains in farm output between city and country. Obviously it has experienced difficulties, at least in the case of foodstuffs, in its attempts not merely to maintain but raise urban living standards. One of its first acts in 1953 was to continue the series of annual price cuts that Stalin had initiated in 1948. Except for milk, it reduced markedly the prices of foods along with those of manufactures. Later in the year the government also cut compulsory public bond subscriptions. In order to meet the increased demand, Mikoyan reported to a conference of trade workers on October

17, 1953, that the government expected to import in that year 4 billion rubles (\$1 billion at the official exchange rate) of consumer goods. It also drew on inventories and reserves. But empty shelves, queues and high collective farm market prices all attest that its efforts were at best only partly successful. The government again cut prices in April 1954 but much less than the year before (*e.g.* meat was now omitted from the list of articles affected). Except for some minor articles, it had omitted up to the time these lines were written to make any price cut at all in 1955. It is again calling on the public to subscribe to its bonds at about the pre-1953 rates. By all accounts, the shortages in state shops nevertheless have not abated. Although cases have been reported of uncontrolled boosts, I believe that as a rule the new government has followed the course set by Stalin in his last years of allowing only very limited increases in money wages.

As a result of the higher prices which they have been receiving for their produce since the fall of 1953, the farmers are now obtaining a larger share of the Soviet supplies of manufactures than they did under Stalin.

V

Khrushchev's agricultural endeavors are difficult to assess. Because of the soil or the climate or both, much of the vast territory of the U.S.S.R. is unsuitable for agriculture and much of what is suitable is inferior. "The Fertile Triangle, which includes most of the farmland of the Soviet Union," Professor Chauncy Harris has written,⁸ "is to be compared to the spring wheat belt of the Dakotas and the Prairie Provinces of Canada, where agricultural yields per acre are relatively low and irregular from year to year, where the variety of crops that can be grown is not great, and where measures for increasing intensity of agriculture through fertilization or more labor are less rewarding than in areas of higher rainfall or longer growing season."

Stalin had exploited only to a limited extent the opportunities for the effective use of fertilizer, however, and if (as is now uncertain) the government persists with the 1953 program in this regard it will not go unrewarded. Although he glowingly portrayed for the benefit of the Central Committee the American experience with corn, Khrushchev realistically assumes that his crops of this grain will often have to be cut for silage before they

⁸ "Growing Food by Decree in Soviet Russia," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1955.

ripen. The actual results of his extraordinary program under the adverse Soviet climatic conditions must be conjectural. Excluding the areas that he incorporated in the U.S.S.R. in 1939 and 1940, Stalin added to the Soviet grain-sown area during all his five-year plans less than 15,000,000 acres. Khrushchev is seeking by 1956 to sow primarily in grain another 69,000,000 to 74,000,000 acres, or more than one-fourth the 1954 acreage. Western experts appear to agree that he can often obtain good returns on the new Eastern lands in their first few years of use; that the returns are likely to diminish thereafter; that there is a real danger of "dust-bowls" under the kind of intensive use the Russians are planning; and that marginal weather conditions make for unstable yields and frequent crop failures.⁹

The U.S.S.R. still has a huge farm labor force, and there can be no thought of any basic shortage in this regard for many years to come. The foreign visitor to a Soviet collective farm notices first of all the great numbers of workers about. Labor economy is still in order momentarily to meet the increased requirements of the new programs, and in the long run to meet continuing industrial recruitment needs; but Russia's problem in agriculture is above all to raise output. One must be on guard against identifying these two aspects in thinking about the possible results of mechanization. Our most dramatic gains from the use of machinery in the United States generally have taken the form of labor economies rather than higher yields per acre. The machine has contributed to our bumper crops, however, by facilitating extensions in the cultivated area; and in many ways (*e.g.* through the resultant improved and more rapid plowing, cultivation, etc.) it has also contributed materially if not spectacularly to higher yields. Consequently, if Khrushchev can find the capital, he can achieve real gains in this way.

The gains will be the greater because of the limited expansion of farm power under Stalin. Horses eat grain, and for this as well as other reasons, the dictator never sought to replace many of the draft animals that were lost under collectivization and during the war. Instead he supplied the farmers with tractors. At his death, Russia's total horse herds (consisting largely though probably not exclusively of farm work animals) numbered about 17,000,000 less than at the outset of the five-year plans. Stalin

⁹ Lazar Volin, "The New Battle for Grain in Soviet Russia," *Foreign Agriculture*, November 1954.

meantime had endowed agriculture with a tractor park of but 16,000,000 horsepower. The total stock of farm power of all sorts (animal and machine; draft and other) may not have increased as much as output. Only through the concentration of the machines in the Machine-Tractor Stations and their most intensive use were the Russians able to achieve anything like their claimed high degree of mechanization. Due to frequent breakdowns, this may not always have been economical of the machines themselves, while the inefficiency and crop losses resulting from the bureaucratic operations of the M.T.S. are a constant theme of Soviet self-criticism. Stalin also left his heirs much to do in regard to farm buildings and other capital improvements.

Through the payment of higher prices, reorganization of the procurement system, transfers of agricultural specialists from superior agencies and many other measures, Khrushchev hopes to improve the efficiency of his collective farms and farmers. In the long run these actions may be among the most fruitful he has taken, but in 1954 the government found it expedient to raise once more the obligatory minimum number of "labor days" which the collective farm member must devote to collective farm work (the agricultural tax goes up 50 percent for any household for which any member does not perform the minimum). Despite a new decree decentralizing planning, it initiated in 1955 a campaign which caused Soviet farmers to sow corn on a wholesale scale, often in clearly unsuitable areas. On January 25, 1955, Khrushchev could still report to the Central Committee: "It is above all necessary to cut down on the impermissibly great losses of grain during the harvest. It is completely intolerable that delays in harvesting on many collective and state farms have resulted in losses of up to a quarter of the standing crop, and sometimes more." The production of manufactured consumer goods which the peasant wants has slackened, and the government must still feed the mushrooming cities. For Khrushchev not the least of the attractions of the new lands program must be the opportunity it affords to make more extensive use of a state farm system which is more amenable to government controls.

The Central Committee of the Party has asked Russia's farmers by 1960 or 1961 to increase their grain harvest to 164,000,000 tons or about 65 percent above 1954;¹⁰ to double their 1954 output

¹⁰ I assume the goal is in terms of the same "factual" yield as the realized figure for 1954 released to the American farm delegation. See *The New York Times*, August 21, 1955.

of meat and milk; and to more than double their 1954 egg crop. Khrushchev certainly should be able to do better than Stalin did in the face of the collectivization and war losses, but—to take now the standpoint of industry—we may at least conclude that agriculture is momentarily more of a retarding factor than it was under Stalin, and that very possibly it will remain so. Also, I believe one must view partly in this light the current heightening of emphasis on labor productivity and technological progress in industry (*e.g.* Bulganin's July 4, 1955, report to the Party). Increases in labor efficiency are to the good from any standpoint, but momentarily labor requirements have increased in agriculture, and many young city people and farmers who might otherwise have gone there are needed in agriculture to raise corn or to till the new lands. More basically, the government is reluctant to invest the additional sums in machinery which might still release large numbers of extra workers for industry. It is reluctant to do this partly because of the shortage of capital and partly because it is not entirely sure of its urban food supplies. If as a result of gains in industrial labor productivity there are fewer city mouths to feed in relation to industrial output, it is true there will also be more rural mouths, but at least the task of extracting surpluses is less onerous. The task was already a heavy one for Stalin, and this was not the least of his reasons for striving so eagerly, despite the huge agricultural labor reserve, and in violation of rather basic precepts of rational economy, to economize labor in industry through heavy capital outlays as well as greater worker efficiency. In their current endeavors to raise labor productivity, his successors can be expected to strive for the same results for the same reason. With all their farm workers, and the vast possibilities of replacing them with machinery, the Russians must be very economical of labor in the cities.

The accumulated urban housing shortage and city "overhead costs" generally must work in the same direction, so we may list labor along with agriculture as likely retarding factors for industry. There also will be others. With all of their progress under the five-year plans, the Russians are still borrowing from the West technologically. With an industrial labor productivity no more than one-half that of the United States, they are borrowing less overtly than before, but none the less persistently; and despite all barriers they will still be able to learn much from us for many years to come. "The most important technical achievement in

Soviet electric power stations," according to the Soviet journal *Planned Economy*,¹¹ "is the application of steam of high pressure (90 atmospheres) and high temperatures (up to 500 degrees Centigrade)." Equipment of the type in question has been used in the United States for many years.

This source of progress must tend to diminish in importance in the course of time. The level of the best Soviet scientific work is very high, and the Russians now have over 500,000 trained engineers and technicians, or about as many as we do; but their opportunities to employ productively their vast investments in industry should tend to decline.

Considering quality and location as well as quantity, we see that the Russians are not as well supplied with industrial minerals as their usual data on reserves suggest. At Magnitogorsk, for example, they already were experiencing a shortage of good iron ore at the end of the war. In the future, the U.S.S.R. will be hampered by diminishing returns in this area, although probably not very materially.

Together, I believe, these adverse factors could be important, but Khrushchev may be able to offset them at least in part. If only he can avoid any real break in the tempo of heavy industry, he may be able in time to concentrate even more of the capital it produces on its own further growth. Possibly he could do this—as he unquestionably hopes he can—while still increasing his investments modestly in other branches including agriculture. With good luck the Russians conceivably might continue for many years to lift themselves by their own bootstraps in this way.

While devoting perhaps one-fourth of the national income to capital investments, Stalin also found the means needed to support a Cold War military force. His successors could hardly cut their military budget on economic grounds alone, and it is difficult to perceive a rhyme of any sort in their cyclical changes in these outlays to date. (They planned a slight increase in 1953 and a cut in 1954; and while they fixed a 1955 goal above the 1954 one, they recently announced that they will reduce their armed forces this year by 640,000 men.) But circumstances permitting, they might obtain additional resources for industrial expansion in this way, and so cope the more effectively with their adversities.

Industrial production in the United States grew during the

¹¹ Roland Gibson, "Recent Technological Progress in the Soviet Union," *Social Research*, Summer 1955.

first half of this century at an average rate of 4.1 percent a year. It grew by 5.5 percent a year from 1948–53, and by 3.6 percent annually from 1950 to 1954. Soviet industry lately has been growing at two to three times these American tempos. The Russians could slow down and yet continue to beat us in this strategic sphere. Khrushchev has expressed confidence that in the “peaceful competition” between two systems Communism will be victorious. He is encountering difficulties which might prove serious, but we must not overrate them at this early stage.

JAPAN AT CROSS-PURPOSES

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

EVEN a first visitor to Japan does not remain oblivious for long of the tensions concealed beneath the smooth surface of Japanese reticence and politeness. Lafcadio Hearn wrote a half-century ago that "the Japanese lives not by thought, by emotion, but by duty." The classical Japanese rules of obligation and duty, with their emphasis on codified tradition rather than individual decision, have been shaken deeply in the past ten years; but they still are potent, and the effort to live up to them in the new conditions created by Japan's first major defeat in history and first foreign occupation produces strains of its own. Little by little you come to feel that you are among a people possessing immense powers of self-control and at the same time existing singly and collectively close to the breaking point.

The breaking point comes when the obligations conflict. This is something which always threatens, for they pervade every phase of life—duty to the Emperor and the nation, to one's parents, to one's teachers, to one's reputation. When the conflict is irreconcilable there is a real nervous crisis. For the individual it may end in suicide; this does not as with us indicate despair but such a high degree of self-discipline and courage as to be in itself an act of virtue. For the nation, the only honorable exit from what seems a humiliating situation will not be national suicide, of course, but still an act of national desperation, a throw of the dice for revenge and glory unlimited or for ruin. This manner of paying the people's debt to Emperor and country may be imposed on the civilian authorities by fanatical nationalists in the armed forces, as in Manchuria in 1931, or it may be by choice of the dominant governing clique, as in the secret dispatch of the Japanese fleet to Pearl Harbor in 1941 while Ambassadors Kuruusu and Nomura were still negotiating with Secretary Hull.

Since the war, the tendency to violence in both private and public life has been checked; the suicide rate has fallen and there is a pause in what had become the habitual and methodical assassination of political leaders. Nor are there visible portents at present of violent actions ahead in the international field. The national patrimony accumulated by years of incredibly hard work since the Meiji Restoration was squandered in one gigantic

gamble, and today the country lacks the material resources to undertake programs of conquest even if its rulers still had the ambitions of a quarter-century ago. One era has closed, one method of attempted adjustment to the realities of personal and national environment has ended in failure. The new era has hardly begun, the new method has not yet been decided.

II

The tradition that there are stern penalties for being caught in the web of conflicting duties has schooled the Japanese to avoid making categorical statements and taking hard and fast positions. In politics, specifically, their realization since the war of how completely their former leaders miscalculated Japan's capacity to seize a dominating place in the world has increased their reluctance to commit themselves to fixed opinions or programs. Leftist leaders exhort and warn; but where they speak concretely it is usually against something and where they are for something it usually is vague. When I questioned them about international issues I found them as much handicapped as everyone else by their lack of knowledge of what the world has been doing and thinking in Japan's fifteen years of isolation from it; and on social questions I found them unable or unwilling to define their Marxist slogans in concrete domestic terms. Among the leaders of the great center parties, with honorable exceptions, the golden rule has been prudence.

Whatever ambition the Japanese have had to regain poise and a sense of direction has not been helped by the fact that we first imposed one set of policies on them and then urged them to do in important respects just the contrary. We treated the Germans in a similar way, first with edicts against fraternization and militarism, then with exhortations to join their brothers in the Western camp and rearm. But the Germans possessed the material basis for creating a new national prosperity by their own hard work, and their economic rebound from the war has given them back their pride and self-assurance—some would say almost too amply. The Japanese lacked the physical means for building their own life afresh and thus gaining a renewal of self-esteem and confidence.

Wherever one travels today—Istanbul or Tehran, Buenos Aires or Djakarta—German salesmen, engineers and bankers are found crowding into government and business offices, offering German

wares and services on the easiest terms. They meet with special success in underdeveloped and formerly colonial areas, for having been losers in the war they are not suspected of imperialism. Japan was also a loser, but her exporters do not enjoy similar advantages. They have succeeded in marketing a varied line of goods in many foreign countries; indeed, they are considered potentially such dangerous competitors that when Japan was recently admitted to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Britain, France, Australia and ten other important export markets for Japan made reservations depriving her of important advantages. The fact remains that Japanese traders encounter exchange difficulties in buying their former supplies of raw materials in Southeast Asia and are excluded, so far, from their principal former markets in China. Moreover, in the Philippines, Formosa, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Thailand, Burma and Malaya the Japanese are remembered as conquerors and despite improving relations Japanese traders still operate there under a hostile handicap.

The Japanese economy has been heavily supported by American purchases during the Korean war, American expenditures for military bases and the spending of American soldiers. This did not recreate Japanese initiative, however, or stimulate Japanese leaders to take responsibility for the unpopular measures needed to give the country a solid basis for competing in world markets. Japan must import about a quarter of her food; she must pay for it with exports; and to do this she must increase the production of exportable goods and decrease the domestic consumption of them. She will also have to modernize her industrial plant, cut manufacturing costs and curb inflation. This is a program involving temporary hardship. No political leader or party has so far dared to give it much more than lip service and leftist spokesmen recommend policies leading in the opposite direction.

Unlike the Germans, too, the Japanese have been tasting defeat for the first time, and their reactions remind foreigners more of the German behavior after 1918 than since 1945. In the First World War it never seems to have occurred to the Germans that they could be beaten. The war was a German war, and Imperial Germany was united under the Kaiser in patriotic fervor to win it. Defeat came as a crippling shock. Nobody wanted to take over responsibility from those who had failed. Governments were weak and lacked direction. There was a passion for amusement.

The second war and the second defeat were different for Germany. The war was a Nazi war. The people were not united. When defeat came, they guessed in advance what it would be like. Somehow it was less of a psychological shock to find again that German leaders had miscalculated, that Germany once more had gambled wrong and still was not going to rule the world. After the successive failures of the Kaiser, Weimar and the Nazis, the natural temptation was to float politically, to avoid engaging in parties or programs. Yet the free part of Germany has developed quite a cohesive political structure. Nobody would accuse Chancellor Adenauer of unwillingness to accept responsibility or of indecisiveness in using it.

Japan fought the Second World War on the losing side. The Japanese fought it under their Emperor, and their reverence for him, their duty toward him, made them happy to sacrifice everything in his name, their lives of course included. It was a national war, fought in a Kamikaze spirit. Defeat was stupefying.

Parallels must not be exaggerated, for many of the circumstances differ. The Allied attitude toward Germany was much less punitive in 1945 than it had been in 1918; however, it was not harsh toward Japan in 1945 either. In Germany after this war the Allied policy was to replace the German administration, local and national; in Japan, on the other hand, General MacArthur tried to reform and utilize the Japanese administration. In spite of this advantage, Japan's response to the challenges of defeat has not been like Germany's. By comparison she has seemed to be marking time. There is intense preoccupation with amusements of every sort—theatres, fairs, excursions, Pachinko gambling emporiums, all are jammed. The programs of political parties are not clearly defined and political doings excite only mild public interest. A study made for UNESCO indicates that even among young people the urge to play an active rôle in politics is negligible¹ (though this does not mean they are unconcerned about issues like military service that touch them directly).

Japanese often blame the prevailing mood of hesitation and indifference on the loss of confidence in traditional beliefs and observances. Old-established ethical standards have been undermined but people have not yet found new ones which they can fully respect. The Japanese were not averse to the democratic re-

¹ "Without the Chrysanthemum and the Sword," by Jean Stoetzel, a study of postwar attitudes of youth in Japan, published for UNESCO by Columbia University Press, 1955, p. 162.

forms ordered by the Occupation authorities; it is a commonplace to say that as a people they are highly adaptable, and when their old methods and principles failed they were more than willing to try those which had been proved more successful. Or did they only think that they wanted to try them? The study of Japanese youth just mentioned indicates that democratic principles often have been accepted in the abstract but are not considered applicable in the Japanese social context, where respect for public authority and filial obedience contradict ideas of individual judgment and independent action.

In any event, to set out to become democratic by foreign order makes an unpromising beginning. As Lily Abegg pointed out in a recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, the whole enterprise ran against the grain of Japanese life, with its spirit of collective rather than individual responsibility. The Japanese interpret individualism and liberalism, she writes, as being much the same thing as egoism and concentration on selfish interest. When these were among the habits taken over from the West, soberer elements in the Japanese society became less sure of their liking for democracy. They do not repudiate democracy—far from it. But there is a tendency to interpret it in more traditional Japanese terms, terms that we would call nationalistic, even reactionary, or else to break away to the left and use the democratic reforms started under American compulsion as the basis for a new society concerned with economic rather than political equality.

Is there a danger of a militarist resurgence? German apathy and confusion after the First World War facilitated von Seeckt's effort to establish the *Reichswehr* as the principal political power in Germany and made possible Ludendorff's disreputable methods of the *Deutsche Kampfbund* and the military Putsch in treasonable alliance with Hitler. There are no serious indications of a parallel development in Japan today. For the present the Japanese "Weimar Republic" is not in danger from the right. The balance of forces which makes and unmakes governments seems on the whole more likely to shift in the other direction.

It is while they are still in a most unsettled frame of mind, then, that the Japanese people now find themselves subjected to the pulls of conflicting interest set in motion by the Cold War. They are unsure of their friends, their enemies and above all themselves. Their inner thoughts, if we could know them, would probably be surprising.

III

Like others caught in the Cold War the Japanese wish they could escape into some magic haven of calm. Arguments are beginning to be heard whether Japan might not find neutrality a possible rôle. There is a good deal of confusion as to what would be the price of making the effort or, still more, of succeeding in it.

Japan has a constitution, dictated in the main by General MacArthur, which among other things prohibits her from rearming. She also signed a security treaty with the United States granting our armed forces bases and other facilities. But Japan is again sovereign (as Foreign Minister Shigemitsu reminded us most politely during his visit to Washington) and within the limits of her contractual obligations she is able to alter many attitudes which we may have too easily assumed she had wholeheartedly accepted. One example is Premier Hatoyama's recent effort (unsuccessful) to establish a governmental committee to propose changes in the constitution legalizing rearmament. Another is the negotiation with Russian representatives in London to end the ten-year state of war with the Soviets. The fact that we approve of one and have misgivings as to where the other may lead simply emphasizes what a wide scope Japan has for making readjustments in both domestic and foreign relations.

In longing for neutrality the Japanese are not different from myriads of others all around the globe. Most people everywhere think of neutrality as signifying peace; and since they yearn for peace they wonder whether commitments to either of the great camps might not be avoided, or, if already in existence, made less binding, less automatic. Further, Japan's history of militaristic misrule, her frightful war losses and her experience with atomic bombing do give her more title to be irrationally pacifist than many others who seek to flee the obligations and risks of the world as it is.

It was not by chance, then, that the Soviets opened their propaganda drive to bring Japan into the so-called "neutrality belt" even before they made similar bids to Austria, Yugoslavia and, most recently, Germany. In *Pravda's* words, neutrality is now "on the agenda of contemporary life." It appears there under various titles—"areas of peace" (Nehru), "active coexistence" (Tito), "active neutrality" (Vice-President Hatta of Indonesia), "virile neutrality" (*Le Monde*, Paris). As yet the slogan for Japan has not been formulated. But since the Japanese are still so deeply

under the impression of the defeat and Occupation it will probably emphasize mistrust of both the great antagonists, of course with the specific purpose of reducing Japan's feeling about the United States to the level of her traditional feeling about Russia. If the Japanese could be brought to lump the Soviet Union and the United States together in suspicion and dislike, that would represent a tremendous Soviet advance.

Contrary to many Europeans and Asians, most Americans are still not convinced that the recent changes in Soviet manners and tactics indicate an abandonment of long-established Communist goals so much as a realization that Western defenses are too strong at present to be attacked successfully. While this is so, and to hasten the day when it will be so no longer, Soviet propagandists find neutralism their most profitable international theme. Needless to say, they preach it for others, not for their own; no satellite leader would be so idiotic as to suppose that his country could remain neutral in any war involving the Soviet Union. But it is wrong to assume that average people on our side of the Iron Curtain notice this anomaly and take it as a warning of Soviet guile. They are overjoyed to find new grounds to hope for peace and do not ask why the nation which raised up the spectre of a new war now finds it desirable to lighten its shadow.

Nor do their leaders always remind them how and why the Cold War against international Communism began and what would have happened to their own freedoms if other nations had not been able and willing to wage the contest to the present point of stalemate. Some of these leaders have the idealistic notion of welding together a new force for world peace, such a powerful galaxy of neutral states that it cannot be forced into taking part in any armed clash and may even become a factor in making a clash less likely. Others are parochial, aiming only to find a safe corner for their country alone, content to let the rest of civilization go hang. Others are simple expedientists, playing for political advantage or taking out insurance against a possible victory of either contestant. And of course there are Communists and fellow-travellers operating openly or under cover.

IV

All these trends exist in Japanese political life today. The dominant conservative elements were divided after the elections of February 1955 into Democrats, with 185 members in the

House of Representatives led by Premier Hatoyama, and Liberals, with 112 members led by Taketora Ogata and former Premier Yoshida. The Socialists were also divided, with 89 members in the left-wing group and 67 members in the right-wing group. On October 13 last the two Socialist groups were reunited: with elections in the offing, the attractions of being able to wage an integrated war against the conservatives outweighed discord in matters of principle. Following suit, the two conservative parties, whose rivalries have been largely personal, merged on November 15. For the time being, a two-party system has come into effect.

On one extreme of the Japanese political spectrum are the Communists, with two members in the House of Representatives and a total strength somewhere between 60,000 (the police estimate) and 100,000 (the party estimate). At their latest meeting they revealed a new moderate line designed to attract Socialist support and facilitate efforts to form an eventual "popular front." Voting with them are the four members of the pro-Communist Labor-Farmer Party. On the other extreme flank are the survivors of former reactionary nationalistic societies and military cliques. They are not at present openly represented in parliament. Independents and several current vacancies account for the balance of the House's total membership of 467.

Since the rôle of the Socialists is comparatively little known abroad, and since their control of more than one-third of the Diet enables them to block changes in the constitution, their objectives, tactics and popular appeal repay particular study. Indications on all three points were provided last summer when the Hatoyama Government screwed up its courage to introduce a measure creating a National Defense Council to plan for Japanese rearmament and a Constitutional Research Council to propose constitutional revisions to make sure of its legality. The two Socialist factions joined to filibuster these bills to death in the closing session of the upper chamber of the Diet without the Government daring to use its powers to halt questioning and secure a vote. The United States, which greatly desired the passage of these two bills, blundered into ensuring their defeat. Not noticing that the legislation had just squeaked through the lower house and was now hanging fire in the upper one, the Pentagon chose this moment to announce that it was shipping atomic weapons to the Far East, including atomic cannon to Okinawa

and long-range bombardment rockets to Japan. The Socialists were able to make such an issue of the fear that we intend making Japan an atomic base that the Government lost heart and let the session end without forcing a showdown.

It is in incidents like these that the Socialists show their strength and add to it. True, the Government shortly afterwards decided to create a Defense Council, though as a "temporary measure" and without parliamentary sanction. But to forestall popular discontent it also had to announce that the issue of a constitutional amendment permitting the formation of armed forces will wait till it can be settled in new elections. Meanwhile, in an effort to improve the Government's standing, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu visited Washington and requested a review of the whole defense relationship with the aim of replacing Japan's one-sided concessions in the security treaty with the more usual two-way obligations of a mutual defense pact. Eventually (he hinted) this would permit the withdrawal of American forces. Even here he found himself under attack by the Socialists, who interpreted the proposal as opening the way for the use of Japanese troops (when they exist) outside of the country.

The merger of the two Socialist groups is particularly interesting. It remains to be seen whether one swallowed the other and can digest it, or whether the discord will continue beneath the surface and lead eventually to another split. In past controversies the moderates have been handicapped (like the moderate Socialists in Italy and other European countries) by what might be called "on-the-other-handedness." Thus Mr. Eki Sone, their chief intellectual planner, has favored the pro-Western orientation of the Hatoyama Government; on the other hand, he has criticized it for not being active enough in promoting better relations with Soviet Russia and Communist China. Rearmament, he told me, is in principle right and necessary; on the other hand, it should not be pushed at present because that will interfere with negotiations for a Soviet peace treaty. The right wing broke with the left over the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The left wing were not willing to support a treaty which the Soviet Union refused to sign; the right wingers, who are anti-Communists or at least non-Communists, accepted the treaty, but opposed the security treaty with the United States which Prime Minister Yoshida signed at the same time. They approved the security treaty in principle, Mr. Sone said, but thought it should not have been negotiated

until after Japan had regained her sovereignty.

There has been no "on-the-other-hand" in the talk of the left-wing Socialists though there has been plenty of evasion about how the Marxist principles which they advocate should be practised in Japan. Their literature has tried to avoid the subject. They also have avoided identifying their foreign policies with those of the Soviet Union, which is still widely mistrusted in Japan, but instead have pointed to the successes of Red China since she got rid of Chiang Kai-shek and his Western patrons. They have emphasized her progress in industrialization and what they call efficiency, meaning totalitarian discipline, but above all in gaining independence of action and respectful attention abroad such as no Chinese régime has enjoyed in modern times. Japanese students and intellectuals incline to idealize China in any case, partly because she promises to be the leader of "Free Asia," partly as a way of repudiating the Japanese militarists who treated China so shamefully in the past. There is vast ignorance, of course, about the penalties being paid at home by the Chinese people for Chou En-lai's ability to speak with such authority abroad. Nothing is said about the cost to Chinese farmers and workers of collectivization and hasty industrialization; nothing is said about Peking's dependence on Moscow.

Socialist hopes for winning future power are pinned mainly on the liberal-minded younger generation. Both wings gained in votes in the last election (the left more than the right); together they won an increase of 1,610,000 votes over their previous combined total, compared to an increase of 660,000 for the Democrats and Liberals. This suggests that they secured an overwhelming majority of the 2,140,000 voters who had come of age in the interval between elections.

A former President of the University of Tokyo told me that he thought the trend to the left among students would weaken now that economic conditions have become easier. There is a left-wing group of professors and students, he said, and there is a small group of right-wing extremists (mainly among the natural scientists); but he described the majority as independent and liberal, viewing all ideologies in a rather cool and critical spirit. This leads them to favor neutralism. "Japan, they say, should be a bridge between the Eastern and Western camps." He admitted the naïveté of supposing that Japan can be disarmed and still immune to outside pressure. "But that is the program of the Socialists,"

he remarked, as though that were sufficient explanation of the attempt to reconcile irreconcilables.

So one rounds the circle, and finds that for many Japanese voters (as for so many elsewhere) logic counts less than feeling. It is feeling, above all, that the Socialists consciously exploit—feeling against things as they are in personal and national life, feeling for things as they should be if society were equitable and the world did not live under the fear of aggression. They find their greatest success, naturally, in playing on the mass immaturity of the growing generation which knows least about the world and is least firmly rooted in Japanese tradition.

A number of Socialist leaders were identified with the Occupation in its early days. For that reason, and because the United States still has many convinced friends in Japan, even the left wingers usually attack American policy more for backsliding than for original sin. There are the inevitable references to American materialism and the horrors of Hollywood culture, but the crux of leftist criticism is that we are disappointing the world's liberal hopes. Thus Washington's present defense policies are spoken of mournfully as a betrayal of the peaceful principles which we introduced into Japanese life during MacArthur's rule. The change-over is not linked to the Communist aggression in Korea or threats against Southeast Asia. These are pictured in any case as of direct concern only to the American imperialists and their reactionary protégés, Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek, affecting Japan merely because she is tied like a tail to the American kite. Moral: abrogate the American-Japanese treaty or at least alter its administration to render it ineffective.

Though the left-wing Socialists have demanded the evacuation of American troops they have recognized no relationship between that and preparation for Japan to defend herself. Last summer they played a leading part in organizing sit-down strikes, protest marches and similar demonstrations by peasants against the American use of precious agricultural land for air bases, specifically for extending runways to handle jet aircraft. Spurred at last into reply, the Japanese Government reminded the public that the air bases are primarily for Japan's own defense, that the land-owners receive generous compensation, that the cost of the expansions was being borne by the American taxpayer and that the improved facilities will eventually belong to Japan.

American emphasis on air bases and air power in the Far East

creates uneasiness far outside Socialist ranks, partly because it calls up visions of nuclear warfare but also because it indicates that Japan might be expected to fend for herself in another world war while the United States made its major military effort in other theatres. The fact that we do not commit important land forces to the Far East is taken as evidence that we think of Japan as an expendable ally, to be used as an air base as long as practicable and redeemed from the enemy later on as part of the ultimate victory. Those hostile to the United States do not want American forces of any sort in Japan, of course; but the absence of land forces gives them an argument which they pursue to the wrong conclusion—that instead of strengthening herself Japan must withdraw into a vacuum of neutrality. The inconsistency is ignored.

Japanese leftists place no confidence in the United Nations. Its early promise has failed, they say, and not because of Soviet obstruction but of our efforts to make it an instrument of American domination. They take no account of why efforts to equip U.N. to resist aggression broke down or why nothing so far has come of projects to reduce armaments and put atomic weapons under inspection and control. I asked Mr. Hiroo Wada, an intellectual leader of the left-wing Socialists (though not much more proletarian in looks, dress or manner than Mr. Sone, or for that matter Mr. Molotov), whether U.N. weakness, Soviet military capacities, especially for nuclear warfare, and the increasing military potential of Red China should not affect Japan's defense policy. Should she not continue her arrangement with the United States until she has developed forces of her own capable of defending her coasts and thus giving her at least a chance of being able to remain neutral? "There is no threat to Japan today," Mr. Wada replied blandly. "Japan can look out for herself."

I asked Mr. Wada to differentiate his party's attitude from that of the Communists on the agricultural problems in which he happens to be especially interested. Both parties attack the government's land policy, he replied, not in its original concept (under American guidance 90 percent of the former tenant farmers received land of their own) but in its administration. He claims that rural credit has been so meagre and the action of government-sponsored farmer coöperatives so slow that farmers are beginning to sell their land back to former owners or to new large proprietors. Nevertheless, whereas the Communists preach

collectivization the Socialists only study it and discuss how and when it might some day become practicable in Japan. This difference in approach, Mr. Wada thought, accounted for the Socialist gains at Communist expense in the last election. For he admits that Japanese peasants love their land and that since they usually are specialists in a single crop any project for the collectivization of Japanese farms runs into special technical difficulties.

Wherever one travels in the Far East one is asked why American commercial policy does not square with American political profession. In Tokyo this criticism is very much in vogue. One of the ablest leftist intellectuals, a Harvard-trained economist, told me that our agricultural disposal program seems consciously designed to handicap Japan's recovery in order to benefit American farmers; as evidence he cited our requirement that Japan buy our rice, which plays havoc with her essential export trade with Thailand, Burma and other rice-producing countries of Southeast Asia. Incidentally, he also was under the apparently sincere impression that the 15 percent of the program which had been advertised as an American "gift" to Japan was earmarked, by our demand, for rearmament—whereas the fact is that it is earmarked for improving the nutrition of Japanese schoolchildren.

Unfortunately there is more ground for the professor's complaint (voiced also by many others throughout the Far East) regarding American foreign economic operations in general. Too often one set of officials in Washington seems not to know what another is doing, or if it does know is not interested. It is senseless for one agency to contribute dollars to enable Thailand to grow rice, while another—or a different set of representatives of the same agency in another capital—takes action that in effect prevents Thailand from selling her rice surplus. It is senseless to contribute dollars to restore and expand the Japanese economy and insist that Japan purchase surplus American rice at the expense of resuming natural trade relations with Thailand. Policy—or lack of policy—of this sort undercuts our claim to be an efficient nation and to know what we are doing. But it is used by leftist critics in Japan and elsewhere as proof of something more damaging—selfishness and a lack of sincerity.

The Socialist slogans are chosen well for their purposes, as indicated by the Government's reluctance to oppose them vigorously. During the electoral campaign which brought the Democrats into office, Mr. Hatoyama made promises and aroused hopes which he

has not been able to fulfill. In particular he dwelt on the economic advantages to be gained from renewed relations and increased trade with Soviet Russia and Red China.

Actually, even if the negotiations which began in London last summer were to produce a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty there are slight grounds for expecting any considerable trade between the two countries. The chief Soviet aim, as Ambassador Malik made clear, is to win Japan to neutrality. He proposed that the treaty bar the waters between Japan and Korea to all foreign military craft except ships of the Soviet Union and Communist China and in addition asked that Japan renounce alliances or coalitions directed against any Power which had fought against Japan in the last war—a proviso that might be used later as leverage for insisting on abrogation of the security treaty with the United States. In return, the Soviets were willing to grant Japan “most-favored-nation” tariff treatment (as the United States already does) and a fishing agreement, and to support her application for U. N. membership. The negotiations are suspended as this is written. The Japanese have been disappointed that the United States did not back them up more strongly. They must find out for themselves, however, what is and what is not obtainable in negotiations with Moscow; nor is it sure that our active support might not have been a handicap.

The Soviets have so far held in reserve the question of returning Japanese prisoners and have insisted on postponing territorial questions. The latter involve the future of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands (occupied by the Soviets under the Yalta agreement, renounced by Japan in the San Francisco Treaty, but not specifically assigned in that treaty to any other nation) and the Habomais and Shikotan, small islands lying close to the northern coast of Hokkaido.

When Japanese leftists mention the Soviet-held islands they always couple them with a demand for the return of the Ryukus (Okinawa) and the Bonin Islands, both occupied by the United States. Washington does not agree that the situations are comparable. We recognize Japan’s “residual sovereignty” in the islands and have promised to return them when they are no longer essential for American-Japanese defense and for security in the Far East. It happens that Premier Hatoyama was careless enough to link the claims against Russia and the United States in a speech which he made in the Diet shortly before the start of the London

negotiations; and of course the Soviets and their leftist echoes in Japan have made the most of his error. To soften criticism of its defense policies the Hatoyama Government may ask us not only to "equalize rights and obligations" under the security treaty but also to make concessions in regard to the American-held islands. We need not feel called on to step up Japan's policy-making rôle until she can increase her financial and military contributions to joint operations. However, to strengthen the Government against domestic critics as well as in negotiations with the Soviets we might transfer the civil administration of the islands to Japanese authorities. There is no insuperable military reason against this; we operate our bases in Japan proper in an environment which is under Japanese civil administration, and we could do the same in the islands. The increased friendship of the Japanese people would be an over-all strategic gain, since our military position in Okinawa depends heavily on our position in Japan.

Though the territorial disputes with the Soviets are so important most Japanese seem more interested in relations with Peking than with Moscow. They see real economic advantages to be gained in China and they are anxious to establish good relations with a neighbor on the upswing of power. They used to buy and sell there on a large scale, especially in Manchuria, and they think they might trade there again today—machinery and textiles for coal and other commodities now bought from the United States and other distant sources. Recently Tokyo put out feelers for a negotiation about the repatriation of Japanese detained in China. According to government sources, Peking's precondition for this, and still more for a political settlement, is that Japan sever relations with the Nationalist Government on Formosa. This is more credible on the whole than the report of a Socialist delegation recently in Peking that Chou En-lai would be willing to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan without conditions; for that would imply Peking's acceptance of the "two Chinas" concept, at least to the extent of receiving a Japanese ambassador while another Japanese ambassador was accredited in Taipei.

Before Japan regained her sovereignty the United States embargoed all Japanese trade with Communist China as a measure in the Korean war; and since then it has urged the Japanese Government to live up to its obligations as a member of the voluntary Coördinating Committee which drew up the list of forbidden items. The Japanese Government has both economic and political

reasons for wanting the embargo modified to apply only to the sale of strategic materials—the rule governing trade with the Soviet Union and the East European satellites. As there seems no early prospect of formally ending the Korean war, the present discrimination against Japanese trade with Red China threatens to continue indefinitely; and the fact that Mr. Hatoyama cannot defend it on grounds of principle gives a real advantage to his Socialist critics. Senator George recently suggested that in fairness Japan should be allowed to reopen her markets in China except for trade in strictly military goods; and he added that this would help the American textile industry by reducing Japanese competition.

v

Advocates of a vigorous American policy in the Far East believe that Asians have come to mistrust the United States for “talking big but acting weak.” The memory of our bold action in Korea is said to have been wiped out by our shilly-shallying as the Communists were moving southward in Indo-China. We are urged to draw a sharp line and proclaim once for all that even the smallest Communist advance across it means war. The alternative, we are told, is that we shall lose whatever is left of Free Asia’s confidence, that every friend will become neutralist and every waverer will join the other side, leaving us to face our enemies everywhere alone. Undoubtedly backing can be found for this argument in Seoul and Taipei, where the leaders live in hope that in one way or another the United States will become involved in a general war and that it will end with their country’s freedom restored—and with them, naturally, in command.

No such feeling can be detected in Tokyo. The Japanese seem more concerned about the possibility that the United States may take some ill-considered action and involve them in war than that it will fail to respond in proper time and measure to a major Communist provocation. They are very conscious of the fact that we have a military treaty with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s government on Formosa as well as with them. Like us they recognize that government, but they know that its main interest must necessarily be in war—a continuation by every possible means of the Chinese civil war—while their own concern is all for peace. They do not suspect us of consciously seeking war but they do fear that we may be involved unexpectedly in war in the Formosa

Strait, and they with us. Disputes within the leadership of the Republican Party added to the sense of insecurity in this regard. Even if Senator McCarthy's influence could be discounted, that of Senator Knowland could not. The feeling that something unpredictable might happen became acute during the crisis a year ago over the offshore Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

Most of the moderate Japanese leaders recognize that Formosa proper is a part of the same "island chain" to which Japan herself belongs and they understand why the United States pledged itself to defend it. True, some American military experts (particularly in the Air Force) have begun questioning whether the "island chain" is as indispensable to our security as it seemed before the advent of the new long-range atomic bombers. Nevertheless, the concept that the "island chain" is the front line of defense against Communism in the Pacific and that its strong points stand or fall together still has currency in Japan as elsewhere. The Japanese therefore understand that if the Communists invade Formosa this means that they are seeking general war and Japan will be involved. But what happens if the Communists attack the offshore islands? The Nationalist Government has crammed them with men and equipment even though they have little strategic value except in connection with an invasion of the mainland. With the idea of deterring a Communist attack, the United States decided to leave open whether or not it would help defend the islands. To the Japanese this seemed to entrust the final decision between peace and war to the two rival Chinese governments. Even warm friends of the United States became alarmed and for the first time talk was heard in responsible quarters about the need to revise the security treaty.

The only way of preserving the security treaty in the long run will be to establish Japanese confidence in the unity and reliability of American leadership. Revisions in the administrative agreement to increase Japanese participation in defense policies may satisfy Japanese amour propre to some extent. But the basic situation which causes Japanese apprehensions will continue as long as American bases exist on Japanese soil; for if the United States were at war with mainland China its planes would fly sorties from those bases and Communist Chinese planes would retaliate. What is necessary is to convince the Japanese people that the risks inherent in this situation are far less than the risks they would run without American protection. The Japanese Gov-

ernment will have to show that it is firmly convinced of this and will have to take the lead in convincing their people. On our side we can argue the proposition most effectively not by underlining the risks for Japan of trying to "go it alone" but in demonstrating that the risks of the American alliance will not be enlarged by inadvertent actions on our part or as a result of disagreement within our national leadership or because of our intransigence on a minor issue or because the final decision of our policy seemed to have been left to third parties which do not have the same stake in peace as do the United States and Japan.

If this confidence is reestablished in the Japanese mind, less support will be given to those who demand the abrogation of the treaty and the expulsion of American forces. Playing on the pacifism which we ourselves did so much to create, they not only increased their voting strength markedly in the last election but by all appearances have been winning new adherents since. If they were to gain as much in the next elections as they did in the last, the present Government's hope of making constitutional changes to facilitate rearmament will have to be abandoned and there will almost surely be crippling changes in the administrative agreement. The "if" is a large one and should not cause anyone to write Japan off as a friend and ally. No abrupt actions, let alone violent ones, are to be expected in Tokyo. There are leaders in the Liberal-Democratic grouping who believe in the American alliance and will defend it ably. But we should be clear that in so far as the future course of Japanese opinion depends on our own attitudes and actions, the Japanese, like our other allies, look for a sense of proportion and restraint on our part in addition to evidence of our material strength and courage.

The fact that no alliance can be strong and lasting on a one-sided basis has connotations for the Japanese, of course, as well as for us. It would be disastrous if they exercised their sovereign independence in a way to arouse suspicions that they hope for a day when, under the guise of neutralism, they might play off the free world and the Communist world against each other. For Japan to trust to neutralism would go far toward delivering all Asia to the Communists. She would come under Communist domination herself or she would become a Communist ally. Either would be a quiet form of suicide.

LATIN AMERICAN REALITIES

By Eduardo Santos

IN THE United States today there unquestionably is an ever-growing interest in the countries of Latin America, a development which naturally is welcome to those countries themselves. But first let us ask just what is meant by "Latin America?" Certainly this term, applied loosely to the 20 republics which together with the United States form the Organization of American States, is inexact, for our Latinity is open to discussion. Yet the substitutes which have been proposed have proved even less satisfactory, and so this vague, convenient and pleasant-sounding term has come to be generally accepted. We shall speak, therefore, of Latin America and the peoples who comprise it.

There are so many false conceptions about these peoples that an impatient commentator recently declared, "What Latin America needs is to be discovered, not colonized." In the universities of the United States many specialists, it is true, have devoted themselves to the study of our problems, acquiring a thorough knowledge of them and interpreting them with great discernment. This was amply demonstrated during the "Conference on Responsible Freedom in the Americas," organized last year by Columbia University. But most of these people are teachers. I am afraid that in official circles knowledge of Latin America has not reached so high a level. In general we are the victims on the one hand of superficial generalizations and on the other of specialized studies which, although in many cases excellent, are limited to a particular field of interest to which alone they concede importance, ignoring the total picture and thus frequently conveying false and dangerous impressions.

A great writer of the late nineteenth century exclaimed that Latin America was not a continent but an archipelago and, paradoxical though it may sound, this is true. Until 40 years ago its countries were separated from each other by distances and natural barriers that seemed insurmountable. When the peoples concerned traveled they went either to Europe or the United States; rarely did they visit the countries bordering their own, for communications were both difficult and scarce. That situation has now been completely changed by the advent of the automobile and the airplane. Today the peoples of Latin America are being

drawn ever closer together, and are showing an increasing interest in each other. In the sphere of journalism particularly the old barriers are being eliminated, a factor of enormous importance in the constant growth of mutual understanding. This was made evident in a number of recent events in a way to give us high hopes for the future. The assembly of the Inter-American Press just held in New Orleans revealed strikingly not only the ever-closer bonds uniting the Latin American peoples but a sincere and fruitful desire for friendly coöperation between them and the United States. These are signs of the birth of a new era in inter-American relations.

II

Among the Latin American countries there exist certain radical differences, giving each its precise individuality. Each country has its own unmistakable characteristics determined by race, geography, climate, history, and degree of industrial development. In some the populations are almost totally European, as in Uruguay, Argentina and Chile. Here even the climate reminds us of Europe, with marked temperature changes between winter and summer. In other countries the indigenous pre-Columbian population is in the majority, preserving its customs and languages intact, as in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay. In still others the fusion of races is virtually complete, as in Colombia, Venezuela and a large part of Central America, where only small remnants of the pure aboriginal races are to be found. Here the populations are primarily *mestizo*, a mixture of white, Indian and Negro. Brazil with its enormously increasing population, its great masses of European immigrants and its variety of races and conditions is a world in itself, reminding us in many ways of the United States 60 years ago.

It is impossible to generalize freely about something so varied and at times so contradictory. This, unfortunately, is the practice of all-too-many writer-tourists, who in most cases cannot speak the language and are ignorant of the deeper realities existing in the countries which they so fleetingly visit. Their reporting is often a conglomeration of prejudices, superficial evaluations, and anecdotes which for the most part are interesting only because they highlight the picturesque exception. In their haste they sometimes have recourse to commonplaces and outdated concepts. Indeed, certain recent books and newspaper articles read

as though they had been written in 1910: the urge to synthesize or the need for haste has led the writer to speak of Latin America as though he were dealing with one single country or problem.

The development of these countries has not been uniform. Indeed, the exact opposite is true, and enormous disparities exist as a result. Here are 20 individual cases which if they are similar in some respects are totally different in others. If one forgets or ignores this fact one cannot possibly arrive at a true understanding of Latin America.

But let us now focus our attention on the similarities rather than the differences, for in them an observer in the United States may well see the foundations of a unified approach to common problems which beset the Latin American nations. Everywhere in Latin America there exist what might be called "constant laws"—that is, analogous situations, similar hopes and longings. The archipelago of yesterday, despite the marked differences which still separate one country from another, is moving toward a very evident unity on higher levels.

One essential and vastly influential link is unity of religion, for adherence to the Roman Catholic Church is almost unanimous throughout Latin America. In most cases that adherence is the expression of an ardent faith, although in many others it is no more than a cordial but passive acceptance. Catholicism in these countries is both a conviction and a custom. The only serious objection to it is that it is all too frequently identified with intransigent fanatics or with politicians eager to exploit religion for their own advantage. If Catholicism in Latin America could rid itself of these two great enemies, the only ones it has that are worth taking into account; if it would strive boldly and consistently to become less a mere hereditary habit and more a daily expression of sincere faith; and if, conscious of its immense power, it would put that power at the service of all, refusing to be made the banner of reaction or the shield of the ambitious, it would unquestionably constitute the major force for unity, in thought and action, in the whole of Latin America. But for this it would have to abide faithfully by the evangelical precept, "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's." It would have to maintain its autonomy unsullied, never permitting itself to be used to undermine the authority of the state or to infringe on clearly defined civil rights.

Unity of language, the two Latin languages of the hemisphere, is another unifying factor. More than 110,000,000 human beings in Latin America speak Spanish; more than 50,000,000 Portuguese. The two languages are distinct, of course, but very similar. A century ago some philologists expressed the fear that the Spanish language in America would evolve into a series of new languages or dialects as it came into contact with the waves of immigrants from different European countries and with the indigenous tongues. Nothing of the sort happened. Spanish and Portuguese maintained their purity in Latin America just as English did in the United States. Naturally certain marked regional peculiarities and usages exist, but the language, enriched by permissible Americanisms, is becoming more and more pure and uniform. This is a factor of the greatest importance in the development of unity.

Another element which has contributed to our growing feeling of solidarity is our common historical background: analogies in our origins and development, the memory of the period in which we were bound together by the ideal of emancipation, the constant interchange between our peoples of every class.

Religion, language, history—these are the sources of unity in Latin America. It should be the duty of all Latin Americans to strengthen the influence of them by demonstrating our sincerity, cherishing our genuine religious spirit, and encouraging the best use of our language in speech and in writing.

In the economic sphere there are but few factors making for unity (the solidarity of the coffee industry is an exception), because our economies are often analogous rather than complementary, and because all of our countries are more or less poor and lacking in the wherewithal to help each other. Our principal markets, the great centers to which we can turn for capital and aid, are to be found beyond the confines of our continent, primarily in the United States, to which our economies with their different degrees of development are inseparably linked. It is here more than anywhere else that a global approach to Latin America is needed, for if we are to evaluate and understand this bond, if we are to strengthen and improve it, we must open wide the gates to a mutually beneficial coöperation.

I have already referred to the dangers of the type of study which gives attention only to one phase of the complex problem we are considering. This is the error of which the majority of

businessmen—that is, industrialists and bankers—are guilty, obsessed as they are with curves of production and consumption, imports and exports, balances of payments, possibilities for industrial investment and ways of increasing output. The problem goes much deeper than all this. The economic development of Latin America has sociological and political implications of vast scope. It is not merely a matter of exploitation and production of raw materials, or of attractive opportunities for investment of foreign capital.

In envisaging the economic development of Latin America we must discard the Communist habit unconsciously adopted in so many conservative circles of giving a materialist interpretation, in this case not to history but to contemporary reality. The only valid and admissible approach is entirely different: the problem requires solutions based on moral, spiritual, social, and in the best sense of the word political arguments and aspirations which are at the same time grounded in precise realities. If any one of these factors is missing, the structure is bound to be precarious. More than 340,000,000 people inhabit the vast world of the Americas that stretches from Alaska to the Straits of Magellan, and their number is constantly growing. The problems of this world are above all human problems and they must be looked at from a human point of view rather than from the viewpoint of insensate materialism.

In economic geography Latin America is shown as an underdeveloped area, but the fact is that its development since the beginning of the century or, more precisely, since the first great European war, has been nothing short of astounding. Practically all of its peoples vegetated during the first century of their independent existence in so far as concerned the development of their economies and exploitation of their natural riches. This incubation was a long-drawn-out process, but it was not a waste: today all these countries are showing a remarkable rate of material progress.

Many of the world's greatest cities are in Latin America: Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Havana, Santiago, Lima, Montevideo. Bogotá, which 50 years ago had scarcely 100,000 inhabitants, today has more than 800,000, and the population of Caracas has risen dizzily to 1,000,000. Modern city planning, intelligently conceived, is producing magnificent results in these capitals. In the past half century Latin America

has undergone a fundamental transformation. The benefits of material civilization are everywhere asserting themselves, and Dr. Milton Eisenhower, after a rapid but conscientious tour of some of our countries, declared that in Latin America the United States has its best market and most important customers, not only right now but in the tremendous possibilities which it offers for the immediate future. Suffice it to recall that the population of Latin America, which a century and a half ago was less than 20,000,000, has now passed the 170,000,000 mark.

In Latin America the essential and fundamental problem is that of human beings. The nations which comprise it must express and assert themselves not only in material works and economic achievements but in ways that will strengthen their individual personalities and enhance the independence of their citizens. The worst form of colonialism is that in which foreign capitalism reduces a country's nationals to a subordinate position and manages their economy by remote control.

This viewpoint does not by any means imply sympathy for the vain and selfish nationalism advocated by some. Such nationalism, whether springing from complexes of inferiority or superiority, from a senseless aversion to everything foreign or a fatuous idolatry of everything domestic, is one of the worst deformations of the human soul. It is and has been the cause of innumerable collective misfortunes in many parts of our planet. Nationalism of the Peronist type is nothing but a demagogic weapon of totally unscrupulous, power-mad politicians, and is not in consonance with either the temper or the needs of the Latin American peoples. This is a fact which must be recognized. At the same time it should be recognized that these peoples have the right to insist that there be no threat of foreign domination in the indispensable economic coöperation with the United States which they so fervently desire and which is a *sine qua non* of their progress. Economic aid should not and must not become exploitation; it must never strangle the autonomy of these peoples or overstep the limits which the spirit of well-intentioned coöperation itself defines. Indeed, within these limits an effort must be made to free the Latin American peoples from poverty and backwardness; to elevate their condition; to encourage improvements in sanitation and health; to broaden their educational opportunities in schools, colleges and universities and assist their cultural expression in all fields; to foster in each of these countries an auto-

mous development which will reinforce its sovereignty and permit its citizens to feel and be the lords and masters of their own domain.

President Wilson in certain memorable speeches highlighted this theme, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt with his fruitful Good Neighbor policy gave it concrete expression. Let us remember them when, as sometimes happens, the aspirations and theories of businessmen point in other and dangerous directions.

When the colossal wealth of the United States and its technical and industrial might are brought face to face with the poverty from which we are just emerging and with the incipient industrial development of Latin America, problems of the greatest delicacy arise. A way must be found to insure the effective defense of the weak in their inevitable contacts with forces which, while they are indispensable for progress, are always dangerous if not controlled and inspired by a high concept of collaboration among nations and peoples. Capitalism left to its own devices always leans toward exclusive domination and ruthless materialism. It likes to think of itself as the center and *raison d'être* of all human activity. Coming up against the opposition of other principles where it had thought there were no obstacles to its own advance, it reacts with an impatience which in the past has led it to the most deplorable extremes. We must be forewarned against such excesses in the future if we are to avoid painful and difficult problems.

Right here we find another aspect of the basic unity which links the 170,000,000 inhabitants of Latin America and the republics to which they belong: their own concept of what their economic development should be, how their natural wealth should be exploited, how they should coöperate with foreign Powers and how they should strengthen their bonds with the United States. On these points there is close agreement of opinion and feeling throughout Latin America, a fact which is easily explained. For its peoples cannot afford to concentrate on financial enrichment and purely material progress, but must think in terms of the building of nations, the making of independent citizens, the strengthening of each republic's personality and the accentuation of its individuality. They reject the rôle of satellite and shun the danger of becoming poor imitations of alien forms of government.

III

Another one-sided approach, the most dangerous and least justified of all, is that which is advocated for military reasons and from the military point of view. This concept encourages all-out armament in Latin America, seeks to increase the size of its armed forces, and envisages the whole area primarily as a factor in one-sided military calculations, in defiance of common sense and the most obvious realities, and at the expense of our most pressing needs.

It is a distinction of Latin America that peace reigns among its member nations. Any attempt to start an international war here would be devoid of cause or even pretext; and it would be criminal, because it could not possibly reflect anything other than the selfish desires of a few men intent upon making a profit out of carnage. The peoples of Latin America wish to live together not only in peace but in close friendship. The deep historical, racial, emotional and economic factors which on other continents have traditionally set nation against nation do not exist in Latin America. To try to alter this situation artificially, to create mutually hostile blocs after the fashion of other continents, to play the politics of discord where everything calls for harmony and the peaceful solution of differences—this would be an unpardonable crime.

Furthermore, international peace in the Americas is fully guaranteed by the Pan American agreements and by the Act of Chapultepec outlawing the aggressor and automatically uniting all the others against him. The governments which are truly peace-loving governments—I do not say peoples, because all of the peoples of Latin America are peace-loving—can thus count on a sure guarantee of the defense of their rights if madness or evil should at any time threaten them. This distinctive position as a continent where peace is guaranteed gives Latin America an honored and perhaps decisive rôle in international relations.

Latin America's fortunate geographical situation is an asset in this connection. She cannot be made to serve as a pawn in the chess game of human destinies. The very nature of things as they are today, the very fact that the development of armaments has made such terrifying progress, has rudely but fortunately placed us beyond the possibility of direct participation in a universal conflict. Fortunately such a conflict is becoming more and more unlikely, even, one might say, impossible. War industries—and

in this too we are fortunate—do not as yet figure in our economies. If worst should come to worst and a new conflict should threaten civilization, our necessary, just and inevitable solidarity with the United States would find a thousand ways of manifesting itself other than through the armaments and militarism which are today our natural enemies and a growing threat to us all.

Unfortunately this outlook is not shared by certain military experts who suffer from a disquieting myopia and insist on looking at everything from their own limited professional angle. Obsessed as they are with weapons and armies which it would ruin us to try to build up, they do not bother to ask themselves what use these could be to us in an atomic war. An honest answer to this question would undo in 15 minutes all the grandiose armament plans of which we are the victims.

Magazines in the United States recently published a list of jet airplanes purchased by various South American dictatorships—magnificent and enormously costly, but now completely outdated as far as international warfare is concerned. They also listed considerable numbers of small warships, as expensive as they were showy and useless, to say nothing of tanks and cannon of the type manufactured 25 years ago. In a world conflict today all of this would have to be hastily hidden from view because it would serve no purpose. It is not the type of equipment that would be needed to put down a rebellion at home, and it will never be used for a war between sister nations, because such a war would not be tolerated by men of good will anywhere in America.

The hundreds of millions of dollars which these outmoded armaments are costing would satisfy some of the infinite needs of people who are still living in dire poverty and lack the most elementary necessities of life. There is no excuse for sinking enormous sums of money in such useless and dangerous projects when millions of people are suffering from tropical diseases for lack of funds to conduct public health services properly. There is no sense in such waste when we lack schools, universities, roads, decent housing for our peasants in the country and our workers in the cities and centers of culture. In all of these things we are woefully deficient, and yet in place of them we are given airplanes and tanks that wreck our economies and make us so uneasy that we can only hope no use will ever be found for them.

For all these reasons one of the greatest needs of Latin America and one of the most fervent desires of her peoples is that her

armies should become once again what the Colombian Army, for example, represented for 35 years: an institution respected and loved by all, occupying with dignity the place of honor and service which the Constitution assigned to it in the national life and limiting itself strictly thereto; a disciplined and calm defender of national order and decorum, never a means of coercion to be used by any one faction against the people. Such armies should remain aloof from politics, never seeking to influence a political decision by their might. Nor is there any reason why they should be a crushing burden on the taxpayer. For the healthy reality is that in Latin America today there is simply no place for huge armies or oppressive armament programs, and everything points to a new concept of collective living.

Among all of Latin America's needs, the most important is that it should be, in the inspiring words of President Wilson, safe for democracy. Everywhere the democratic form of government must be a reality. This is not to say that anyone is looking for perfection, which exists nowhere, but only for one of those approximations which are the best we can hope for in the political organization of peoples. The foundations of democratic life, freedom of expression and association, the right of suffrage as the source from which all public authority springs—these must be respected and cherished. Public authority itself must have a clearly defined and delineated orbit; the reign of law must prevail, and the Constitution must be a true shield for every citizen; the arbitrary exercise of personal power must not be tolerated, and might must not be allowed to triumph over right. Our countries should be headed by responsible, representative, republican governments, "of the people, by the people and for the people." All this means that the peoples of Latin America need, want and hope to eliminate those dictatorships, most of them military, which to the detriment of us all are installed in ten or 12 of our countries.

Latin America should not be too hastily condemned for such dictatorships. Bad as they are, they are not as objectionable as the dictatorships of Hitler, Mussolini, Franco and the Iron Curtain countries. Even in the United States itself our picturesque dictators have had their emulators who could well be compared to them, although fortunately on a local scale. To cite one example, Huey Long achieved many successes while the general public remained apathetic.

This militarist epidemic is not a product of the tropics (nor,

be it remembered, is all of Latin America tropical). It is in large part a universal evil. The world is really one world only when it comes to the spread of epidemics, which advance with lightning speed in every direction unless they are checked in good time by the erection of the necessary *cordons sanitaires*. The militarist dictatorships in Latin America are only the local manifestations of the totalitarianism—whether it be called Communism, Nazism, Francoism or Fascism—which for the past 35 years has been threatening human liberty. They are different forms of one and the same virus which attacks the essential elements of democratic life and seeks to destroy them. Their symptoms are identical: hatred of liberty, suppression of free suffrage, unlimited personal power, demagoguery in place of justice, the omnipotent state embodied in one man or clique, contempt for civil liberties and human rights.

The contagion of all this has spread to us from a world demoralized by 40 years of such violence and international criminality as might well disorient any people. The clash of innumerable hostile interests, passions and fears in recent times has produced changes so extraordinary, happenings so unforeseen, upsets so undreamed of that at moments the whole fate of humanity has hung in the balance and it has seemed as though the sacred principles which are always on the lips of so many were actually enshrined in the hearts of very few.

Against this background it is hardly a wonder that chaotic conditions prevail in some Latin American nations today. Many of these nations were familiar in earlier years with a type of *caudillo* who has now passed from the stage forever, the soldier who thanks to luck and ability emerged from the small civil wars to impose his will by the sheer force of his personal courage and physical prowess, a party man sprung from the people, with limited intellectual capacities but possessed of the gift of command and a ferocious energy. Typical examples were Porfirio Diaz and Juan Vicente Gomez.

All that has passed. In our age of technical advancements and overwhelming material power, of mechanized and highly costly military organizations, the *caudillos* have been replaced—and not for the better—by armies and their chiefs, just as the civil wars of old have been replaced by the *coup d'état*. The participants in those wars fought each other with a certain gallantry, after all, and with very modest armaments in their hands. Today

the *coup d'état* is accomplished within a matter of hours, and is backed by sufficient power to discourage if not completely stifle all possible resistance. For what unarmed people, no matter how great their majority, can attempt to fight against tanks and airplanes?

The most galling thing about this prevalence of brute force in the political life of some Latin American nations is that the armies which have seized power have never distinguished themselves in glorious campaigns, nor have their generals won acclaim, like the heroes of Italian opera, returning victorious from historic battles. Nothing of the kind. Our generals have never seen a battlefield, and their armies have never waged war. Their first battle, and one in which there is no physical enemy, is the seizure of power by virtue of the sheer weight of armaments put into their hands. They then proceed to occupy, as though it were conquered enemy territory, the country which they are determined to rule by force of arms.

The military profession is not exactly the best school in which to learn the difficult art of government. If governing were merely commanding, as the military believe, the rôle they assume would be justified. But to govern means to interpret, to reconcile, to respect the rights of all, to give freedom of expression to every opinion, to abide by the laws and never subordinate them to personal caprice. To govern—to govern well—often means to have the courage to rectify a mistake; to ask for and listen to advice; to have patience; and to realize that one owes one's power to the will of the people and exercises it for the period they have determined and within the limitations they have established. All of this is difficult for the military to understand and accept, accustomed as they are to the blind obedience of their inferiors, the dry voices of command, and the narrow horizon of their profession, which rarely encompasses the element of humanism.

Dictatorships of any kind, and particularly military ones, can only do harm in Latin America and jeopardize the fulfillment of our true destinies. Our essential need is to produce good citizens, to provide all of our people with the opportunity to assert their personalities, to dignify the Latin American of every class, giving him intellectual, moral and spiritual stature, and finally, to ennoble our nations. All of this is endangered by dictatorship, which invariably destroys character and by its very nature causes corruption wherever it exists. Dictatorship breeds dishonesty, ser-

vility, adulation, greed, and thereby debases the people it rules. For our America, whose purest apostle was José Martí, dictatorship represents a mortal peril. Our worst enemy is not poverty, but tyranny, the totalitarian disease which has done and is still doing so much evil.

There is no substitute for the essentially democratic régime in Latin America, adapted in its details to the idiosyncrasies of each nation, and it is the only régime which can offer the stability and security our friends in the United States long to see us achieve. Any dictatorship is precarious, and the only thing it can be sure of is its own downfall, especially when its foundations are as weak as those of our dictatorial régimes in Latin America. And when they fall, dictators usually bring down everything around them, including the majority of their friends. Many are they who regret having been such a friend, many are they who realize what a mistake it was to believe that in a choice between the dictator and the oppressed people, they could ignore or scorn the latter with impunity!

This desire for democratic government, this intense, persistent longing in the hearts of our people for the freedom which they have known and cannot reconcile themselves to living without, is another factor contributing to unity in Latin America. It is the shining current, sometimes running underground, sometimes in the full light of the sun, which no perspicacious observer can fail to discern in our countries, happy or sad, backward or progressive, but always hungering for justice, liberty and peace.

CHINESE MINORITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By Walter H. Mallory

THE lot of minorities is rarely a happy one. Aliens suffer social indignities, economic handicaps and sometimes actual bodily harm at the hands of indigenous populations. The degree of the unpleasantness which they are accorded depends upon many factors—racial differences, religion, social customs, their economic status, the degree of their loyalty to their own cultural mores, the strength and purposes of their home governments. It also depends upon the attitude of the people in whose midst they live toward their own ethnic and social standards. A minority in the United States, where the “melting pot” theory is given at least lip service, would be expected, for example, to fare very much better than an alien population in China where foreigners have traditionally been regarded as “barbarians” and spoken of (albeit without actual rancor) as “foreign devils.”

In the light of these considerations it can be seen that the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia live under trying circumstances, for all those conditions which make for separateness and arouse hostility are present there to a marked degree. Strong racial differences exist between the Chinese and the Southeast Asians; for the most part there are differences in religion; the Chinese perpetuate their language and social customs and hold firmly to them; they usually have a higher economic status than the majority group. Added to all this they are torn by the struggle between Communism and private enterprise, between Peking and Formosa. Most of their problems are not new; they have existed for centuries. Nor will their status be quickly changed or their lot made easier in the foreseeable future. The factors which have fashioned their present dilemma are much too fundamental to yield quickly to governmental action, no matter how enlightened, or to social changes, no matter how well intentioned and directed. Theirs is indeed a long-term problem.

II

The influence of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, and the effects of that influence, are considerably out of proportion to the numbers involved, substantial as these numbers are—a total of about ten millions. This represents approximately 2 percent of the total

Chinese in the world and less than 6 percent of the population of the Southeast Asian countries in which important Chinese minorities are found.

The following table is arranged in the order of size of the ethnic Chinese compared with the total population of each area:

*Chinese in Southeast Asia*¹

<i>Country</i>	<i>Chinese</i>	<i>Total Population</i>	<i>Percent Chinese</i>
Malaya (and Singapore)	3,000,000	5,900,000	50.8
British Borneo	220,000	880,000	25.0
Thailand	3,000,000	19,000,000	15.8
Indo-China	1,000,000	27,000,000	3.7
Indonesia	2,000,000	78,000,000	2.6
Burma	300,000	18,000,000	1.7
Philippines	150,000	21,500,000	0.7
Total:	9,670,000	170,280,000	5.7

London, New York and San Francisco have their "Chinatowns"—enclaves of Chinese residents who, despite the blandishments of occidental civilization, have kept in essence their way of life generation after generation. To be sure, most of these are now British subjects, or American citizens, and the children of the dwellers in Mott and Pell Streets have acquired the American idiom, an addiction to baseball and a certain boisterousness which seems to be a by-product of life in the United States. But I think no one would doubt that even these younger citizens are "Chinese" though their elders were qualified to vote for or against General Eisenhower or Mr. Truman. In Southeast Asia the Chinese minorities are even more conspicuous: the proportion of Chinese to the total population is much greater; contact with the homeland, which serves to nourish their separateness, is easier; and their importance in the community is very much greater. Whether one is in Singapore or Surabaya or Penang, if he strays into the Chinese quarter the sights and sounds and smells are unmistakably those of China.

No one knows for certain how long these Chinese communities have existed in Southeast Asia. The time must be measured in centuries rather than decades. Long before the discovery of America there were Chinese settlements in the *Nanyang* or South Seas, in Malaya, in Java, and to an even greater extent in Thai-

¹ These are "ethnic" or "legal" Chinese, in other words those who in general look like, act like and think of themselves as Chinese, or are thought of as such. If those of mixed blood were included the number would be much greater. The numbers are estimates. For more detailed figures of an earlier date see "The Chinese in Southeast Asia," by Victor Purcell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951).

land, Burma and Indo-China, which were contiguous to China proper and subject not only to colonization but to actual invasion and control. So when the Spanish, the Portuguese, the British and the Dutch came to Southeast Asia, the Chinese had already established themselves. These people came from Southeast China, from Kwantung, Fukien, Kwangsi and Kiangsi provinces. They had in many cases intermarried with the native women but had kept their culture.

While Chinese communities were firmly entrenched in the *Nanyang* before the age of Western colonialism, it was the favorable conditions created by the Spanish, Dutch and British which resulted in the substantial influx of the last few centuries. First, the Westerners brought comparative security, providing the opportunity for profitable trade. Later, the development of nineteenth century capitalism created a market for the raw materials which the East could produce for the industrial machines in Europe. New sources of labor were required for the tin mines and the rubber plantations of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. As trade grew and the standards of living slowly improved, the Chinese established themselves as shopkeepers and artisans. The Chinese talent for trade, their greater diligence and their superior ability as handicraftsmen brought them increasing opportunities. They finally gained control not only of most of the retail trade of this whole area but much of the international trade as well.

The qualities of the Chinese as good businessmen were early recognized by the Dutch and British, and resulted in their being given special opportunities until they came in many places to occupy a position between the ruling groups and native peoples. They were the compradors, the money lenders, the buyers of the exportable products for the Western overlords who furnished the markets, the capital and the shipping to carry them abroad. They were also the retail merchants who sold the goods which the native peoples took in return for their labor. This situation persists to this day despite the strenuous efforts by the postwar governments to supplant the Chinese with native businessmen.

While the colonial governments were quite willing or even anxious that the Chinese should continue as separate communities, the new independent governments formed since World War II have wished them to transfer their allegiance to the countries where they have so long made their homes. The Communist seizure of power in the Chinese homeland in 1949 has heightened

these desires. A strong nationalistic and expansionist government in China which claimed all overseas Chinese as their own gave urgency to the necessity for solving the nationality problem. There have been increased controls and restrictions of these minorities everywhere. In some cases an effort has been made to force the Chinese to choose rather promptly whether they are to become citizens of the new countries or to continue to be aliens. This has in theory given them three choices: to be citizens of the new countries, of Communist China, or of Nationalist China. But in fact in those countries that have recognized Communist China (Indonesia, Burma and the British colonies) there are only two choices, for Nationalist China has no representation in these places and the free Chinese are thus cut adrift.

III

The first country to achieve what its government apparently regards as satisfactory arrangements with Communist China with respect to its Chinese residents has been Indonesia. Indonesia gave early recognition to Peking. She set up a procedure providing that all Chinese who had been Dutch subjects would automatically become Indonesian citizens unless they registered as Chinese. It challenged Peking's claim that all Chinese everywhere were nationals of Communist China. However, the Chinese in Indonesia exhibited considerable coolness to the proposal despite the fact that the majority of them were born there and had become permanently identified with the country. Some were, of course, ardent Nationalists; others were impressed by the success of Mao Tse-tung in creating what looked like a strong régime, and felt that they could count on special support and protection from Peking which they would not have as Indonesian citizens.

No accurate statistics are available, but it has been estimated that perhaps 500,000 have thus far opted for Chinese citizenship. This does not mean that the remaining 1,500,000 desired to be Indonesians. In so vast a country, with its 3,000 separate islands stretched across 3,600 miles of ocean, there has been lack of knowledge of the regulations and confusion in registration. But more important, the great majority probably have not wanted to commit themselves one way or the other, at least until they are more certain where their best future lies. In view of this apparent reluctance for Indonesian nationality, the Nationalist Party, which formed the Cabinet in 1953, sought to force a choice, and

a law was drafted to give effect to that purpose. Such opposition developed, however, not only on the part of the Chinese but also among the Eurasians, that it has not been presented to Parliament.

Soon after Ambassador Arnold Mononutu was accredited to Peking in 1953, negotiations were undertaken between the two countries to solve the dual citizenship problems for the Chinese residing in Indonesia. The Peking Government claimed them all no matter where they were born. Indonesia claimed at least those who had been born in her territory and, in addition, wished to nationalize all who might seek Indonesian citizenship. Finally, at the Bandung Conference in April 1955, Chou En-lai, as a gesture of goodwill, announced an agreement on the issue with Indonesia. It was hailed by the two governments as a solution of the overseas Chinese problem in Indonesia, and as a model for other countries where large Chinese populations exist. The treaty must be ratified by both sides. Presumably this will present no difficulty so far as China is concerned, but very severe opposition is likely to be encountered in the Indonesian Parliament. As time has passed and the terms of the agreement have become known, the opposition to it has grown in Indonesia. All the principal opposition parties have expressed their disapproval, as have the organizations of Eurasians and even the Baperki (an organization composed mainly of Indonesian-born Chinese who favor assimilation) which is led by pro-Communists and serves as a forum not only for Chinese but also to some extent for other minorities. Both governments have been aware of these criticisms and during Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo's visit to Peking in June 1955, a clarification was made in an exchange of letters. The opposition, however, has persisted and even increased after the fall of the Sastroamidjojo Cabinet in July.

Since this treaty has been spoken of as a model for other countries, it may be useful to consider its main provisions, even though it has not as yet come into force. It states in the beginning that all persons who at the same time have the citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia and of the People's Republic of China shall choose between the two citizenships "in accordance with their own will." This must be done during a two-year period (from the date of ratification) by all Chinese over 18 years of age, or those under 18 years of age who are already married. A simple expression of choice is sufficient and the individual will thereby "auto-

matically lose" the other nationality. Anyone who does not express the choice of citizenship within two years "shall be considered to have chosen the citizenship of China if his father is of Chinese descent." If a father's citizenship is unknown, his children who fail to choose will take on the citizenship of their mother. Persons under 18 years of age, unless married, have the citizenship of their parents' choice until coming of age; then they have one year in which to choose for themselves.

An important provision stipulates that persons who have chosen Indonesian citizenship will "automatically" lose it if they leave Indonesia to "establish permanent residence elsewhere, and have regained the citizenship of the People's Republic of China in accordance with their own will." Children born in China or in Indonesia take, from birth, the citizenship of their fathers. In marriages between Chinese and Indonesians, both man and wife retain their original citizenship unless they voluntarily apply for and obtain the citizenship of the other.

Finally, each of the contracting parties agreed to urge their citizens residing in the country of the other contracting party to abide by the laws and customs of that country and not to participate in its political activities. There is also a general provision that the two contracting parties agree to give mutual protection to the legal rights and interests of the respective citizens according to the laws of their respective countries.

The agreement will come into force on the exchange of ratification, in Peking, and will remain in effect for 20 years unless either side wishes to annul it after one year's notice. The exchange of letters between Chou En-lai and Sastroamidjojo in June 1955 was intended to meet the criticism that many Chinese in Indonesia had already made a choice of citizenship and the new agreement would make it necessary for them to choose again. It was agreed, therefore, that among the Chinese with dual nationality in Indonesia there would be persons who, in fact, had only Indonesian nationality due to their long residence there, and thus only a "passive" choice. These persons would not be required to renew their choice; nor would those who under the treaty chose a definite nationality be required to make a further choice on the expiration of the treaty 20 years hence. Further, it was promised that a joint Indonesian-Chinese Commission would be established to carry out the provisions of the treaty.

There is no doubt that in signing this treaty Chou En-lai made

an important concession, and an important departure from established Chinese practice. No government in China's long history has agreed unequivocally to renounce the citizenship claims of persons of the Chinese race residing overseas. We do not know the reasons which may have prompted him to do so—perhaps to allay the very real fear that these overseas Chinese might serve as a fifth column to advance Communist aims; certainly to further the current Communist policy of “sweetness and light” and to win for Communist China the friendship of Southeast Asia. Also, he may have felt that those Chinese who had lived so long away from home and had established themselves so securely abroad as to cause them to be willing to give up their nationality would perhaps be an element of weakness rather than of strength. Certainly the Chinese who had adopted Communism would choose to be Chinese nationals and, under the terms of the agreement, all of those who did not choose—which might well be the vast majority—would automatically become Chinese. In other words, he would lose only those who were actually hostile to his régime, plus those whose interests were so strongly local that they would be of little use to him in any case. And finally this agreement has left the Nationalist Chinese literally without a refuge. They can become Indonesians, or they can desert to the Communist side. If they do nothing they will automatically become nationals of Communist China.

Foreigners who have no direct interest in the agreement have expressed doubts of Peking's sincerity. They point to the fact that during the period when the negotiations were going on the Chinese Communists were actually intensifying their appeals to their overseas brethren. All overseas Chinese were included in last year's census figures, and representatives from overseas, including four from Indonesia, were serving in the National People's Congress in Peking. The Peking authorities have encouraged investments by overseas Chinese, have sought to attract their children to homeland schools, and have offered to accord better treatment to their relatives in China.

Many Indonesians, in addition to their skepticism of Peking's real aims, have concrete objections to the treaty. They feel that the two-year registration period will introduce grave uncertainties and confusion. Even members of the Cabinet or of the Parliament who are of Chinese descent could be thought of during those years as aliens, and registered voters could likewise be challenged. The

provision that Indonesians of Chinese descent, on leaving Indonesia, would revert to Chinese citizenship seems to them to make Indonesian citizenship temporary, and to encourage its adoption for opportunistic reasons. The fact of having to make a choice within a certain time may force many who might otherwise not have taken action to choose to be Chinese when it is the hope of all Indonesians that they should become loyal Indonesian citizens. In other words, the effect is likely to be to force many more into the Chinese ranks than would normally have gone that way—and this is particularly true since all who do not choose will automatically become Chinese, not Indonesian. The terms of the treaty are reciprocal and apply to the Indonesian minority in China in the same manner as to the Chinese minority in Indonesia. The fact is, however, that there is no Indonesian minority in China, so the reciprocity has no practical importance.

Public criticism of this treaty in Indonesia would seem likely to discourage other governments in Southeast Asia from following Indonesia's lead. In the first place, the Philippines and Thailand have not recognized Communist China; and in Malaya and Singapore, where the proportion of Chinese is so great, the suggestion that the Chinese might become nationals of a foreign country is most unwelcome. The governments of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam are too insecure or too occupied with the struggle against Ho Chi Minh to deal with minority problems as such. That leaves only Burma as a likely immediate candidate for a treaty on the issue of dual nationality.

IV

The amazing loyalty of the Chinese to their own culture century after century is due in the first place to their satisfaction with the customs, the language, the philosophy and the scheme of organization of their society. They have, many times with good reason, felt superior to the populations in whose midst they have lived. And they have consciously sought, therefore, to devise the means to preserve their inherited way of life. The family system and the worship of their ancestors, whose graves are the family shrines, have tied them firmly to the homeland. They maintained Chinese newspapers. But the greatest force has been their schools. These they organized and supported, and their children, generation after generation, have learned the language, the history and the philosophy of their own race.

While many overseas Chinese are Buddhists or Christians or Mohammedans, by and large they are not a very religious group. Like their brethren at home they are essentially Confucian humanists. Their lives are molded by Confucian concepts. They are taught to be respectful to their parents, to defer to their elders, to love their brothers and sisters, and to be kind and truthful to their neighbors. They are more concerned with their relations with man than with God. They are more concerned with their present life than with the hereafter. The ethical instructions which they have received at home and in school are practised in their daily lives. If they violate these ethical principles, they "lose face" with their fellow countrymen—probably, in their opinion, the greatest misfortune that could happen to them.

The overseas Chinese have banded together in: 1, clan or family associations; 2, provincial or district associations, organized on the basis of the area in China from which they came; 3, benevolent associations, to look after their welfare; 4, Chambers of Commerce, made up of proprietors of businesses, and divided into different trade guilds; 5, labor unions; and 6, secret and fraternal societies. These overseas Chinese associations are local in nature; there is no relation, for example, between groups in Bangkok and their equivalents in Manila or Djakarta.

The functions of these associations are diverse. In general they devote themselves to the general welfare of the overseas Chinese. They provide financial aid, hospital care, charity and schooling for the young. They petition local authorities to ease restrictions or discrimination against their people—particularly in cases of trade and immigration. One of their important functions is in settling civil disputes by private arbitration. The Chinese have a traditional aversion to appearing in court.

While efforts have been going on in Southeast Asia to differentiate those Chinese who are really aliens, even more far-reaching efforts have been made to bring about an assimilation. Some of these measures may in time be effective, but others, being coercive, have resulted in alienating rather than in persuading the Chinese to change their status. This is particularly true in Indonesia where the economic restrictions which have been imposed on the Chinese in order to wrest from them their superior economic status have been applied on a racial basis without regard to citizenship. Actually these measures are not written into law, but it is difficult if not impossible for a Chinese, for example, to

obtain an import or export license. The distinction is made between *pure* Indonesian citizens and foreign citizens (which includes all Chinese); and between national firms (controlled by persons of Indonesian blood) and foreign firms. In this way the Chinese—even those who have declared themselves Indonesian citizens—are treated as though they were foreigners so far as business matters are concerned; and these matters are of primary importance to them.

Measures which may in the end have the most effect in bringing about an assimilation of the Chinese are being applied to their schools—the most vital tool to preserve their cultural integrity. In Thailand, the Chinese school system has been under attack for several decades. At first the government required that all teachers pass examinations in the Thai language, that instruction be in Thai, and that all syllabi in Chinese schools be subject to government regulations. Later, they actually began to close the schools, charging that these regulations were not being followed. By the end of World War II, all Chinese schools had been closed; but after the war they were revived again and attained a number of more than 400. But by 1950 all middle schools had again been closed, and the number of primary schools has been progressively reduced. Those that are left can scarcely be called Chinese schools at all—they are Thai schools, but supported and attended by Chinese. All instruction is in Thai except for Chinese language study which is permitted for a maximum of ten hours per week. The principals are Thai and they act as agents of the authorities in keeping a tight control. In Cambodia and Malaya there have also been restrictions against the establishment of Chinese schools, as well as controls to prevent Communist indoctrination. However, these schools now receive some financial support from the government. In Indonesia, on the other hand, where strict controls have been applied in the economic field, the schools have met little interference. There, preference is given to the Chinese language and the curriculum is oriented toward China.

Another measure affecting the Chinese minorities is in the field of immigration. All of the countries of Southeast Asia have increased their immigration restrictions. In Thailand, for example, there was a large influx of Chinese in the early years of this century. When the influx, interrupted by the war, resumed in 1945, the Thai government became alarmed and in 1947 restricted Chinese immigration to 10,000 annually. The following year the

number was reduced to 200 annually, a quota still in force. The object of the Thai government is to stabilize the Chinese population at its present level and then to assimilate it. Quite inconsistently, however, the government has made Thai citizenship more difficult for all aliens, including the Chinese. Indonesia has also drastically restricted Chinese immigration to only a few individuals a year, and Chinese students who go to China for their education are not permitted to return.

The Chinese in Malaya cannot be regarded as a minority in the usual sense. If the Malay States and Singapore (a British Crown Colony like Hong Kong) are taken together, the Chinese are actually in the majority. In Singapore, the Chinese are in the vast majority—ethnically it is a Chinese city. But here also there is a strong desire on the part of the government to hold the population's loyalty to the local régime rather than to China. In the Federated Malay States the Chinese comprise 38 percent of the population, the Malays 49 percent. The Chinese have the wealth and control the business, but the Malays wield the political power. In the 1955 election in Malaya the electoral roll totalled 1,280,000. Of these 1,078,000 were Malays while only 143,000 were of the Chinese race.

Until recently the Chinese were not much concerned by their lack of citizenship in Malaya, for they were under British rule and their all-important economic rights were protected. With the granting of more and more self-government this situation has changed, and lack of citizenship has now become their major grievance. Thus the Chinese in Malaya, despite their numbers, are undergoing some of the difficulties of the Chinese minorities in other Southeast Asian countries.

v

Since the theory of Communism, and indeed its practice in China as in Russia, means the death of private property, one would expect that the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia, who have the wealth and the control of business in this vast region, would be utterly hostile to the Peking Communist régime and would prefer to remain loyal to the National Government on Formosa. The overseas Chinese communities, however, have been a major battleground for both groups. Both have sought by overt and underground means to gain the support of these minorities and, if possible, control of them.

The Peking régime has endeavored to assure the continuance of remittances from overseas Chinese to their families on the mainland; the resulting foreign exchange is of value to them for financing Communist activities abroad and to facilitate imports. They have, of course, wished to use these communities as centers for infiltration, for intelligence and for the recruitment of agents to further the international Communist conspiracy.

The Nationalists have been largely concerned with prestige. If the Chinese in Southeast Asia favor Peking, it inevitably weakens Nationalist influence in the world and has an effect on the population of China itself, whose allegiance they must win back from the Communists if they are ever to return to the mainland. The struggle has waxed and waned; sometimes the Nationalists seemed to have overwhelming support and at other times the Peking régime appeared to have gained the ascendancy. There is no knowing how genuine the popular feeling is on either side; the rapid shift of sentiment would suggest that the motivation is opportunistic and often prompted by personal rather than patriotic motives. The casual observer—and almost everyone who is not Chinese must be counted as casual—can gauge this sentiment only by outward manifestations such as which flag, the Communist or Nationalist, is flown on holidays, or what numbers of people go to what meetings. The experience of this casual observer in Indonesia in 1953 led to the belief that every Chinese shop owned three flags—the Communist, the Nationalist and the Indonesian—and that the owner flew the one that seemed most appropriate for the occasion. For example, on the traditional tenth of October holiday, the Nationalist flag was in the majority; on the celebration of the advent of the Communist Party to power in China, there were, naturally, no Nationalist flags. During the Bandung Conference, Djakarta was blazoned with Communist flags and great crowds of Chinese turned out to cheer Chou En-lai on his arrival. I dare say corresponding crowds would turn out for Chiang Kai-shek—and many of them would probably be the same people.

But though it is difficult to measure the degree of support which each side has, it is possible to gauge the trend of opinion, and many observers believe that the majority is now, at least ostensibly, on the side of Peking. After all, these people came originally from China—not Formosa. Their family ties are on the mainland. With the mainland in Communist hands, if they

are to visit the graves of their ancestors, or see the land of their father's birth, they must have a Communist or a foreign, not a Nationalist, passport. These are strong pulls.

Adherence of the Chinese of Southeast Asia to Peking can be a detriment to the cause of Nationalist China and to the free world; but fortunately it can at the same time be a detriment to the Communists. For the more actively this minority group gives allegiance to an alien government, the more suspect they will become in the eyes of the population where they reside, and the more closely will they be controlled. Any effort of Peking to use these groups for its own ends immediately provokes strong reactions. Southeast Asians have seen the Communists move into Tibet, they are aware of their open support of Ho Chi Minh, they know of the close hookup between Peking and their own Communist parties. They are probably more alert to the dangers which menace them than people outside the area realize. What they perhaps do not see is that by building a position of strength *vis-à-vis* Peking they would be helping to solve their problem with the Chinese minority. For this minority which is devoted to free enterprise and favors a business-as-usual policy would identify itself firmly with a strong local government. Its attraction to Peking is increased by local weakness.

Relations between the peoples and governments of Southeast Asia and their Chinese minorities present problems which can be solved only by the Asians themselves. All the Southeast Asian countries are trying to assimilate these minority groups and to gain their loyalty and support for Indonesia, for Malaya, for Thailand—not for Mao Tse-tung or world Communism. Americans can try to appreciate the importance of the problem, and hope that those who bear the responsibility will be successful in mastering the difficulties. But we must realize that it will take a long time and that such problems are never really solved. The most that can be hoped for is enlightened adjustment. Meanwhile, our sympathy goes out to the Chinese minorities themselves whose economic status is being threatened, whose cultural and social pattern is being pressed into foreign molds, and whose traditional ethical and business standards are being ruthlessly attacked by the Communist conspirators in Peking.

DEFENSE OF THE NEAR EAST

By Dankwart A. Rustow


EGYPT'S agreement to barter cotton for arms from the Soviet bloc has once again involved the Near East conspicuously in the Cold War. The Communists have followed up this victory, their first in the Near East in about eight years, by making further offers of arms and other types of aid to countries in the area. The regional troubles which the Russians are thus exploiting were already sufficiently grave. In late August there began a series of armed clashes between Egypt and Israel which have resulted in the heaviest casualties since 1949. The impasse in British-Greek-Turkish negotiations over Cyprus set off a wave of ugly mob violence in Istanbul and Izmir unprecedented in 22 years of the Turkish Republic, paralyzing, for a time at least, both the eastern flank of NATO and the year-old Balkan alliance. Further to the West, recurrent riots in Morocco and Algeria caused France to divert about half her NATO forces to North Africa and jeopardized an area containing a heavy concentration of Western defense installations.

In the year preceding these outbreaks of violence, Western diplomats had achieved what appeared to be notable successes, including agreements regarding the Suez base, Iranian oil, Tunisian home rule and mutual defense among the so-called "northern tier" countries (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan). Almost overnight the crises in Egypt, Palestine, Cyprus and North Africa threatened the regional stability and defensive strength that these agreements had seemed to promise.

The Near East has long been recognized as a focal area both in world politics and in military strategy. What are the main factors that give it its special strategic value? What are its assets and liabilities for regional defense? What are the threats against which it may have to be defended?

II

The first strategic factor is geography. Because of its location, the Near East can serve both as a link and as a barrier between oceans and between continents. A strong Near Eastern defense system would provide an essential connection between Western positions in Europe and in Australasia, securing communications



between NATO and SEATO. If the Suez Canal were closed to allied shipping, the distance between the North Atlantic and the Indian Ocean would be increased by up to 6,000 miles and the required number of ships would be doubled. Conversely, Russian access to the Indian Ocean is probably a prerequisite to Soviet naval operations on a world scale.

The geographic importance of the Near East can best be shown by an examination of the strategic situation which its loss would entail for the West. The Taurus-Zagros mountain line (which, as we shall see, is the principal natural defense of the region) measures only about 1,000 miles from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. To the west of Suez, the only comparable obstacles to a Soviet overland advance are the Atlas and the mountains of Ethiopia and Kenya, separated by about 3,000 miles of desert and steppe. The Zagros line is thus the natural defense not only of the Near East; it is also a first-line defense of the Mediterranean and of the entire African continent (protecting the flank and rear of Europe), as well as of the Indian Ocean and the flank of South and Southeast Asia. As General Eisenhower put it some years ago, "As far as sheer value of territory is concerned, there is no more strategically important area in the world than the Middle East."

Aside from its superlative importance for defense, the Near East is an ideal base of operations for any counterattack by air or land against Soviet aggression. The Near Eastern frontier from Turkey to Afghanistan is the only region where Soviet power has failed to expand beyond its 1939 frontiers. The Near East juts like a wedge driven between positions of Soviet strength in Eastern Europe and East Asia. Its air bases are closer to the main Soviet industrial centers at Baku, along the Donets, in the Urals, and in Southern Siberia than any other non-Communist territory. Conversely, all the vital parts of the Near East—including the northern tier and Levant countries, the major oil fields, the Suez Canal and Western air bases as far away as Tripoli—are within a 1,000-mile radius of airfields in Bulgaria, Caucasia and Turkestan.

The second strategic factor—Near Eastern oil—became prominent after the Second World War when the region attained the status of a first-class oil producer. Its importance is likely to increase in the future, as a few statistics will illustrate. While world production of petroleum more than doubled between 1938 and

1953, Near Eastern production multiplied seven times, raising its share in the total from about 6 to about 20 percent. In the three years of shutdown at Abadan (1951-1954), the Arabian oil fields stepped up their production by about one-half; at the same time roughly 15 barrels of oil were newly discovered for every barrel extracted. The estimated proven reserves of crude petroleum in the Near East are well over ten times the prewar figure. In 1953 alone three times as much oil was added to the industry's conservative estimates of proven reserves in the region as had been produced in 42 years of Near Eastern operations. Today therefore nearly two-thirds of the world's known oil deposits are located in the Near East. Even at the recent high rates of extraction, the region's present proven reserves would insure a steady supply for nearly a century, as against about a dozen years in the United States.

In the actual conduct of any future world war, however, the importance of Near Eastern oil can be discounted: wells, pipelines and tankers make too neat a target for bombers and saboteurs to allow either belligerent to count on a steady flow of petroleum from the region. Moreover, increased production in the Western Hemisphere would probably make up the loss to the free world. In a period of armed peace or preparation for war, on the other hand, the Russians may well be interested both in denying the oil to the West and in acquiring it for their own use. The Near East today meets about four-fifths of Western Europe's demand for petroleum and thus appreciably slows the depletion of the Western Hemisphere fields which are our safest source of supply. Use of the oil in Russia, to be sure, would require undisturbed control of the Eastern Mediterranean or the construction of major pipelines across the Iranian mountains (an unenviable task compared to past pipeline projects across the level Arabian desert). Much of Siberia, moreover, consists of potentially oil-bearing strata so that the Soviets could meet any additional needs more easily by drilling than by conquest. In the Near East itself, however, the oil could fuel a Russian air force and possible naval operations in the Indian Ocean. It seems likely, therefore, that Russian control of Near Eastern oil, if achieved prior to an outbreak of worldwide hostilities, would seriously affect the fuel balance between the two sides and hence the outcome of the war itself.

To these two factors of geography and petroleum must be

added a third—the psychological effect of Near Eastern relations with the West and East on other areas of Asia and Africa. It is a factor that has received less than its due share of attention in our strategic thinking about the region, yet it may well turn out to be decisive.

The Near East not only geographically but in its relations with the West is about midway between the countries of Asia which won complete independence following the Second World War and the countries of Africa which are still largely under Western domination. Although Western hegemony in the Near East generally took the form of mandates, protectorates and preferential treaties rather than outright colonial rule, it is only in recent years—notably since the agreements on Abadan and Suez—that the area as a whole has been able to deal with the West on something like a basis of full independence. What will take the place of the previous political order once guaranteed by Western predominance? Will countries of the region be able to live peaceably alongside each other? Will countries like Egypt, having attained full independence, find and accept a suitable place in the concert of free nations? Will young nations, assisted by the West, be able to insure domestic progress and regional defense? Or will the vacuum left by the withdrawal of Western dominance result in domestic upheaval and regional strife, to be filled eventually by the pressure of Soviet power? The outcome will influence profoundly the West's long-term position in Africa and the short-term attitude of our present friends and allies in South and East Asia.

III

Before we investigate the political complexities involved in forging stable alliances in the Near East, let us examine the area's purely military strengths and weaknesses. Fortunately its most effective geographic barriers—its mountains and seas—all fortify it against possible invasion from the northeast. The Black and Caspian Seas together with the high mountains that stretch in a continuous chain from Anatolia to the Pamirs provide an excellent defense line immediately along the Soviet frontier. The most inhospitable terrain—the Eastern Turkish mountains or “Armenian knot”—lies directly athwart the shortest route from Russia to Suez. To the southeast and southwest the Taurus and Zagros mountains form a second defensive arc connecting this central massif with the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. This second

line has the added advantage that the defender's supplies would move across comparatively level terrain whereas the aggressor would have to bring men and equipment across the first mountain chain. A quick glance at a physical map thus shows that the Near East has a girdle of natural defenses against invasion from Russia second perhaps only to the Alps and the Himalayas on the Eurasian continent. Even in an air age, such a defense line can be a great asset.

But this heavy concentration of natural barriers in the northeast has at least two other implications. First, an airborne operation from Trans-Caucasia would have to traverse less than 300 miles of mountain terrain to reach the plain of northern Iraq. Once Soviet power were extended, in peace or war, south of the Taurus-Zagros line the entire region would be wide open to further invasion. The Anti-Lebanon and the Lebanon ranges are too close to the sea to allow for strong deployment. A defense line across the Sinai peninsula would, at best, protect Africa. On the other hand, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean are close enough on either flank to bring the entire region within easy range of Western carrier-based aircraft. Similarly, the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf coasts offer a number of ports and beaches suitable for amphibious landings, so that a Soviet-occupied Near East would be highly vulnerable to re-invasion by Western forces.

The Turkish army with its 22 infantry divisions and six armored brigades—about 500,000 men in all—is the largest land force not only in the Near East but in NATO as well. The next largest army, at the periphery of the region, is that of Pakistan with close to 200,000 men. The Arab countries and Iran have a total of around 300,000 men under arms, but among military experts only the two divisions of Jordan's British-trained Arab Legion and possibly Egypt's army of approximately 80,000 would be considered to come close to modern standards of training, organization and equipment. The valor of the Turkish soldier has won high praise from those who observed the Turkish brigade in action in Korea, and Turkey over the last seven years has been allocated over one billion dollars in Western military aid—both for heavy equipment and for construction of facilities such as ports, airfields and supply routes. Since Turkey has one of the few effective conscription systems in the region there is a pool of trained or partly trained reserves of well over a million men. On

the other hand, one out of every two recruits is illiterate and the only mechanical skills he commands are likely to be those acquired during his military service. Turkey's industrial plant, vastly improved as a result of the government's recent efforts and of American aid, still is inadequate to service let alone replace her army's mechanized equipment.

American military aid to Pakistan and to Iraq has only just begun. There is little heavy industry in the Arab countries and in Iran. Israel alone offers—in addition to a well-trained army capable of instant mobilization to a level of about 200,000 men—something approaching adequate repair and maintenance facilities for a region-wide war effort. But in view of recent increased tension and violence along her borders there seems to be less prospect than ever that Israel can be integrated into a region-wide defense system. In short, much of the trained manpower and nearly all the military equipment for an effective defense of the region will have to be supplied from the outside.

Turkey, aside from having the best defensive terrain and the largest army, also has the longest road and rail network of the region. Two trunk lines link Turkey with Iraq and the Persian Gulf, and with Syria and Jordan; a third, the Trans-Iranian line, connects the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. All major rail lines are single track, and the routes in Turkey and Iran pass over many bridges and through numerous tunnels. There are some excellent ports, such as Izmir, Beirut, Haifa, Alexandria and Basra, and others are under construction—*e.g.* at Iskenderun, at Latakia and on Cyprus. The region's military airfields are sufficiently dispersed to afford some security against enemy attack. There are major bases at Dhahran in Sa'udi Arabia and at Habbaniyah in Iraq, as well as numerous larger and smaller fields in Turkey, on Cyprus, in the Suez Canal Zone, in Libya, in French North Africa and in Spain.

Whatever the Near East lacks in military training, equipment, communications and even industrial plant could largely be remedied, given sufficient funds, competent advice and time. The most serious obstacles to an effective and integrated defense of the region, however, are neither military nor industrial but rather political. The deep-rooted disunity among the peoples concerned and their distrust of the West have so far thwarted all diplomatic attempts at fashioning an inclusive Near Eastern security system, have slowed efforts toward economic develop-

ment and have opened many avenues for Soviet propaganda and diplomacy.

IV

The Near East bristles with boundary disputes and other international frictions. Greece, Britain and Turkey have fallen out over Cyprus; Syria after 16 years still smarts at the loss of Iskenderun to Turkey; Arab relations have been perplexed by rivalry between Hashemites and Sa'udites and between Egypt and Iraq; Egypt has not forgotten her dream of a unified Nile valley; Afghanistan has claimed independence for the Pushtu border region of Pakistan; Pakistan and India have been at odds over Kashmir. There has been a revolution in Egypt, a succession of military coups in Syria, a series of authoritarian régimes in Iran, and chronic governmental instability in Iraq, while Turkey lately has been in the throes of a severe economic crisis. Worst of all, the Palestine dispute, temporarily adjourned by the armistices of 1949, periodically has threatened to throw the region back into war. The misery of close to a million destitute Arab refugees, the Arab economic boycott and partial blockade of Israel, the rival claims to water, the continual border incidents, have all this time embittered the conflict on both sides.

In relations between the Arabs and the West the Palestine question has long provided the chief irritant. During the period following the First World War and for close to a century before that the West's interest in the Near East had been primarily commercial and strategic. In Palestine alone did colonialism imply colonization. The Zionists, invited by the British mandate and supported by American funds, had come to stay: they proclaimed nationhood for Israel at the very moment when colonialism was in full retreat elsewhere in the region. Common opposition to Israel and to her Western supporters thus has become one of the few effective political bonds among the Arab states.

But generally Near Eastern attitudes toward the West have tended to be ambivalent. Western technical and military superiority, from the late eighteenth century onward, provided both the chief incentive and the chief psychological obstacle to Westernization. In their diplomacy, the governments of the region soon took to playing off the more remote Western Powers against those closer at hand, and major European wars were seized on

as opportunities for securing greater independence. Iran long maintained a precarious sovereignty amid opposing pressures from Britain and Russia. The Arabs in the First World War invoked British help to throw off Ottoman rule, while during the Second World War men like the Mufti of Jerusalem, the Egyptian Premier Ali Mahir, and Rashid Ali, leader of the Iraq coup in 1941, were tempted to align with the Axis in order to oust the British. From their narrow perspective, many Near Easterners—and especially Arabs, who have had no direct contact with Russia—tend to see the present world conflict as just another dispute among two groups of European Powers. Once again the temptation is to profit from tension among the Powers to promote one's own political aspirations.

Regional disunity and animosity towards the West have long been familiar in many parts of the world. But there are several reasons—all implicit in what has been said before—why these attitudes have particularly serious implications in the Near East at this time. First, the Near East, unlike South and East Asia with its peninsulas and archipelagoes, is a compact region which is likely to stand or fall as a unit whether war is hot or cold. Second, containment of global aggression requires harmony along a broad belt: the effectiveness of any northern tier defense scheme, for example, is seriously impaired if it causes countries like Afghanistan, Syria or Egypt to veer to the other side. Third, the struggle of formerly dependent and agrarian areas for full sovereignty and industrialization has come to be inextricably and perilously interwoven with the present East-West contest. President Truman's Point Four message acknowledged this connection—but the Communists have been aware of it since Lenin's writings on colonialism. *Their* bold new program of supporting the nationalist and anti-Western aspirations of what they choose to call the "colonies and semi-colonies of Imperialist Powers" began as early as 1917. Although most of the Near East today is fully sovereign, the problem of colonial devolution still presents itself in its classical form in such areas as Cyprus and North Africa: how to foster responsible self-government, a viable economy and external security before demands for independence have become irresistible. Any hesitation and any miscalculation in this policy field is apt to hurt the Western cause not only by poisoning our relations with the region but by providing high-test fuel for the Kremlin's propaganda machine.

Despite its many military weaknesses and political difficulties, the Near East has so far proved relatively safe from the Soviet threat. The Turkish army, supported in the mid-forties by the British and more recently by the United States, guarded the forbidding Eastern Anatolian mountains and thus served as a deterrent to rash military ventures. The British treaties with Iraq and Jordan and, above all, British control of Suez protected the southern parts of the region. (In World War II the Suez base supported as many as 41 divisions—roughly equivalent to all the forces now under arms in the entire northern tier region, and as late as 1954 British maintenance troops there still outnumbered Egypt's armed forces.) In 1945-47 local opposition, supported by Western military assistance and Western diplomacy, thwarted the last major Soviet bid for expansion into the Near East. Communist troops were defeated or withdrawn in Greece and Iran, and Soviet diplomatic overtures for a foothold along the Turkish straits, on the Dodecanese or in Libya, went unheeded.

In the years following 1947, Soviet preoccupation with China and the Far East may have contributed to alleviating the pressure on the Near East. Meanwhile the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO (1951) consolidated the Western position, as did agreements for British bases in Jordan and Libya and American airfields in Libya and Sa'udi Arabia. Yet Western diplomats for many years were mainly preoccupied with attempts at settling the Palestine, Anglo-Egyptian and Anglo-Iranian disputes. Their effort to organize a comprehensive Middle East Defense Organization failed as it ran head-on into Arab animosity over the Palestine issue and Egyptian demands for evacuation of Suez and the Sudan. Following his Near Eastern tour in the spring of 1953, Mr. Dulles suggested a fresh solution to the problem. A Middle East Defense Organization, he cautioned, was "a future rather than an immediate possibility;" "no such system can be imposed from without." The United States therefore should work to "strengthen the interrelated defense of those countries which want strength, not as against each other or the West, but to resist the common threat to all free peoples." For the present at least, such willingness was found primarily among the northern tier of nations. The Turkish-Pakistani friendship pact in the spring of 1954, agreements for United States military aid to Iraq and Pakistan, and the Baghdad Treaty of mutual coöperation (February 1955) put this northern tier plan into

effect. Subsequently Britain, Pakistan and Iran joined the Baghdad Treaty, and by late fall there seemed a possibility that Jordan might follow suit.

The most obvious advantage of the northern tier policy was that it broke the diplomatic log-jam that for years had hampered all efforts at integrated regional defense. In the event of military aggression, it will enable Western forces to fight a Russian advance along the crucial Zagros defense line. Psychologically Iran's accession to the Baghdad Treaty in October and the meeting of the Baghdad Treaty Council in November tended to offset some of the propaganda value of the Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms agreement. But the short-range, and even the ultimate, contribution of the Baghdad Pact should be judged cautiously. Its effectiveness will depend largely on the internal stability of each of the participating governments, at least two of which—in Iran and Iraq—have maintained themselves in power by almost completely silencing potential opposition. Iran, Iraq and even Pakistan are still seriously deficient in military equipment and training. Strategically, moreover, the northern tier concept is valid only as long as supply lines across other Arab countries remain open to the West—or at the very minimum as long as the “southern tier” countries can be relied upon to maintain a friendly neutrality in a moment of crisis. The only rail connection between Turkey and Iraq follows the Syrian border for about 300 miles and then cuts across 45 miles of Syrian territory. There are at present no rail lines or first-class roads from Turkey and Iraq into Iran or from Iran into Pakistan. The West's natural supply routes to all northern tier countries except Turkey thus run through Syria toward Iraq or through Suez to the Persian Gulf. In case of armed attack on the Near East it may be taken for granted that the West would be able to secure these lines of communication. But if the Czech arms deal proves to be only a prelude to Communist penetration of the “southern tier,” the military value of the Baghdad Pact would be seriously jeopardized.

The Suez Canal remains the strategic hub of the entire region. The British agreement of October 1954 to evacuate Suez leaves the northern tier unguarded at a key point in its rear. Although Egypt has promised to let Britain re-activate the base in case of armed attack on any Arab country or on Turkey, there might not be time. Cyprus, because of its location and terrain, cannot (nor is it intended to) serve as a full substitute for the Canal Zone.

For a time there seemed to be hope that Egypt, having asserted her rights to Suez, might join Western defense arrangements of her own free will. Northern tier negotiations may in part have sought to speed Egypt's decision. But if such was the diplomatic plan, it clearly failed. Egypt's immediate reaction was to announce a military alliance, free from extra-regional associations, with Syria and Sa'udi Arabia. Moreover, there can be little doubt in retrospect that Iraq's adherence to the Baghdad Pact, by frustrating Egypt's long-standing ambition to lead the Arab states in matters of foreign policy, contributed to the recent Soviet-Egyptian move. Other important factors were the failure of Egypt's "Unity-of-the-Nile" policy in the face of British and later Sudanese opposition, mounting friction with Israel, and a military junta's need to placate its own army and to enhance its popularity by some dramatic gesture of independence.

In sum, Western policy has achieved a favorable alignment in part of the Near East at the cost of widening the gulf between the West and other countries in the region. It has sought to prepare positions of military strength at the risk of opening a wider field for Soviet propaganda and diplomatic manoeuvre. The northern tier plan thus leaves open the question: How much better is half a regional defense system than none at all?

v

No evaluation of the Western defensive position in the Near East can be complete without some estimate, however tentative, of Soviet intentions and capabilities in the area. Three main possibilities should be considered.

(1) First there is the possibility of an all-out attack on the West, with fission and fusion bombs and long-range missiles. In such a war, it seems safe to say, the Near East would not be among the primary Soviet targets. Assuming the purpose was a surprise knockout blow against the West, Russia's only immediate interest in the Near East would be to destroy Allied air bases as a means of reducing the scale of massive retaliation.

From our standpoint, defense of the Near East is a means rather than an end in itself. The area contains neither the free institutions we are defending nor the industrial plant with which we must defend them. Its chief importance in an all-out type of war, then, would be to serve as one of several launching grounds (albeit the closest to target) for a Western counterattack on

Soviet centers of industry and airpower. The force of the assault on the Near East would depend, therefore, on the amount of airpower the Soviets were willing and able to divert from their main objective. Defense against this kind of attack would depend almost entirely on Western air strength in the region.

(2) A Russian military invasion of the Near East by land and air might meet less immediate resistance than in Europe but would operate initially in far more difficult terrain. Military experts assume that forces now in the area could not long withstand a massive Russian offensive. But the Taurus-Zagros line, if properly built up within the framework of the Baghdad Treaty, might delay an invader for weeks, perhaps months. This would allow the West to rush in necessary reinforcements—always provided that southern supply lines remain open.

This second type of armed attack seems extremely unlikely as long as the Russians know that it will at once bring into play the West's full defensive and retaliatory power. It may be argued that since the days of Dienbienphu there has been little talk of massive retaliation and that the Soviets, relying on the mutually deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, will be tempted into limited military adventures without fear of full-scale reprisals. It may also be argued, even more plausibly, that as long as the Western front holds firm in Europe, the contest will be decided in other areas—*i.e.* the Near East, South and East Asia and Africa. The answer is that the Near East in peacetime already has what Southeast Asia lacked until the decisive days of the Indo-China campaign—the nucleus of a coherent regional defense system. The Western Powers are pledged to defend Greece and Turkey under NATO, and are linked to Pakistan through SEATO; Britain, Turkey and Pakistan in turn are pledged under the Baghdad Treaty to coöperate for the defense of Iran and Iraq. A statement that the Western Powers would consider any armed attack anywhere along Russia's Near Eastern frontier an attack on themselves would thus not be the result of any last-minute improvisation; in fact it is implicit in a carefully developed and long-standing policy. Any miscalculation of Western intentions in this region would be extremely perilous to the Kremlin. For Russia borders on the Near East without benefit of satellites (and except for Afghanistan without uncommitted buffer states); there is no North Korea and no Chinese People's Republic to bear the brunt of a counteroffensive. The creation of the northern

tier grouping thus would seem to have greatly reduced the likelihood of any overt attack by land and air. There is one additional reason (and this one less comforting) why an armed invasion seems unlikely in the near future: the Soviets have been much too successful in following the third possible line of attack.

(3) The most immediate danger is of "peaceful" penetration by propaganda, diplomatic manœuvre, military and economic aid, followed perhaps by subversion and thinly disguised military action such as was employed a decade ago in Greece and Azerbaijan. There is no need to speculate on the likelihood of this type of offensive. The propaganda campaign has been in progress for years—carried on by local Communists, through Soviet information offices, at commercial fairs, during visits to Moscow of leaders like Abdel Nasser and Nehru, in the United Nations, and at Bandung. The news of the last four months has made it clear that the second phase—one of intense diplomatic manœuvre and military and economic aid—now is also in full swing. Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt are reported to include MIG planes, submarines and other heavy equipment—weapons, in short, which no Near Eastern country, or indeed any small Power, has ever had at its disposal except under regional security arrangements such as NATO. Not long ago the Soviet Ambassador to Cairo told newsmen he was looking forward to the arrival in the Near East of Soviet "economic missions, scientific missions, agricultural missions, meteorological missions, and any other kind of mission you can imagine. . . ." The conclusion of military pacts between Egypt, Syria and Sa'udi Arabia; the recent treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union and Yemen; Egypt's open support for North African nationalists; increasingly intimate Soviet-Afghan economic relations; and rumors that Russia might offer aid to the Palestine Arab refugees—all these open vistas that must be intensely tempting to the men of the Kremlin.

It would be presumptuous to suggest specific tactical moves on a fast-moving diplomatic scene—a large part of which, of necessity, is hidden from the public view. In fact it is easier to point to the dangers in various possible courses of action than to propose positive alternatives. A few concluding observations, however, may be in order.

Western statesmen are to be applauded for rejecting any thought of offering Egypt Western arms in lieu of those received from behind the Iron Curtain; this would have been tantamount

to submitting to extortion. It is to be hoped that they also will discard any idea of matching Soviet arms for Egypt with equal quantities of Western arms for Israel or of offering her a one-sided security treaty (as opposed to a two-way border guarantee). Either of these steps would only add to the explosiveness of the situation and tend to drive the uncommitted Arab countries into Russia's arms. There is no question that the West must prevent by every means the resumption of full-scale war in Palestine—if only because such a war would almost certainly spread, and quite possibly spread out of control. To this end, it may ultimately be necessary to dispatch troops to separate the combatants physically—distasteful as such a move may seem. United Nations action for any such purpose would very likely be hampered by Soviet vetoes, or else would involve direct Soviet participation. Thus action by the existing Truce Organization may be preferable or, failing that, by the United States, Britain and France as signatories of the 1950 declaration on the status quo in Palestine. Indeed, to negotiate with the Russians directly for any kind of “settlement” of the Near Eastern crisis would seem both absurd and humiliating, for they can hardly be supposed to be sincere in their desire to “settle,” except on their own terms, a situation which they have been at such evident pains to unsettle.

The greatest danger perhaps is that our legitimate and urgent concern over the explosive Palestine situation will lead us to overlook the wider implications of recent Soviet moves. These moves are not primarily a military threat, nor are they just a threat to Israel or even just to the Near East. What ultimately is at stake is the free world's position in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, in Southern Asia and Northern Africa. The West therefore should endeavor to consolidate its position in those areas and those policy spheres not immediately affected by the present crisis, while standing ready at every opportunity to counteract and repair the situation in the Near East. We must strengthen the defenses and communications of the northern tier while doing everything to forestall further infiltration in its rear. Since the West will increasingly be involved in competing with the Soviet bloc in the sphere of economic and technical assistance, much will be gained if such projects as the Assuan dam are completed with the aid of Western funds and Western experts. The defenses of areas like Libya, French North Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya will have to be reinforced. More important, it is to be hoped that

with the return of Sultan ben Yusef the Moroccan question will be settled along the lines of the Franco-Tunisian agreement and of increasing scope for self-government, and that the Cyprus question will come closer to a solution before there is another series of major outbreaks.

For some time Egypt is likely to remain the key to the Near Eastern situation. Now that she has finally freed herself from what she considered the vestiges of British colonialism, it would be tragic if she were to throw herself recklessly into the arms of a far more selfish and ruthless colonialism. But we should not assume that Egypt has already done so or that her arms deal with Czechoslovakia has put her forever beyond the pale. The West must rid itself of the habit—still reflected in some of our official statements—of thinking of Near Eastern countries as wayward or compliant children rather than as free agents in international politics. The West also would do well to encourage the formation of viable groups of states, such as the British have promoted in their Central and West African territories. In the long run, a strong Northeast African bloc of, say, Egypt, the Sudan, Libya and Ethiopia—with or without formal ties to the West but determined and able to resist any outside attack—would be of immense value both to the region itself and to the cause of the free world.

A policy of defense perhaps must necessarily rely on a certain amount of improvisation from crisis to crisis. But even while it is engaged in putting out fires, Western policy should redouble its efforts to make the Near Eastern region less inflammable.

THE SAAR MOVES TOWARD GERMANY

By Elizabeth Wiskemann

WITH the industrial age the old Franco-German clash of interests in Europe became primarily a struggle for coal and iron, the sinews—until uranium overtakes them—of peaceful industry or of the waging of war. The quarrels over Lorraine and Morocco before 1914 were part of the struggle to control supplies of iron ore. The coal mines and steel mills of the Saar were developed in conjunction with a German Lorraine from 1871 to 1918. Saar coal, however, was mostly not of good quality and it was difficult to mine; in consequence the German Government put the interests of the Ruhr before those of the Saar, whose communications were consequently neglected. It was not unreasonable, therefore, for the Saar to be provisionally placed, as it was in 1920, under an international régime—a commission of the League of Nations—which preserved its economic links with Lorraine within a customs union with France. This suited both the French, who were now short of coal in proportion to their iron, and the Saarlanders: indeed the latter were particularly well off under the League because their trade with Germany was also to all intents and purposes free. The Treaty of Versailles had laid down that a plebiscite was to be held in the Saar after 15 years; in January 1935 chauvinistic exaltation combined with Nazi intimidation to inflate the instinctive desire of this German population to be reincorporated in Germany, and 90 percent of the Saarlanders voted for this.

After the Second World War, the French took the view that the Ruhr mines should be taken out of German control. They abandoned this principle unwillingly and only in return for Anglo-American approval of the renewed separation of the Saar territory from the rest of Germany. Over 20 years after the plebiscite organized by the League of Nations, on October 23, 1955, the Saarlanders rejected by 423,434 to 201,973 votes (67.7 percent to 32.3 percent) a Statute to which the French and West German Governments after wearisome negotiation had agreed, and according to which the Saar would have become an autonomous entity under the aegis of Western European Union. The Statute was a mangled version of a project drawn up earlier by Jonkheer van Naters for the Council of Europe. Actually there was no

reason why it should have been submitted to a referendum in the Saar since it was not intended to be permanent but only to hold good until the peace treaty with Germany.

It is often assumed that any referendum at any time in the Saar would induce a big majority in favor of incorporation in Germany. In spite of the figures in 1935 and 1955 this is not necessarily true. Three years ago, on November 30, 1952, elections to the Saar Landtag were held. The parties favoring reunion with Germany, since they refused to accept the autonomous constitution of 1947, had been suppressed in 1951; they instructed their supporters to spoil their voting papers, but scarcely 25 percent of the population followed their advice. The rest voted for the parties which accepted the partial autonomy offered to the Saar by the French in 1947, an autonomy tempered by a diplomatic, tariff and financial union with France.

The Saar was a politically backward area in Hohenzollern Germany, and perhaps it has never quite caught up with history. But, allowing for a tendency to obey orders, it remains true to say that a majority was content, until after the end of 1952, with the autonomous régime presided over by Johannes Hoffmann and dependent upon France. In 1955 many of the very same people who were thankful for the French offer in 1947, and who voted for Hoffmann in 1952, voted "Down with Hoffmann and the Statute"—indeed, about half the population must have changed its mind. According to the writer's personal observation, however, it is not true to attribute this change solely to the political campaign waged by the pro-German parties against the statute during the three months before the referendum. A marked, though not a measurable change took place during 1954, thanks on the one hand to the French rejection of the plan for a European Defense Community, and on the other to the mounting prosperity of Western Germany.

Until then a certain number of Saarlanders were genuinely attracted by Hoffmann's talk of passing from French protection to the guardianship of the Council of Europe or the E.D.C.: they agreed with him when he pointed out that, instead of being an apple of Franco-German discord, the Saar might thus become the nucleus of European integration. Certain Saar industrialists, in conjunction with leading representatives of French and German heavy industry, supported this policy more concretely. The Dillingen steel mills in the Saar, 60 percent of whose shares were

now in French hands and 40 percent in Saar and German possession, were already profiting from their connection with the SOLLAC combine in Lorraine. The common market established by the Coal and Steel Community had veiled the conflict of Franco-German interests in heavy industry, and it was supposed that the steel works at Völklingen and Neunkirchen in the Saar, which the French had sequestered at the end of the war, would follow Dillingen into combined control. People representing the Châtillon steel group in France (associated with the ARMCO Steel Corporation) began discussions with representatives of West German mining interests (the Flick group) with a view to the foundation of a chemical industry based upon the Saar coal basin. This was an overdue project, but required free access to the West German market in order to succeed; those who launched it were supporters of the van Naters plan which provided for the progressive abolition of the customs frontier between the Saar and Germany. But with the defeat of the E.D.C. bill in Paris on August 30, 1954, the political hopes and economic plans based upon it were destroyed; Western European Union came too late to carry conviction to those in the Saar or the Federal Republic who had believed in the E.D.C.

With the collapse of the E.D.C. the Franco-German industrialists' honeymoon à la Schuman came to an end, and the voices of the more nationalistic entrepreneurs, the Stumms and the Röchlings, who had owned the steel mills sequestered by the French, were heard again. The Stumms had once ruled the workers of Neunkirchen and Dillingen with a rod of iron and were not popular; in any case they had lost control of Dillingen earlier,¹ and, after the return of the Saar to Germany in 1935, the financier, Otto Wolff, had acquired half the shares of Neunkirchen. But old Hermann Röchling of Völklingen, once an enthusiastic Nazi and bitterly anti-French, had treated his working people well, and some of them had resented his imprisonment as a war criminal. With the turn of the tide in 1954 popular sentiment began to demand the restitution of Neunkirchen and Völklingen as part of the national patrimony.

The E.D.C. failure approximately coincided with a rise in popular feeling in the Saar that it was no longer advantageous to

¹ The French had gained a majority of the shares after 1918. At present the Stumms own little more than a fifth of the non-French shares in the Dillingen concern and they grumble that the French are edging them out. At Neunkirchen, since the French sequestration ended, Otto Wolff is the driving force though he nominally owns only 50 percent.

be economically linked with France if one were cut off from Germany. Hitherto the union with France, followed by the Korea boom, had brought full employment, better wages than in Germany and higher social benefits which included children's allowances almost as generous as those in France. Already in 1952, however, people were beginning to speak of the miracle of West German recovery. In 1953 the talk of a recession in the United States caused German production to hesitate, but by 1954 it was steaming straight ahead. The Saarlanders, many of whom crossed the frontier frequently, became aware that German goods were cheaper than goods in the France-Saar union, yet a Saarlander was debarred by high French customs duties from enjoying German prices. From this time on the Saar-German tariff frontier became a powerful irritant, and not only to ardent nationalists; it will be cherished to the end only by those who depend upon the Saar light industries which it has sheltered from German competition.

In theory, it has been seen, the case for the France-Saar union was based upon the traditional exchange of Saar coal for the iron ore of Lorraine; the highly industrialized Saar had also depended upon the agricultural produce of Lorraine. In fact, since the end of the last war the Saar has consumed more foodstuffs from other regions of France. As for the exchange of coal and iron, once the common market was created this Saar-Lorraine traffic became less essential though the blast furnaces of the Saar were specifically adjusted to ore from Lorraine. On the other hand, the common market abolished the subsidies on French ore which became more expensive; consequently the Saar in 1953 imported more iron ore from Luxembourg.² Meanwhile, large sums of money, including a high proportion of Marshall Aid, had been invested in the heavy industry of Lorraine, while relatively little—partly because of the uncertainty of its future—had been invested in the Saar. Thus Saar coal and steel products were faced with competition on the south-German market from the better-equipped mills and mines of Lorraine, and commercial opinion in the Saar began to regard the connection with Lorraine as an anachronism.

An important section of the Saar community—some 65,000 miners—was largely opposed to the Hoffmann régime from the beginning because the Saar mines were again, as they had been

² The Burbach steelworks in the Saar belong to the Luxembourg ARBED concern and depend upon ore from Luxembourg.

in the days of the League of Nations, the property of the French state.³ Although wages and conditions for the miners were extremely good, and the French helped to found a new university outside Saarbrücken with astonishingly cheap facilities for the sons of miners, the employees of a foreign state were certain to be resentful towards managers appointed by that state. The situation was exacerbated by the problem of the Warndt mines beneath the frontier with Lorraine, where the coal was of better quality and the reserves extensive. For technical reasons the Warndt coal had always been mined from Lorraine, and in 1948 the Warndt mines were leased to the Coal Board of Lorraine for 30 years. It was easy for anyone who wished to stir up feeling against the French to play upon this theme, and it added to the sheaf of grievances now associated with the name of Lorraine. Hoffmann fought hard for a share of control of the other Saar mines and to this the French agreed by the conventions of May 1953; but, with jealous eyes watching from Lorraine, it proved impossible to do more than appoint a commission to deal later with the problem of the Warndt. By August 1954 little progress had been made, and the coal quarrel helped to swell the wave of disillusionment.

In order to describe the situation accurately it should be added that anti-French feeling was stimulated by the arbitrary methods of Gilbert Grandval, the former military governor transformed into French Ambassador, and of Professor Angeloz, the French rector of the new university. It was never quite clear whether the French or Hoffmann were more to blame for the provocative fact that Hoffmann's Minister of the Interior, Hector, was a citizen of the French Republic.

The statute to which Mendès-France and Adenauer pledged France and Western Germany on October 23, 1954, was intended to grapple with the new facts and feelings by arranging, as van Naters had intended, for the progressive opening of the Saar-German frontier and for the substitution of French tutelage by that of a Commissioner appointed by the W.E.U. Council of Ministers. An annexed letter undertook that French control of Völklingen and Neunkirchen and of certain formerly German banks would be lifted before the referendum for which the Statute provided. The sequestration of Neunkirchen was lifted only in the week preceding the referendum. Völklingen, however, was

³ As reparations payment.

dealt with six months earlier when the French and West German Governments arranged to buy out the Röchlings for 200,000,000 Swiss francs; it was significant for the state of public feeling in the Saar by April 1955 that this agreement was badly received with murmurs that "This should be ours."⁴ The new economic convention between France and the Saar, negotiated in accordance with the first part of clause 12 of the Statute and signed immediately after the Völklingen agreement on May 3, was greeted by pro-German opinion as precluding the possibility of West German participation on equal terms in economic relations with the Saar.

Even so, without an organized campaign of opposition to the Statute, it might well have been accepted. There would have been more spoilt ballots than in 1952, and more people who did not vote at all; but in all probability most people, in spite of the prevailing bitterness, would have felt that if the German Government made this arrangement there was no alternative.

So sure of its acceptance were the signatories of the Saar Statute that they wrote into it a clause—number 6—by which the pro-German parties previously banned by Hoffmann should be allowed to resume their political activities three months before the referendum on the statute itself. Having seized upon clause 6 which re-entitled them to exist, these parties set out to distort and obscure and thereby torpedo the rest of the Statute. Ignoring its provisional nature, they declared that to approve it would be forever to divorce the Saar from Germany. Mobilizing the irritation caused by French mistakes and by changing circumstances, they announced that the referendum was a unique opportunity to vote for or against Germany.

The campaign waged in this sense from July 23 until October 23, 1955, provided a disquieting display of the resurgence of German nationalism. The Refugee Party and the *Landsmannschaften*, which voice the grievances of the Germans expelled by the Poles, Czechs and other East Europeans, have made many chauvinistic and near-Nazi declamations in the Federal Republic. But politically such performances have borne no particular relation to any decisive international event and it is possible to dismiss them as the letting off of steam. The campaign of the anti-Statute par-

⁴ There had been a brief metalworkers' strike in the Saar towards the end of 1954 which was as much as anything a demonstration against French control of the sequestered steel mills.

ties in the Saar united in their *Deutscher Heimatbund* was a very deliberate affair, and its leaders basked proudly in the sunshine of international publicity. In this connection the present writer found it instructive to think back to the plebiscite held in January 1935 and to compare very carefully what was observed then and now. In 1955 the combined *Heimatbund*, or either of the major German parties meeting alone, draped the halls in which they met in the black, red and gold of the Federal, as of the Weimar, Republic, and indeed of the liberals of 1848; usually posters with some poultry-like eagles were also displayed. The audiences arrived early and were regaled with Prussian military music while they waited; at the end of most meetings the *Deutschlandlied* was sung (the aggressive verse only exceptionally).

One might have supposed that Christian Democrat and Socialist speakers would have insisted upon the contrast with 1935 and have cried out, "This is not Hitler's Germany to which we urge you to return, but a free and federal republic where the Saar can take its place among the *Länder*." But, on the contrary, appeals of this kind were avoided. A return to Germany, no matter of what kind, was all that the pro-German orators preached, exactly as the Nazis had in 1935—the Nazis to whom they were careful not to refer. At the same time they attacked Hoffmann and the pro-Statute Socialists like Heinz Braun precisely because they had been anti-Nazis in 1935 and had worked with the Allies during the war.

Except when he appeared upon a *Heimatbund* platform, Dr. Heinrich Schneider employed slightly different tactics. The symbol of his smaller, more middle-class party, the Democratic Party of the Saar, associated with the F.D.P. in the Federal Republic, was a stiffer, more pugnacious eagle in black against a red ground; thus his colors were in effect the black, white and red of Imperial Germany upon which Hitler had imposed the swastika. Again Dr. Schneider deliberately mocked the Statute as only diverging by one letter (*Statut*, *Status*) from the status quo of League of Nations régime which was so clamorously rejected in 1935 but has ever since been regretted by many of the Saarlanders. It was evident, nevertheless, that Schneider was the hero of the anti-Statute campaign of 1955.

Although anti-Semitism and anything that was undeniably Nazi was avoided by the pro-German orators, some of their tech-

nique was singularly reminiscent of that of the Nationalist and Nazi destroyers of the Weimar Republic. A prominent Saar businessman, Dr. Wildt, revived the phrase of *Schandvertrag* for the Treaty of Versailles, while Dr. Schneider loved to throw a Hitler-like scorn upon the Statute as something that the French might offer "to niggers but not to Germans." On the eve of the referendum the Belgian Senator, Fernand Dehousse, President of the W.E.U. Commission which was supervising the referendum, broadcast an address in which he explained to the Saarlanders what the Statute really offered them, correctly denying the pro-German claim that it presented a choice for or against Germany. At a meeting on the same evening Dr. Ney, leader of the Christian Democratic Party of the Saar, attacked this correction furiously as malevolent interference—assuming, as Hitler always did, that anyone who was not 100 percent with his party must be against it. Of course such methods may creep into electoral contests all over the world, but both the scale and the nature of this kind of distortion have acquired a disagreeable familiarity in the German language.

For German nationalists the whole referendum campaign comprised a first step in the reunification of Germany, the first stage in the electoral process by which that is to be brought about. His German antagonists had long abused Hoffmann as the Grotewohl of the Saar, and hints were circulated during the last week before the voting took place that if the Statute were accepted there would be risings like those in Eastern Germany in June 1953. On the other hand, by contrast with 1935 when Nazis and Communists had been at daggers drawn, in 1955 the Communists were the allies of the *Heimatbund* whose orators, if they condemned the East German régime by implication, never launched into Nazi diatribes against Communism. In the socially backward Catholic Saar the Communists have never had much following. The opportunity, however, was not to be missed, and East Berlin, no doubt working via Düsseldorf, stepped into the breach. During the anti-Hoffmann disturbances in the Saar in August certain young Communists from West Germany were known to have taken a hand in what it was hoped would help to prepare the discomfiture of the West.

The most striking contrast with 1935, when Laval was in power and it suited Hitler to forbid anti-French talk, was the virulent abuse of France which dominated pro-German propaganda in

1955. Hoffmann was abused, but essentially as the tool of France; the Statute was abused, but mostly as an ill-concealed instrument of France—it was even alleged that the Statute would cause young Saarlanders to be sent to die for France in Morocco. One of the most telling anti-Statute leaflets, which was sown broadcast in the streets in the last week before the plebiscite, showed a French military helmet being forced upon a Saarlander's head. A big red "No" was scrawled across it.

This leaflet was direct provocation of the W.E.U. which should never have tolerated such things. Article 4 of the Statute provided for the Saar to be fitted into the W.E.U. defense system under the Supreme Allied Command in Europe (SACEUR). The W.E.U. Commission in the Saar—the representatives of the League of Nations behaved in much the same way in 1935—instead of entering the arena as the champion of its own basic principles, seemed obsessed with the aim of impartial arbitration between the Hoffmann régime and the pro-German parties attacking it, an attitude only suitable later during the campaign preceding the Landtag elections in December. Thus the Statute, defended only by the Catholic People's Party and a small Socialist group, was identified with nothing but a government which had been in office too long to be popular in any case. The supporters of this government did their best to advertise the European idea, while responsible W.E.U. leaders did nothing. There was no reason, simply because they had assumed responsibility for the voting conditions like any government party, why they should fail to state the arguments for their great and good cause. Indeed, with the pro-German parties misstating the arguments against it, there was every reason for them to do so. The very faultiness of the drafting of the Statute made it the more needful for authoritative W.E.U. spokesmen to define it precisely.

Since in fact nothing was done beyond the appointment of a commission to supervise the voting, it appeared as if the W.E.U. felt no concern for the issue. In 1935 the League propped up its dying prestige with military contingents from four member countries, but in 1955 the W.E.U. had nothing but some NATO troops hidden in the background, troops in whose existence no one believed. Gossip spoke only of French troops in Lorraine—a boomerang, since nothing would have served pro-German propaganda better than their appearance. Even as an umpire the W.E.U. Commission in the Saar was ineffectual: the voters were less

afraid than in 1935 by as much as Adenauer's Germany is different from Hitler's, but by no more than that. Senator Dehousse, one felt, should have explained the Statute at the beginning of the campaign and repeatedly, not only on the eve of the poll. He and his commission should never have allowed those who supported the W.E.U. Statute to be stigmatized as separatist, a word which is equivalent to traitor in the German mind. On at least one occasion, at the end of a pro-German speech devoted exclusively to abuse of the French, Senator Dehousse felt himself constrained to shake hands with the speaker, perhaps for some extraneous reason. But what incongruity that the Belgian representative of a Western European Union, of which France and Western Germany are the two most important of the seven members, should countenance the vilification of the French by a Saarland orator surrounded by the emblems of Western Germany! The French have always said that only in economic union with the Saar could they participate in the Coal and Steel Community without fear of being overwhelmed by Germany. One reason for their rejection of the E.D.C. had been the lack of a previous agreement on the Saar, and they signed the Paris Agreements in 1955 on condition that the Saar Statute should be accepted. What could do more to rearrouse all their suspicions than the rejection of this same Statute?

Thus the results of the referendum and the campaign preceding it may be summarized as follows. In the first place, the economic problems of the territory of the Saar, where those of France and Germany intersect, have been reformulated but not resolved; indeed, their solution, which seemed halfway to achievement thanks to the Coal and Steel Community, has certainly been postponed. Secondly, the German problem has been complicated by a regional outburst of chauvinism directed not against the Communist world of the East but, on the contrary, against the Western Powers. This has brought about, thirdly, the defeat of the most tangible political venture hitherto undertaken by the Western European Union. The bilateral Franco-German agreement which may now be attained in conjunction with a new pro-German Government in Saarbrücken after the elections to the Landtag on December 18 will be something retrograde by comparison with the Statute which was rejected on October 23.

FOREIGN LOANS AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA

By Pedro G. Beltrán

THE need for solidarity and understanding among the nations of the Western Hemisphere is perhaps more obvious than at any time in our history. If we are to preserve the national independence and sovereignty which we each deeply cherish we must come closer and closer together, depending more and more on each other's support. There is even less chance for isolated, individual survival today than there was in the Nazi era.

Although we may agree fully on the necessity of bringing our peoples more closely together, the opportunities for misunderstanding are great. This is especially so in cases where anti-Americanism can pay political dividends. Misunderstanding can be much reduced, however, if no action is ever taken by the United States abroad in the interests of a special group or even a party in power but only on behalf of the welfare of a people as a whole. This is particularly true in the case of loans and other financial operations, where the greatest good—or the greatest mischief—can be done. No matter how well-meaning the United States may be, great care should be exercised when a helping hand is extended to any country. This is not an easy thing. It can be done only by people who are familiar with local conditions and know what the real needs of the country are.

Take as an example the case of a government with an unbalanced budget. There is no capital market in Latin America such as is known in the United States and some European countries, and a budgetary deficit cannot be made good by an issue of bonds. Private investors will not buy them. The Treasury then has recourse to the central bank which, by increasing the circulation through issuing more notes, can supply all the money that is wanted.

The consequent inflation causes a rise in the cost of living which is very soon felt by everyone. Workmen, employees and in fact, the whole population feel the pinch and become progressively worse off. When inflation has continued for some time conditions become unbearable. Internal depreciation of the currency will soon lead to a weakening of the foreign exchange position. Then it may appear that the easiest thing—as has happened so often—

is to set up exchange control. Due to inflation, the fixed rate of exchange will get out of line with the market value of the currency in relation to that of other countries; there will then be a demand for more foreign exchange than is currently available. This will lead to further tightening of exchange restrictions.

Rising costs of living are bound to lead to higher costs of production. As exchange control maintains the rate at the same level, a rise in production costs causes marginal producers to start closing down. As the effects of inflation are felt more acutely, production drops even more, with the result that less is sold abroad and less exchange becomes available on current account. This leads to a further deterioration of conditions. Production and employment shrink. The resultant discontent provides a wonderful opening for Communist propaganda.

At the same time, exchange restrictions stop the flow of foreign capital from abroad, for exchange control becomes nothing but a trap from which it is hard to escape. It allows capital to enter a country but prevents investors from taking home profits, let alone repatriating capital. This is not theory, but is a harsh fact of recent economic and political history. It is difficult to imagine who will put a penny into a country where such conditions prevail. Thus to the discontent produced by a rising cost of living is added economic paralysis, unemployment and a lack of private capital just at the time when it is most needed. And this, too, is not theory, but fact.

Without any question it is easy to state the problem and arrive at the right conclusion. Had there been no exchange control, no pegged rate, then the free market for foreign exchange would have shown that something was wrong. Public opinion would have reacted against the harmful inflationary policies of the government. At the same time, rising costs would have been met by larger proceeds, in local currency, of sales abroad, thus making it possible for production to continue. Foreign capital would not have been deterred from coming into the country because, with free exchange, investors could continue to remit profits home.

It should be borne in mind that as long as inflation continues one cannot be on safe ground. With controls, the bad effects of inflation are felt more acutely even though financial help may have been forthcoming from abroad. As things get worse, the argument is made that the government should continue to receive foreign help because otherwise popular discontent will lead to its

downfall. The worse the situation, the more urgent generous help becomes; without it the very people who have been agitating against the United States would seize power. But if the handouts have the effect of strengthening the government, enabling it to continue along the wrong path, Washington will be blamed more and more for the current hardships. Anti-American propagandists will tell the people: "All that you see happening is due to Washington. It has friends in the government and is helping them. Due to this help the government is so strong that we are powerless to act. Our standard of living will continue to go down while prices continue to soar."

Loans for particular projects can produce very much the same effects. The lender cannot divest himself of responsibility merely by saying that the investment in itself is sound, that it is self-liquidating. Often a foreign loan is made to take care only of the foreign exchange requirements of a given project. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as well as the Export-Import Bank finances foreign purchases only. If the government lacks the necessary funds in its own currency to take care of the local expenses, then a loan of foreign currency will generate inflation, for it is the central bank that will provide the rest of the money required. In a case like this, the lender cannot claim to be altogether innocent of what is happening, and anti-American propaganda will make the most of it. Neither side will profit from such a policy.

In ordinary commercial banking practice a bank will not finance a client without first seeing that he sets his house in order. It will not make loans for new investments and new projects, however attractive they may be in themselves, unless and until it has confidence in the ability of the borrower to make a success of the enterprise as a whole. Only a concern that is properly run and capable of standing on its own feet will inspire a bank with sufficient confidence to undertake the financing. If the banker were not to assume this attitude he would be blamed when the client sooner or later went on the rocks. The borrower himself would turn against the banker and blame him for the false sense of security in which he allowed him to continue on the wrong course without having made it a condition that he first put his house in order.

There is a valid parallel between this ordinary commercial banking practice and international transactions. In both there is

the same responsibility to have due regard for possible implications. The determining consideration should always be the permanent interest of the country.

The common belief may be that what is needed is just money. If it is forthcoming, troubles may at first seem to have been overcome. No amount of preaching can then make much of an impression, as no one would pay any attention to it. Furthermore, the very fact that conditions improve, even though only temporarily, could lead people further astray. Permanent harm would thus be done though it might appear on the surface that the country was being helped.

If a nation relies on handouts in order to live, then no matter how convenient such help may appear to be, its future is doomed. As time goes on it finds it harder and harder to get on its feet and forge its own future. It has no sure and independent source of income. Instead it lives by what it receives for political considerations, which cannot be relied upon indefinitely. It ends by making no effort to develop its own resources or be self-supporting. As long as this state of affairs prevails, such a country will never come of age but will continue to be dependent, without prospects for the future.

It is more important, therefore, that at the outset the reason for helping should be made perfectly clear. What is needed is the development of such an orderly and progressive economy that people will come to have faith in the country's future. To build on solid foundations it must be realized that a country will achieve something real, durable and promising only through its own efforts: the determination to work out its own salvation, the opening up of new resources, the development of new lines of production and trade. All of these in turn demand monetary stability. The country should be made aware that no amount of foreign help can produce an orderly and balanced development if domestic policy runs contrary to the basic requirements for economic prosperity. On the other hand, it should be informed that the required financing will come readily to hand if wise policies are followed. When a country shows signs of giving serious consideration to its basic problems, of trying not so much to overcome temporary difficulties as to achieve permanent results, it is on its way to earning a good reputation. This is especially so if its past record is free from objectionable measures or practices. Local capital will then venture into investments with an eye to the long-

term future instead of thinking only of quick and large returns. Foreign capital will soon follow suit.

In the case of Peru, for example, actual experience fully confirms what has just been said. In 1940, contrary to previous policies and no doubt influenced by what was being done in most countries, the Peruvian Government established a *de facto* fixed rate of exchange. When inflation developed, the demand for foreign exchange came to exceed the amounts available. The Government then had recourse to exchange control. As inflation progressed and as conditions grew worse, this led to a tightening of restrictions with all its evil consequences. It became harder and harder to apportion the supply of foreign exchange among requests as the margin between them grew, and it became correspondingly hard to prevent corruption. Production dropped. Commercial credit from foreign suppliers practically ceased as conditions deteriorated; capital would not venture into new enterprises.

Before ten years had elapsed conditions became so bad that it was decided to revert to former policies. Exchange was unpegged, controls were done away with and supply and demand were allowed to determine the equilibrium rate in a free market. Very soon a change for the better began to be felt. Production increased and so did exports. In turn, the country could afford larger imports. Exports in 1954 have been 224 percent of 1948 exports in weight and 152 percent in value (U.S. dollars). It was only in December 1948 that controls started to be relinquished and it was not till the end of 1949 that most of them had disappeared and a free market was fully established for foreign exchange.

And then, instead of counting on Washington for grants, local efforts developed to get the economy going. As government interference retreated, the free economy provided a convenient setting for progress. New industries developed markedly in various fields. Local capital became much bolder. The liberal policy evidenced by new laws regulating oil and mining led to investments of both local and foreign money in these fields. American oil companies are prospecting in new areas and already have made successful strikes. In mining, a group of American companies is about to invest \$200,000,000 to open up a large new mining deposit which requires the building of a new port, a smelter and a railroad, apart from the actual work at the mines.

Meanwhile, large sums of European money are helping in the

development of hydroelectric power and iron and steel production while joint enterprises of Peruvian and American capital are venturing into other fields. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as well as the Export-Import Bank, which for years would not lend money to Peru, now readily considers any proposal. In fact, Peru has come to be looked upon as one of the most attractive countries for foreign investment in Latin America. Commercial credit, which had practically come to a standstill under controls, has grown today to sizeable amounts, thus helping to finance imports in the cheapest way because the rate of interest in Peru, as in all new countries, is very high when compared to the cost of money in the United States. European suppliers are also freely granting medium-term credit facilities to Peruvian buyers.

The contrast between all this and the conditions prevalent in the days of controls and of a fixed rate of exchange is perhaps the best argument in favor of a free economy and a floating rate of exchange. When present conditions in Peru are compared to those in neighboring countries the difference seems to be even greater. Inflation there has gone much farther, and consequently the exchange problem is much more serious than it ever became in Peru. In fact, those countries are undergoing a very acute economic crisis. Exchange has been pegged but the rate has to be altered time and again as inflation progresses. Rather than achieving stability, everybody has lost confidence and seems to expect further deterioration of conditions, a continuous rise in the cost of living and further falls in the exchange. Under such conditions initiative is stifled, economic development comes to a standstill and production itself shrinks, while discontent and unrest become more and more evident.

In these circumstances the American Government should do its best to make the issues entirely clear. Speaking in unequivocal terms it should insist that no halfway measures will suffice. And when a country takes appropriate action, showing its determination to set its house in order with deeds and not with words, then—if needed—generous financial help should be given promptly so that there will be no delay in gaining public confidence in the new policies. In this way the American Government can help to put a country on the right road to the development of an independent economy. Private capital will then be attracted and will take care of the rest.

It should be realized that private capital can achieve what no public treasury can do, not even that of the United States. For one thing, once confidence is established the amounts of private capital that may flow into a country are almost unlimited. This can never be the case with public funds. Private investors will compete with each other and seek the opportunities that yield the most; but government money cannot do this, since risk venture is considered beyond its province. Furthermore, too many strings are tied to official funds; things have to be done according to a set pattern, with endless red tape and great loss of time. There is no regard for the fact that each problem has its own peculiarities; plans drawn up elsewhere must be carried through even though local experience may indicate that they will not work.

For a long time to come the big problem in Latin America will be the lack of capital. The United States had the same problem 100 years ago, and it was thanks to money from Europe that the country was opened up. The size of the United States gives an idea of the amount of money that was required. The problems that had to be faced were new, which meant that the risks involved were very great; but capital was free to come in and develop new resources without government interference. Private enterprise willingly and boldly accepted the challenge. Daring private investments contributed enormously to the development of the United States.

The position of Latin American countries at present is similar to that of the United States a century ago, but the problems involved are actually much simpler because they have been encountered before. Whether it is in mining or in transportation, in farming or in manufacture, experience obtained elsewhere can be applied to find the right solution. The amount of capital required may be very large, but certainly it is not in excess of what is available in the United States and in Europe.

Private capital will readily flow into a Latin American country if the investor feels that he is able to act in a free economy, without restrictions; if he can invest money and draw profits and even repatriate his capital when wanted; if there are no exchange restrictions, no controls, no ceiling prices, no inflation; and if the currency is stable; in other words, if free competition can develop without hindrance. Under such conditions investors in the United States will soon get to know the Latin American peoples and will

find local partners for their projects. The joint enterprises which will develop will link the peoples of the two countries more closely. From the United States would come capital, the technical advice and the experts. The people on the spot, who have a knowledge of local conditions which it is not always easy for a foreigner to acquire, can then run the enterprise; they may also be able to put up some money as well. As the success of these enterprises becomes known in financial circles abroad, more people will seek openings for their money under similar conditions.

Even then the American Government can be of great help. For example, there may be a good project which because of its size or for other special reasons is difficult to finance privately. Washington can come forward and supply the required money. Actually, such help would hardly ever be required if Washington were to provide a sufficient tax inducement to investors in Latin America. Today, the real difficulties encountered are often in the field of taxation. In the report of the International Development Advisory Board on An Economic Program for the Americas a year ago we find the following recommendations:

Study ways and means of using tax incentives to encourage the flow of foreign private investment, including the feasibility of bilateral tax treaties incorporating reductions in tax rates.

In addition to such bilateral studies, we consider this to be a field in which constructive action can be taken unilaterally by the United States Congress. Such action should include further efforts to carry out the recommendations of the Randall Commission regarding taxes on income earned abroad, not only as regards corporate income but also income received by individuals and investment trusts.

In the Economic Report of the President transmitted to Congress last January, President Eisenhower went even further along these lines. Indeed the American Government could do a great deal in this respect. The cost would be small in comparison to what may be lost by lending direct financial help which in some cases contributes very little or nothing to the permanent good of a country and may do it untold harm. Washington has a tremendous responsibility in the task of uniting the peoples of this hemisphere for their common good. It will discharge that responsibility if it chooses the right principles and sticks to them without fear or favor.

NEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIETS

SOME LESSONS OF THE WAR PERIOD

By John C. Campbell

THE Geneva meeting of the heads of government ushered in a new period in international relations. Only time will tell whether we are on the threshold of the "era of orderly peaceful change" mentioned as a hopeful possibility by Secretary Dulles in his address to the U.N. General Assembly. The deadlock at the recent Foreign Ministers' Conference should dampen any undue optimism as to early settlement of major problems in Europe. Even so, we are probably facing a situation where some of the fixed points and guide-lines of the Cold War, which up to now have simplified life for our diplomats and information experts, will tend to disappear. It should be a period of greater fluidity in world affairs, and also, despite the recent intransigence of Mr. Molotov, of periodic if not continuous negotiation with the Soviet Union.

The tensions of the Cold War have produced a great longing for surcease among the peoples of the world, and especially the peoples of Europe. The new Soviet leaders, more flexible in their tactics than the aging Stalin, have been able to capitalize on that longing and to exploit the elements of disunity and weakness in the West. They have adopted policies, including some unexpected concessions such as the turnabout on the Austrian treaty, which virtually compel the United States to unhinge its own policies from former rigid positions and to negotiate seriously if it is to hold its own in Europe and keep the Western alliance together. Another factor of overwhelming importance is the growth of nuclear power on both sides to the point where a general war must be regarded, by governments and by peoples, as "unthinkable." Not only does this development put greater pressure on both sides to seek a real agreement on disarmament. It also tends to transfer the struggle to other levels, though without resolving unsettled problems, removing sources of conflict or reducing the dangers of military action short of general war.

The United States will thus have to meet the challenge of a many-faceted competition. It may also have unexpected opportunities, since the Communist bloc as well as the free world will be subject to new influences and new pressures. It would be un-

wise, therefore, to proclaim any one issue or meeting to be the "acid test." If agreements are not reached, the problems will still be there and we shall have to negotiate on them again. This is a prospect which justifies a search for some guiding principles in the experience of that earlier period ten to twelve years ago which was also one of fluidity, of opportunities (most of them lost) and of frequent negotiation: the closing years of World War II and the first months of "peace." The circumstances of today, obviously, differ widely from those of 1944 or 1945. But the main problem is the same: How to establish a basis for relations with the Soviet Union that will give the world some promise of real peace while safeguarding our own security?

The tragedy of that earlier period, all the more poignant because of the high hopes of the American and other peoples after the great sacrifices of the war, lay in the failure to reach a fair and stable settlement in Europe. As a consequence, one hundred million Europeans merely exchanged the Nazi yoke for that of the Soviets, while the free countries of Western Europe were forced into a position where they had to take desperate measures to safeguard their own independence and prevent the balance of power being tipped even more heavily against them. For that tragedy two developments were mainly responsible: 1, the presence of the Soviet armies in Eastern Europe and a large part of Germany, and 2, the decision of the Soviet leadership to push its power and control as far as conditions would permit.

These two developments were beyond the capacity of American policy and diplomacy to change except in a marginal sense. Geography, military decisions and the magnitude of their victories determined the location of the Soviet armies in the closing stages of the war. Their own concepts of national interest and of Marxist doctrine determined the course chosen by the Soviet leaders. To exaggerate what the United States could have done is as little justified as to maintain that its record is beyond criticism. Moreover, the principal objective of American policy toward the Soviet Union had to be to keep the Russians fighting as effectively as possible until Hitler's defeat was assured. Such an objective carried the inevitable risk that the postwar Soviet Union might present a threat to world security. What we have to ask ourselves is not why we "lost the peace" after winning the war, but to what degree American statesmanship was remiss in not perceiving the meaning of what was going on and in not using

all its opportunities, in dealing with the Russians, to influence the course of those developments and mitigate their harmful effects.

II

Our mistakes of omission and commission at that time fall into three general categories: failure to assess Soviet policies correctly; failure to define our own objectives clearly and pursue them consistently; and failure to relate military power and military decisions to political objectives.

The miscalculations as to Soviet purposes were partly the product of naïve hopes of the President and some of his close advisers. But in many respects they were peculiarly the product of the psychological atmosphere of the time. The American people were fighting a global war. To them and to their leaders it had to be a war with some promise of a just and lasting peace to follow victory. Obviously, this would require that the major Allied Powers coöperate in establishing it. It was an easy transition from the knowledge that Russian coöperation was essential to the assumption that it would be forthcoming. President Roosevelt, after all, had some knowledge of Soviet history and only a year or so before had himself been shocked and incensed by the Soviet pact with Hitler and the attack on Finland. But his "grand design for peace" could be realized only with Soviet coöperation and he was not going to give it up without a thorough test.

The real cause for criticism is not that the test was made—it had to be made—but that it was allowed to last so long, and that hopes, unwarranted though understandable, were allowed to color official thinking on what the Soviet leaders said and what they did. For example, Stalin's soft-peddling of Communism and his appeals to Russian nationalism and to religion were interpreted more as fundamental changes in the nature of the Soviet system than as temporary concessions and tactics necessary to get popular support for the war. Many in Washington were sure that the Soviet Government, in its own interest, would turn all its energies to domestic reconstruction after the war and that for this it would need contented neighbors and help from the West. This opinion had logic, but it did not represent Stalin's view of Soviet interests. It was a favorite theory that the association of Russia in the war effort of a world coalition would somehow "civilize" the Soviet Union so that it would conform to the general rules of international society. The President is said to have regarded the Soviet

Union as a large and uninhibited St. Bernard puppy which would in due course be trained and "housebroken." Unfortunately he underestimated the puppy's innate unconcern with the rules of the house as well as his own capacities as a trainer.

Some of the analyses of today bear an ominous resemblance to those of the war period. Thus it is said that the Soviet régime is undergoing basic change favorable to the prospects of genuine coöperation in the West; that it may face economic collapse; that, beset by fear of nuclear war and by internal problems, it must retreat on the international front. To found policies on such theories, without further evidence, could be disastrous. On the other hand, to assume that no change has taken or will take place, that nothing can be negotiated and that conflict is inevitable, could be equally disastrous. The recent "soft line" may be a transient tactical shift to confuse and divide the West. It may be an attempt to stabilize the situation in Europe in order to concentrate on Asia. It may be something more fundamental, reflecting a desire for long-term relief from the burdens and dangers of the Cold War, perhaps for some real accord on disarmament. These theories must be tested by the facts as they develop before any one of them is made the basis for demands or for concessions and before we proceed on a course that may be wrong.

During the war period too much faith and credit were given to general Soviet statements such as support for a "free and independent Poland," or a "democratic Germany," even after it was clear that the Kremlin wanted quite the opposite. The break with the Polish government-in-exile, the liquidation of the Polish army in Russia and the formation of the "Union of Polish Patriots" were all indications—early indications—of a design to take over all of Poland. The Soviet attitude toward the Warsaw rising in mid-1944 should have left no doubt of it. Similarly, it should have been fairly obvious what was the purpose of the formation of the "Free Germany Committee," in which Germans who were long-time Communists and Soviet agents held leading posts, and of the prominence given to the Dimitrovs, Rakosis and Paukers as "well-known leaders" of the Eastern European peoples. It is not necessary to argue that Soviet policy was already fixed and blue-printed at that stage. Soviet calculations, then as now, had to take into account certain unknowns, including Western moves and reactions. But the Soviet leadership was setting a course on which it would advance so long as it could get away with it.

Misinterpretation of Soviet views on security was another example of self-deception. The Soviet Government advanced its demands for territory, for reparations and for "friendly" neighbors largely in the name of security. Western opinion was prepared to grant the legitimacy of Soviet concern over possible future aggression. But official Washington was mistaken in thinking that Soviet security needs, as Moscow would see them, could possibly be reconciled with American ideas concerning fair territorial settlements and the independence of the nations of Eastern Europe. To Stalin the only guarantee of security was the extension of Soviet power.

Again there is talk of satisfying the Soviet Union's "legitimate" concern for security in the event of the reunification of Germany. This is the rationale for the elaborate treaty proposal offered by the Western Powers at the opening of the recent Geneva conference. But Moscow, as was so evident ten years ago, seeks security not in promises from Chancellor Adenauer or the Western Powers but in maintaining and extending its physical control and in disrupting any "hostile blocs," such as NATO, that stand in its way. The United States may have to keep stating its willingness to conclude a general European security treaty as the only means of countering Soviet proposals and of satisfying German and European opinion that everything possible is being done for German unity and for peace. But it should do so in the full knowledge that security in Europe will continue to depend on our deterrent power, on the maintenance of NATO, and on the willingness of the Soviet Union itself to permit Germany's reunification and to take the pressure off Western Europe.

Throughout the war the American approach to the Soviet problem was marked by an almost exclusive concern with current military considerations and a lack of rapport among the various departments concerned. While the State Department was hampered by disunity at the top levels and cannot claim any shining record of clairvoyance and positive policy recommendations, it is worth noting that much of its thinking and its work on the Soviet problem which might have been useful in crucial negotiations never reached "the summit." Today we have better means of coördinating intelligence data and policy within the government, chiefly through the National Security Council. President Eisenhower believes in staff work. Nevertheless, it is well to recall the risks of an excess of "personal diplomacy." Any President or any Secre-

tary of State will, of course, rely on his own background and his own "feel" for the situation. His is the responsibility, and in any specific decision he may be right and his "expert" advisers wrong. Nevertheless, the conclusions on Soviet policy which become assumptions of our own policies are of such importance that they must be the best "national estimates," using all the knowledge available to the government.

III

The second major failure of the war period was the inability of the United States to develop a clear concept of the extent of its own interest in Europe and to pursue that interest with purpose and consistency. America's "peace aims," stated in the Atlantic Charter and later declarations, were an equitable and stable settlement of territorial questions, economic recovery and future unhampered trade, and a new world security organization to safeguard the peace. These general purposes did not provide an adequate basis for taking concrete decisions related to the shifting balance of power in Europe. Even though the outlines of that problem could be clearly foreseen, American leaders deliberately chose not to approach it in those terms. Secretary Hull, in his own words, was "grounded to the taproots in the iniquitous consequences of the system of spheres of influence and balance of power." Unfortunately, the Soviet decision to participate in a world security organization, on which he and the President counted so heavily, did not mean the advent of the rule of law and the end of power relationships among nations.

Early in the war the President and Mr. Hull made the decision that all territorial issues and specific details of the postwar settlement should be left to the peace table. They had several good reasons for such a decision, not the least of which was the danger to the common war effort of any squabbling over the spoils of a victory not yet won. As Sumner Welles has cogently argued, however, this decision prevented American diplomacy from even attempting, in the early stages of the war when Russia was in no strong bargaining position, to press for agreement on concrete territorial and political issues as the basis for an acceptable European settlement.¹ Stalin may not have agreed. At no time, even in the dark days of 1941, did he modify his claim to the territory

¹ Sumner Welles, "Two Roosevelt Decisions: One Debit, One Credit," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1951; and "Seven Decisions That Shaped History" (Harper, New York, 1950).

gained in 1939-40 through collusion with Hitler. And even if he had agreed, would he in victory have kept a promise extracted from him in time of peril? Such an attempt, nevertheless, might have exposed at a much earlier date the real aims of the Soviet leaders and enabled the United States to react more rapidly and effectively in the crucial months of 1944 and 1945.

In any event, once the Soviet armies were on the march westward, it was apparent that decisions could not be postponed to some hypothetical peace conference. The Russians would make them by the technique of the accomplished fact. Yet when the time came to talk and bargain with the Kremlin, we took no position at all. At the Moscow conference of 1943, when Poland and Yugoslavia came up for discussion, Secretary Hull gave the impression that the United States had no real interest in Eastern Europe. President Roosevelt at Teheran left the burden of the discussion on this subject to Mr. Churchill. The papers prepared for the American delegation at Yalta presented a fairly detailed picture of the dangers both to our principles and to our power position that would flow from the continuance of what was going on in Eastern Europe.² The tragedy of Yalta was not that American interests or free nations were "sold out" but that the clear issues that had arisen were not argued in forceful and concrete terms, and that the American negotiators were content with appearances of agreement that had no basis in political reality.

The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe was admirable in its proclaimed purpose of assisting in the establishment of broadly representative provisional régimes in the liberated and former enemy states, and then in the holding of free and unfettered elections. As Professor Sontag has said in these pages, America has no need to apologize for championing such principles.³ But the fact that Stalin accepted the American draft with only one insignificant verbal change, almost without discussion, should have provided more cause for second thoughts than apparently was the case. The ink on it was scarcely dry when Moscow imposed a puppet government on Rumania. Throughout all Eastern Europe the consolidation of Communist power went right ahead.

Stalin undoubtedly read the meaning of the declaration in the

² The State Department publication, "Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945" (Washington, 1949), by Harley A. Notter, as well as the first part of the recently released but not yet officially published documents on the conferences at Malta and Yalta, provide some indication of the thorough study given to postwar problems by the Department during the war.

³ Raymond J. Sontag, "Reflections on the Yalta Papers," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1955.

light of all that had gone before and especially of his agreement with Churchill the previous October, the famous deal which disposed of the fate of the Balkan countries in terms of percentages of Soviet and Western influence. Stalin probably regarded it as a harmless or even useful device behind the fine words of which the two Powers could proceed as they had already agreed; his restraint in the Greek affair would seem to confirm that supposition. The United States, he had some right to assume, was following the British lead in this part of the world. The vigor of the American reaction to his later moves in Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland must therefore have surprised him, though it certainly did not divert him from his course.

President Roosevelt at Yalta did not impress on Stalin that he had any real concern with what the Russians had already done in the Balkans. The State Department indeed, while well informed on the mass executions of "Fascists," deportations, persecution of non-Communist groups and studied humiliation of official Western representatives that marked Soviet and Communist conduct in those countries, had deliberately refrained from telling this story to the American people in order not to "rock the boat." Moscow could draw its own conclusions from that. Yet the American Government apparently regarded the declaration and the agreements on Poland and Jugoslavia as a serious basis on which Soviet-Western coöperation and the freedom of European nations could be built, not just as a device to beguile the public and cover a Western retreat or as a means of exposing Soviet bad faith. The President saw Yalta as superseding, not confirming, any arrangements Britain and Russia had made in allocating wartime responsibilities. Consequently, Vishinsky's *diktat* in Bucharest and Moscow's unilateral interpretation of the agreement on Poland, coming at the time of Stalin's offensive messages on the negotiations for surrender of the German forces in Italy, caused him deep concern. But he was then in the last weeks of his life and was understandably reluctant to admit publicly the apparent failure of all his hopes.

Then, with the advent of a new President and later a new Secretary of State, a period of uncertainty was inevitable. As all efforts were bent to assure the success of San Francisco, for which Soviet coöperation was necessary, a kind of paralysis overtook American diplomacy on the East European settlement at the very point when, with victory over Germany, we were freed from

dependence on the Red Army (except, as we thought, in the Far East) but still had powerful forces of our own in Europe. Mr. Truman talked "tough" to Mr. Molotov, but Mr. Stalin did not change his policies. Potsdam, probably the last opportunity, brought no real change in Eastern Europe despite strong American talk for free elections. As at Yalta, after the wrangling the pressure to get some kind of an agreement preserving the fiction of Allied unity was too great to be resisted. After Potsdam, with American forces in Europe melting away, Western policy entered a period of compromises with earlier compromises, of continuing and not always graceful retreat.

The United States had fluctuated in a state of hazy uncertainty between a strong stand on principle for self-determination and free elections in Eastern Europe on the one hand, and on the other a "realism" which recognized that this area was remote from the centers of American power and a matter primarily for settlement by Britain and Russia. On the latter theory, the vital interests of America nowhere clashed with those of Russia, and thus we were in a position to play a sort of mediator rôle. Neither line was followed steadily and consistently. The principles remained general and unrealizable in areas of Soviet occupation, and at the same time they brought about a negative or at best distrustful American attitude toward Mr. Churchill's rather desperate attempts in 1944 to save something from the wreckage by the methods of direct and specific deals with Stalin and by military action in Greece. As for the rôle of mediator, this idea served only to annoy the British; Stalin never regarded his two allies as anything but an "Anglo-Saxon front" despite studied American efforts to avoid offending the Russians by any appearance of "ganging up" on them with previously agreed Anglo-American proposals.

In a review of this record it is only fair to recall the circumstances of the time and the limitations on American policy. The United States had abandoned isolation only when forced to do so by the war. The Administration was guardedly approaching the question of postwar commitments in preparing Congress and the public for participation in a new world organization to replace the League. No consideration was given to possible American guarantees to the nations of Western Europe, much less to those of Eastern Europe which seemed more remote and less vital to United States security, as in fact they were. The principles of free elections and national independence were in accord with our tra-

ditions. They also constituted a sound formula for a policy of *cordon sanitaire*, if this had been our policy, but to make them stick we would have had to risk a break with Russia; it was fatuous to expect to put such principles into effect with Stalin's coöperation and goodwill.

IV

If Eastern Europe was somewhat remote in American eyes, Germany, the main enemy and the key to the settlement in Europe, was not. All the more glaring, then, was the failure of the United States Government to work out, in good time, a policy for Germany and to press it consistently in negotiation with the other major Allies. One unsettling factor was the continued adherence of the President to the idea of partition, despite the contrary views of Secretary Hull and of most of the advisers and staff of the State Department. Thus, as late as the Yalta conference the permanent partition of Germany was "agreed in principle" by the Heads of Government, and was left in the hands of a special committee in London right up to the time of Germany's surrender, when Stalin publicly abandoned it. Meanwhile, the aberration of the "Morgenthau Plan" and the interdepartmental controversies it engendered had taken American policy off on a tangent and left American negotiators, in the crucial period of the closing stages of the war, without instructions as to American objectives in postwar Germany.

Allowance must be made for the strength of the idea of punishing the nation which again had brought to the world the horrors of war and of making it impossible for it ever to do so again. Yet "unconditional surrender" and destruction of German power did not constitute a long-term policy for Germany or for Europe. The fact remains that the United States did not have a policy on the disposition of German territory or on the future rôle it envisaged for the German nation. Nor did it, in the arrangements for the Occupation period, find a way to keep open these questions for future settlement by assuring that the occupying Powers would deal with Germany as a whole. The Potsdam Agreement provided for "uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany, so far as is practicable," and for treating Germany as "a single economic unit," but these provisions were simply ignored by the Soviet authorities in their zone. The same agreement gave Russia a free hand in taking repara-

tions from East Germany, accepted Polish control up to the Oder-Neisse and the transfer of millions of Germans to truncated Germany. These provisions were not ignored, but on the contrary were "liberally" interpreted by the Soviets.

If earlier and more definite agreements on Germany had been reached, the results might have been the same as soon as Soviet forces came into physical control of Eastern Germany. If that is so, probably there were but two ways of heading off what happened: 1, avoiding all agreement on zones of occupation, thus taking a chance on where the various Allied forces would be when war ended and on a possible clash with the Russians in a scramble for territory; 2, seeking agreement on a joint occupation with forces of all occupying Powers serving side-by-side throughout Germany. The first alternative would have risked the possibility of having the Russians on the Rhine, which in early 1944 when the Soviet zone was agreed on seemed more likely than that the Americans and British would be on the Oder. The second alternative, which is more worthy of examination, was in fact seriously considered by the State Department in 1944, but it might have presented insuperable practical difficulties for the military commanders and caused intolerable confusion in the job of directing and controlling the Germans. Moreover, though it would have given the West some foothold in East Germany, it would also have put Soviet soldiers on the Rhine and in the Ruhr. In view of the negative attitude of the War Department and the probability that the Soviets would not agree to it, the State Department never pressed the proposal.

The United States might well, however, have pressed for a more favorable division of Germany. The actual line dividing the Soviet from the Western zones was proposed by the British and accepted without argument by Moscow. We could have urged a line running through Berlin, to keep the Russians somewhat farther east and to avoid isolation of Berlin in the Soviet zone; even a narrow Western territorial corridor would have made the blockade impossible, but this was not even proposed.

American diplomats, in negotiating the zonal divisions, were aware that they could become the basis for *de facto* partition of Germany. Yet they were not justified, until the attempt had been made to work out agreed policies among the three Allies, in proceeding on any other assumption than that Germany would be treated as a political and economic unit. As we have seen, agree-

ment was not even reached between various agencies of the United States Government itself. And American negotiators can hardly be blamed for failing to guard at all costs against a possible *de facto* partition at a time when the President of the United States was known to favor a permanent partition of Germany into several states.⁴

After Potsdam the policy of the Western Powers in Germany hardened and called a halt to further Soviet gains, a change made possible by the continued presence of their forces in West Germany. Will today's or tomorrow's negotiations provide any opportunity of reopening or reversing what happened in the lands to the east, after a decade of Sovietization? We should not concede that this is impossible. But it will require above all a clear conception of objectives and a strategy for pursuing them.

To attempt a detailed definition of such objectives, which must be related to our global situation both present and future, is beyond the scope of this article. In broad terms, the objectives in Europe presumably are a strengthened NATO, a free united Germany associated with the West, and freedom of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. Any strategy to attain them must be rooted in political realities. Sir Edward Grey's dictum that events make diplomacy instead of diplomacy making events is not true without exception, but it carries an important lesson. We found in 1944 that our attempts at "solutions" by diplomacy were running behind events; that Soviet control of events was a fundamental fact in determining the context of negotiations and the character of the agreements reached; that the United States, in order to be "realistic," was forced into a diplomacy of compromise and retreat. It therefore behooves us, when pursuing settlements at the conference table, to pursue them also on the ground. We cannot, for example, successfully negotiate for German unity unless the political and economic situation in the Federal Republic remains sound and firm, unless our positions have the support of the Germans themselves; otherwise they will be founded on sand. Similarly, if the Soviets run into difficulties and increased pressures in their control of East Germany and the satellites, their negotiating position is bound to be weakened.

Furthermore, we should avoid the pitfalls of negotiation in generalities. Let us proclaim our own principles to the world but not

⁴ Philip E. Mosely, "Dismemberment of Germany," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1950, and "The Occupation of Germany," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1950.

rely for their fulfillment on Soviet adherence to new "Yalta declarations." We would have no excuse for being deceived by such a proposal for German unification, resembling the Yalta deal on Poland, as Molotov put forward at Geneva. To be worthwhile, any settlements will have to be specific and in such terms as not to trade concrete advantages for promises and to permit equivalent compensatory redress in case of Soviet violation. This is the virtue of the plan to proceed toward German unification and a European security system by gradual stages. A European security treaty by itself, whether it is one such as the Soviet Union has proposed or some other general formula, is the kind of agreement that would be meaningless and possibly dangerous in misleading European peoples, weakening the NATO bond and freeing Soviet hands for meddling elsewhere.

v

The record of our wartime decisions is punctuated by a number of occasions when a clearer conception of political objectives and of the rôle of military power in attaining them might have left the West in a much more favorable position than was its lot at the close of the final wartime conference at Potsdam. Such a conclusion is necessarily based on speculation. Most of the cases, moreover, involved decisions in which great weight necessarily had to be given to military strategy or prior commitments regardless of the political factors. But it is worth considering what would have happened "if."

The decision against a 1944 campaign through Trieste to Vienna or Budapest, based on unconvincing military grounds and on loyalty to the grand strategy agreed upon with Stalin at Teheran, killed the only hope of forestalling Soviet occupation of the middle Danube area; the President actually proposed that he and Churchill submit their differences on the point to Stalin for decision. The failure in 1944 to conclude an armistice with Bulgaria, which was not at war with the U.S.S.R., before the arrival of Soviet troops at the frontier delivered the country into Soviet hands, deprived the Western Powers of a chance to draw the line at the Danube instead of at the northern border of Greece. A decision in 1945 to push on and liberate Prague, instead of pointedly leaving this honor to the Russians, would have had immense symbolic and political value even though it might not have changed the fate of Czechoslovakia. The decision to withdraw

American forces which at the end of the fighting held a sizable part of the Soviet zone of Germany deprived the West of its best bargaining counter to compel the Russians to fulfill their obligations with respect to Germany and Eastern Europe; although the zones had already been agreed on, it was quixotic to be in such a hurry to apply this past agreement against ourselves at a time when the Russians had torn up the recently concluded Yalta agreements and taken full advantage of their own military advances. Moreover, this handing over to Soviet rule of people who had thought they were under our protection, like the forcible repatriation of Soviet citizens, did irreparable damage to America's prestige and good name. Finally, there was the catastrophic demobilization of American forces in Europe; once that process began our paper protests could only be taken for just that.

The lesson of the relationship of policy and diplomacy to power seems to have been learned, though it must be learned by the Congress and the public as well as by the Executive. The power situation is now no longer that of 1944-45, with armies on the march and filling the vacuums left in the wake of Axis defeat. It is more fixed and rigid as both parties, tacitly accepting the line of the Iron Curtain as their military frontier, have built up their armed strength on both sides of it. But it is not static or unaffected by politics both national and international. The United States must maintain the power, both over-all and on the spot in Europe, to deter resort to force and to support its diplomacy. At the same time, in its diplomacy it must carefully calculate the effect of various proposals—such as for reduction or withdrawal of Soviet and Western forces in Germany or for arms limitation on both sides of the Iron Curtain—on its relative power position. We can perhaps accept a deal which affects both sides about equally, provided the political consequences are acceptable.

Obviously the mere piling up of military power will not ensure the success of American diplomacy. The possession of annihilating force by the United States will not unite Germany or bring freedom to Eastern Europe. Except in the unexpected event of a foolproof agreement on disarmament, however, this power is necessary to the security of the free world; and without it there is no hope of successful political and diplomatic moves to turn the prevailing balance to the free world's benefit.

Another useful lesson has to do with the nature and timing of the positions we take in negotiations. The danger of being pressed

into a bad agreement because of unwillingness to face the public reaction to non-agreement is self-evident. Furthermore, having seen the folly of failing to take a firm position on a point until it was hopelessly lost, we should be aware of the dangers of remaining on the defensive, of letting negotiations be confined to areas where Western vulnerabilities can be exploited. Thus, in negotiating on Europe, we should talk about all Europe, about Russia's satellites as well as about Germany and NATO. The most fruitful approach, however, does not lie in flat demands for free elections in Eastern Europe, which can only result in unproductive deadlock, but rather in exploring such matters as increased East-West contacts, mutual withdrawal of forces and regional arms limitation on both sides of the Iron Curtain, which could open the door to more far-reaching developments.

Finally, there is the indefinable matter of public attitudes and "atmosphere." It is somewhat ominous that Soviet spokesmen are so insistent on proclaiming the end of the Cold War, even while they yield nothing at Geneva and extend the war to new areas. We can expect periodic shifts in the Soviet line as they seek to win advantage by one means or another. American opinion is bound to be influenced by such phenomena as the smiles and camaraderie of the "summit" meeting, the loudly announced reductions of armed forces, and the friendly farm experts eating their way through church suppers in Iowa, just as it is influenced by the stony obstinacy of Mr. Molotov. The best answer to the risks involved in such reactions is an increased effort to inform the public and a policy which does not fluctuate with each Soviet manoeuvre. During the last war the American government and people developed an unreasoningly hopeful attitude which actually was more helpful to Soviet than to American interests in its effect on the negotiations of that time. Both as a government and as a people we shall have to look more than superficially at the smiling spirit of Geneva lest, as it fades from view and reappears like the Cheshire cat, we miss its resemblance to the grinning spectre of Yalta.

THE CRISIS OF AUSTRALIAN LABOR

By Lloyd Ross

BY the time these words are read, Australia will have had a national election. The conflict within the Australian Labor Party has been a dominant factor in the electoral campaign and will affect the result. What is the background of this Party crisis? What is the clash of ideas, particularly in the field of international affairs, which gives it interest and importance far beyond the limits of Australia?

Since the defeat of the Chifley Labor Government in 1949, Labor has been in opposition in the Commonwealth Parliament, although it continued to hold office in five of the six states—Queensland, New South Wales, Tasmania, West Australia and (until recently) Victoria. The leadership of Dr. Herbert Vere Evatt, who succeeded the late J. B. Chifley in 1951, has been frequently challenged, mainly because he opposed efforts to proscribe the Communist Party, but partly because he exercised his personal rights as a lawyer to assist Communists legally. Dr. Evatt retaliated by accusing his opponents within the Labor Party of being under the control of “The Movement,” a political expression of Catholic Action. Charges and countercharges followed; sectarian feelings poisoned the political atmosphere. When Dr. Evatt’s opponents in Victoria formed a separate executive, they were expelled from the Labor Party; an anti-Evatt breakaway party voted against the State Labor Government and in the ensuing election Labor was defeated. In the Commonwealth Parliament, a small group of Victorian members followed suit by leaving the official Labor Party. The division within the Labor Party has extended less openly, but just as seriously, throughout Australia. In every State there are those who believe that the official Party is temporizing with Communists in the trade unions, or is following a wrong policy in international affairs.

There are, however, issues other than international policy involved in the conflict, and these may be isolated first. There are the differences about the part that Roman Catholics have played or should play in Party councils; about the Party’s stated objective of “socialization”—its meaning, its importance as a guide in planning legislation, its finality; about the relationship between Communism and Labor; the extent to which theoretical differences should involve the Labor Party in fighting Communism in the trade unions; about the inevitable personal strains and factionalism in a large and well-established political party; and about the disappointments at Labor’s failure to defeat the Commonwealth Liberal-Country Party alliance led by Prime Minister R. G. Menzies. These issues are interwoven with the central controversy over international policy.

As Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs in the Curtin and Chifley Labor Governments, Dr. Evatt won a great reputation in the two fields of law and international affairs. This reputation has passed over party lines. In the international sphere he has enjoyed as wide esteem as any Australian, including Prime Minister W. M. Hughes in World War I and Prime Minister Curtin in World War II. His present difficulties, like the differences within the Labor Party, have developed not because there is any important

group which opposes his basic philosophy of international peace through social justice but because its application has involved Dr. Evatt in controversial attitudes toward Communism at home and abroad.

Serious dissension in the Labor Party began in 1950 with the effort to reinstitute the wartime ban on the Communist Party which had been lifted in December 1942.

During the first postwar election, held in 1946, Mr. Menzies said: "We must be extremely reluctant to put down the Communist Party. We must not let it be thought that they are such a force in political philosophy that we cannot meet them." The proper way to deal with Communism, he claimed, was to expose its false arguments to open discussion. If, however, the Communists fomented strikes, they should be dealt with as lawbreakers. Following a series of industrial disputes and the development of international strains, Mr. Menzies in 1949 declared himself in favor of banning the Communist Party. On April 27, 1950, in furtherance of election promises, he introduced the Communist Party Dissolution Bill, the principal features of which were:¹

- (1) The Communist Party was declared to be seeking the violent overthrow of the established government of Australia and to be a part of the world Communist revolutionary movement.
- (2) The Australian Communist Party was declared illegal and dissolved.
- (3) The Governor-General was empowered to declare unlawful organizations affiliated to or controlled by Communists which could be regarded as a menace to defense, or the Constitution, or to the laws of the Commonwealth.
- (4) The Governor-General might "declare" specific individuals who had been after May 10, 1948, and before the dissolution of an association, a member of it. Persons so declared might not hold a position in the government service or in important trade unions.
- (5) A person so declared had the onus of proving that he was not a Communist, except that if he elected to go into the witness box and state on oath that he was not a Communist, the onus of proof would rest on the Crown.

Though opposed by the late Mr. Chifley, who was then leader of the Labor Party, and by Dr. Evatt, the deputy leader, the Labor Party decided to agree to the Bill in principle, but to attempt a modification of a number of clauses. However, the Government refused to accept the Labor amendments. The Party then refrained from opposing the Bill in the Senate, where Labor had a majority and could have held up its passage. Chifley, Evatt and most union leaders believed strongly that the Bill represented a drastic interference with democratic principles. The Party as a whole was afraid of an election on the issue, however, so principles gave way to expediency and the Bill was passed.

The Communist Party Dissolution Act was immediately challenged in the High Court by a number of unions, with Dr. Evatt appearing on behalf of the Waterside Workers' Federation—a Communist-controlled union. The Act was declared invalid in March 1951. A week later Parliament was dissolved and in the subsequent election Labor gained five seats in the House of Representatives, but was still in a minority, and lost control of the Senate. The Menzies Government decided to submit to the people a referendum to alter the Australian Constitution for the purpose of giving the Commonwealth

¹ This summary is taken from Leicester Webb, "Communism and Democracy in Australia: a Survey of the 1951 Referendum." New York: Praeger, 1955, p. 24.

Parliament power to dissolve the Communist Party. Dr. Evatt, who had become Party leader following the death of Mr. Chifley, dominated the campaign. The referendum proposals were defeated by a margin of 52,000 votes out of some 4,700,000 cast. Of Dr. Evatt's part in the campaign, a severe critic of his policies said: "Immediately the referendum was launched he took the initiative in the fight; he held it to the end, vigorously campaigning in every State, and by sheer personal earnestness and force, making the other side's effort in general look careless and lethargic."

These events merge into any discussion of Labor's policies in international affairs. Communism was believed to be a danger by many, not only because Communists were alleged to foment industrial disputes, but because these disputes sometimes were political and aimed at controlling Australia's external policy in the interests of Soviet Russia. Many Labor supporters would in fact have preferred to support the referendum, and these now were insistent that the Party must accept responsibility for weakening Communist influence in the unions by other means. This thesis was accepted by the Industrial Groups, which had been formed by the Labor Party, but with reservations on the part of those who believed that unions should be left free from outside political interference. Those whose point of departure was fear of Communism—especially the Roman Catholics—threw themselves enthusiastically into the campaign for eliminating Communist influence from unions. Throughout these controversies there was a possibility that some members of the Labor Party and of the community would identify opposition to particular anti-Communist legislation with apathy towards the spread of Communist influence, especially in the unions. Upon those members of the Labor Party, including Dr. Evatt, who were campaigning against the Government's methods of dealing with Communism, rested the responsibility of uprooting Communism in the unions by methods of Labor organization. Part of the explanation for the present discontent is that the Labor Party's recent statements on foreign policy coincide with Dr. Evatt's repudiation of the Industrial Groups and of the need to take an active part in the anti-Communist campaign in the unions.

The Labor Party's position on international affairs was set forth in a policy statement at the 1955 Federal Labor Party Conference. Colonialism, it said, must be ended; the dignity and self-respect of Asian nations and peoples must be recognized; official and unofficial visits between Australia and Asian countries must be encouraged. SEATO, as a regional organization within the United Nations, has a positive duty to try to lessen international tension in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. To promote the security of the area, including New Guinea, and to improve standards of life, a mutual regional pact for security and welfare should be negotiated among Australia, Holland and Indonesia. A renewed attempt should be made to include all applicants in the United Nations Organization. The policy statement asserted further that had the United Nations intervention in Indo-China been taken five years earlier, a better settlement would have been obtained. "Indo-China is typical of those cases where inexcusable delay in recognizing a genuine nationalist, anti-colonial movement in Asia resulted in Communism gradually capturing the Nationalist movement," the policy declaration read. "Democratic Nation-

alism suffered a severe setback." Generous assistance was advocated from Australia to Asian peoples suffering from poverty, disease and lack of educational facilities. Stress was placed on the need for "continuous action by way of conciliation and peaceful intervention for the purpose of preventing war and of bringing all armed conflict to an end."

Opposing the use of armed forces in Malaya, the Labor Party Conference stated more specifically that "the use of Australian armed forces in Malaya will gravely injure Australian relations with our Asian neighbors while in no way contributing to the prevention of aggression. The 'guerrilla' operations in Malaya have lasted five years. They will eventually be ended by some form of agreement or amnesty. Action toward this end should begin now."

In April 1955, Prime Minister Menzies announced a Federal Cabinet decision to coöperate with Britain and New Zealand in establishing a strategic reserve in Southeast Asia. The Federal Cabinet also decided to send an Australian force to Malaya. "If the battle against Communism is to be an effective one," said Mr. Menzies, "it must be won as far north of Australia as possible." He insisted that Australia could not accept the collaboration of friends and allies in a comprehensive defense against aggressive Communism unless it was prepared to assume a share of the responsibilities. Australia, he argued, could not be effectively "defended either by our own efforts within our own borders, or by resolutions of the United Nations rendered impotent by the Communist veto." Emphasizing the need to coöperate with the United Kingdom and the United States, he continued: "With our vast territory and our small population, we cannot survive a surging Communist challenge from abroad except by the coöperation of powerful friends, including, in particular, the United Kingdom and the United States."

These decisions were opposed by Dr. Evatt, speaking on behalf of the Labor Party. The Party, he said, "believes that an attempt should now be made to settle this guerrilla warfare by some form of agreement or merciful amnesty, by the quicker granting of self-government to the Malayan peoples, and by the eradication of poor working conditions in the rubber plantations." And he added, "Malaya is entitled to self-government." Australia should not send troops to interfere in the internal politics of Malaya. This was not because Labor favored isolationism, but because it looked at the situation in Southeast Asia from a point of view which was "realistic, humane, and in strict accordance with United Nations principles set out in the Charter." "The Labor Party has promised to support self-government by all nations."

In his reply Dr. Evatt also made a reference to opponents within his own Party. "Subversive elements within Labor," he said, "will no longer be able to stop the drive which Labor will lead towards better relations with Asian peoples." Dr. Evatt was alluding to the fact that dissidents within his own Party supported the dispatch of Australian troops to Malaya. The Party's foreign policy, these dissident elements said, "is insulting and dangerous to the friendly coöperation at present existing between Australia, England and the United States of America." Such a policy, they claimed, would tend to isolate Australia from all traditional support in foreign affairs and leave the Commonwealth "totally dependent in the Pacific on acceptance by Australia of policies designed to placate Communist-dominated Pacific nations."

These anti-Evatt elements also oppose recognition of Red China and support the claims of the Chinese Nationalists, almost to the point of giving them armed assistance. They favor aid to Asians, but believe that resistance to Asian Communism must be organized. They criticize recent truces and, while expressing the hope that war may be avoided, suggest that peace will be illusory so long as international Communism exists, or so long as powerful armed forces are not at the disposal of the anti-Communists. The Evatt foreign policy, said *News-Weekly*, a progressive journal, whose inspiration is Catholic but whose influence extends into all anti-Communist circles, "is the kind of thing one could expect from a sort of Vichy Government in Canberra, operating under Chinese Communist auspices."

The Communists today are in fact very vocal in supporting the main elements of Labor's international policies. Trade union and Labor Party ranks have been permeated with their propaganda. A petition demanding that hydrogen and atomic bombs be banned has been circulated and more than 100,000 Australians were said to have signed the peace petition prior to the Helsinki conference in June 1955, which was attended by 31 Australian representatives. "No Australian troops for Malaya," according to the Communist *Tribune*, is the "fighting slogan of the Australian working people." Attacks on the United States are continuous and undiluted. The story of Sacco and Vanzetti was revived as Communists organized united front memorial celebrations in honor of the Rosenbergs. McCarthy was made into a symbol of American policy and McCarthyism into a generalization of the American spirit.

The tendency today is for official Labor to minimize the influence of Communism—an indirect result of the Labor split which, as we have seen, originated immediately in the problem of defeating Communism in the unions. Communism is said to be no longer a national danger, as shown by the small Communist votes in recent elections; or Communism, it is argued, can be beaten only by improving working conditions through efficient and aggressive Labor leadership. Yet, the influence of Communists in Australia has never been measured by political results, but by their success in controlling the policies and administration of trade unions and in infiltrating their policies into Labor organizations. Judged by both tests, they are recovering lost ground. They have won elections in key engineering and transport unions; in international affairs they have identified themselves with Labor policies so that on immediate issues there are few clear differences. For example, the Communists could well applaud the words of the Deputy Leader of the Labor Party, Mr. A. A. Calwell, when he described the Malayan campaign as a "colonial expedition." The purpose, he said, was to protect the interests of millionaire investors; the solution is to grant "immediate independence to Malaya." Malaya belongs to the Malaysians as Australia belongs to the Australians.

In union elections, combined Communist-Evatt slates are appearing in opposition to those who achieved office by obtaining Labor Party sanction—now withdrawn—in fighting Communists. This is another example of the major ideological problem that is weakening Australian Labor. Official Labor seems unable to develop policies which can be distinguished from the Liberal Party on the one side and Communists on the other. While opposing the

strong anti-Communists in its own ranks, Labor seems in process of being ideologically absorbed by the more aggressive and vocal forces of the Communists.

Historically, Labor's problem in international policies—and often in domestic affairs—is that it must choose among a set of ideas and a set of reservations. The achievement of John Curtin in the Second World War was that he selected the idea and the reservation which met the needs of his Party and his nation. He opposed the policies which had led to the outbreak of war, but convinced the Party that Australia's freedom was at stake. He belonged to a party that was critical of the economic policies of the United States, but he rallied the people with prospects of American aid. He had opposed conscription of Australians for service overseas, but he persuaded his Party to accept the view that national freedom required a modification of a basic tradition. He recognized that isolationism was no longer desirable or practicable. He agreed with the policies of his Party in excluding Communists from membership, and in lifting the ban on the Communist Party. But both he and Chifley died before the problems of postwar Communism created new difficulties for Party and nation.

A responsible Labor Party in Australia today must recognize the need for building Australian defenses, economically and politically. While exploring seriously the hopes of peaceful settlement with Asian Communism and recognizing honestly the claims of Asian nationalism, Labor must link these with the tradition of national leadership which Chifley and Curtin established.

Mr. Calwell, Deputy Leader of the Labor Party, in the August 22 issue of *The New Commonwealth* wrote:

In Australia, unlike England, the United States and Canada, there is no such thing as a bipartisan foreign policy. . . . Never at any time in our history has there been agreement between the Government and the Opposition on matters of foreign policy—not even in time of war. This is due to the fact that the anti-Labour forces in Australia are imperialist in outlook while the Labour Party is stridently nationalist.

Mr. Calwell illustrates again the limitations both of the traditional Labor generalizations on international affairs and of the realities of such generalizations in meeting the complicated problems of Australia. Labor's difficulties today arise partly because her security—as well as her nationalism—must be reconciled with the latter-day nationalism of her neighbors. If Australian Labor in its sympathy for nationalist aspirations and its opposition to imperialism ignores the complications created by Soviet Communism and expanding nationalism, then Labor will fail to develop a rounded answer to all aspects of the problem.

There is some evidence that Australian public opinion is becoming more willing to listen to Labor's oversimplified approach to international affairs. The Australian community shows signs of being critical of defense preparations, especially where these seem to be increasing contemporary economic difficulties.

Before the recent divisions developed within the Party, popular trends favored Labor; reaction against a long-established government had begun. The economic policies of the Federal Government were erratic and uncertain;

consolidation, rather than expansion of social policies, had lost its appeal; hopes of peace rather than fear of war were pervading the outlook of the community; the swing of the pendulum, noticeable in the preceding election, favored Labor.

The political question before the elections was whether the internal dissensions in the Labor Party had reversed these trends. The report of the Australian Royal Commission on Espionage fell flat after the expectations created by the drastic events of the Petrov decision to remain in Australia. The details of the Report could be used against Labor, not because there was any evidence to link Labor with Communist espionage, but because Dr. Evatt criticized the integrity of the Commissioners, claimed that the Petrov revelations were part of a political conspiracy against Labor and belittled the evidence of Soviet espionage. This attack not only intensified internal Party dissensions, but revived earlier public suspicion of Dr. Evatt's policies, or at least his wisdom. When Dr. Evatt appeared before the Commission in defense of members of his staff implicated by "Document J" but generally absolved by the Report, public opinion was divided between those who admired his courage in defending his colleagues and those who resented his suggestion that everybody concerned was involved in a conspiracy against him. It was against this background that the elections have been fought. The outcome depends on how much the electorate has been influenced by it and how much by the general issues, on which Labor has an advantage.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF PEACE. BY CHESTER BOWLES. New York: Harper, 1955, 391 p. \$4.50.

The former Ambassador to India here presents his analysis of the world crisis and his prescription for an American stance and policy to meet it. In his estimate, the prospects are reasonably encouraging in Europe. He therefore puts principal emphasis upon Asia and Africa, where he feels that American prestige has been declining, where we have failed thus far to meet the challenges of the times, and where, very possibly, the issue between Communism and democracy will be decided. In general he proposes that we make full use of the mighty ferment still present in democratic ideals to regain the confidence of the non-European world, a confidence that military strength alone cannot create.

A CHRONICLE OF JEOPARDY: 1945-55. BY REXFORD G. TUGWELL. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955, 488 p. \$7.50.

As the author says, "this is a book, very largely, of opinion"—a series of ten "anniversary" reflections written over the years since the first atomic explosion. It is of interest in giving the evolution of one man's views, both pessimistic and angry, on world events as the thermonuclear age advanced.

WORLD INDIVISIBLE. BY KONRAD ADENAUER. New York: Harper, 1955, 128 p. \$2.75.

A selection of the Chancellor's speeches and statements, made since the establishment of the Bonn Republic, on a variety of German, European and international topics.

DEMOCRACY IN WORLD POLITICS. BY LESTER B. PEARSON. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955, 123 p. \$2.75.

Lectures by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, delivered at Princeton University in 1955.

HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR. BY KENNETH INGRAM. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955, 239 p. \$5.00.

A painful effort to assess the "measure of guilt" attaching to the Western democracies and the Soviet Union for the coming of the cold war. The author's effort to be evenhanded leads him into such dubious statements as "the Soviet Union did not compel by actual military invasion any of its neighbors to become satellites."

THE REALIGNMENT OF EUROPE. EDITED BY ARNOLD TOYNBEE AND VERONICA M. TOYNBEE. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1955, 619 p. \$14.00.

This volume in the Survey of International Affairs Series for the war years, 1939-1946, deals with events in Europe following the collapse of German power: the first steps toward economic rehabilitation under UNRRA, the expansion of

Soviet control in the states of Eastern Europe, and the hectic resurrection of political life in Greece, Italy and Western Europe.

LES ACCORDS SECRETS FRANCO-BRITANNIQUES DE L'AUTOMNE 1940. BY LOUIS ROUGIER. Paris: Grasset, 1954, 249 p. Fr. 495.

More on the curious history of the Churchill-Pétain agreements of 1940, and their bearing on the collaborationist trials at the end of the war.

WAR PREMEDITATED—1939. BY WALTHER HOFER. London: Thames and Hudson, 1955, 227 p. 16/.

An able study, by a Swiss historian, of the immediate background of the Second World War in the summer of 1939. While most of the material will be familiar to students of the subject, it is well assembled and directed to showing Hitler's full responsibility for destroying the peace. (A translation of "Die Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges." Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954, 236 p. DM. 6.80.)

SOUVERÄNITÄT UND SOLIDARITÄT. BY ERNST SAUER. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1954, 174 p. DM. 10.80.

A contribution to the old but continuing problem of pairing sovereignty with international solidarity.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. BY LELAND M. GOODRICH AND ANNE P. SIMONS. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1955, 709 p. \$6.00.

This volume—the first in a projected series of seven Brookings studies dealing with the United Nations system—surveys the methods and processes for maintaining peace and security. The authors conclude that members of the U.N. must still rely primarily on their own strength and special defense arrangements, but that the more drastic proposals to "strengthen" the U.N. system are probably not feasible.

THE UN RECORD. BY CHESLY MANLY. Chicago: Regnery, 1955, 256 p. \$3.95.

The author celebrates the tenth anniversary of the U.N. Charter by urging America's withdrawal from the organization.

INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS. BY PHILIP C. JESSUP, ADOLF LANDE AND OLIVER J. LISSITZYN. New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1955, 173 p. \$1.75. (Columbia University Press, distributor.)

A survey of changes in the international scene relating to, or confirming, the conclusions advanced by the late Joseph P. Chamberlain in his essay "International Organization," first appearing in 1942 and here reprinted.

MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES. BY JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954, 421 p. \$8.00.

An American trial lawyer examines the proceedings of the Nuremberg trials to test the legal right to conduct them and the fairness of the procedures used and the sentences handed down.

DER AKTION DER USA IN KOREA. BY FRANZ PFEFFER. Hamburg: Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht, 1955, 214 p.

A discussion of the problem of decision-making in war and peace under the American Constitution, with special reference to the Korean war.

DEBATES WITH HISTORIANS. BY PIETER GEYL. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955, 241 p. Guilders 12.40.

Essays on historians and historiography, by one of the outstanding living historians; includes a number of pieces in his debate with Arnold Toynbee, of whom he is probably the most perceptive critic.

HERETICS AND RENEGADES. BY ISAAC DEUTSCHER. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955, 288 p. 15/.

A collection of Mr. Deutscher's recent essays and reviews—all of them related in one way or another to the Soviet Union and Communism. Of considerable topical interest is his rather polemical "reply to critics" who attacked his recent book, "Russia After Stalin."

THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF HAROLD J. LASKI. BY HERBERT A. DEANE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, 370 p. \$5.75.

An able, scholarly analysis of the progress of Laski's political thought, as a pluralist, a Fabian and finally a Marxist. Without malice, indeed with considerable sympathy, it is an altogether devastating critique.

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY AND THE WORLD MAP. BY Y. M. GOBLET. New York: Praeger, 1955, 291 p. \$6.50.

A general study, by a French geographer, of the development, meaning and basic concepts of political geography, "that part of human geography which deals with those political complexes which have a territorial component."

YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 1954-55. Brussels: Union of International Associations, 1955, 1196 p. Belgian Fr. 500.

The fifth issue of a useful reference, which covers the U.N., the European Coal and Steel Community, other intergovernmental organizations, and international nongovernmental organizations.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1954. EDITED BY PETER V. CURL. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1955, 506 p. \$5.00.

The sixteenth annual volume of selected documents, initiated by the World Peace Foundation and carried on by the Council on Foreign Relations since 1952.

AMERICAN AGENCIES INTERESTED IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. COMPILED BY RUTH SAVORD AND DONALD WASSON. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1955, 289 p. \$3.00.

The latest edition of this handy reference book provides detailed data on aims, organization, personnel and publications. It includes listings of foreign chambers of commerce and information bureaus, and dormant and discontinued organizations. Subject and personnel indexes add to its value.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS BIBLIOGRAPHY. BY HENRY L. ROBERTS, ASSISTED BY JEAN GUNTHER AND JANIS A. KRESLINS. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1955, 727 p. \$10.00.

An extensive annotated bibliography of books published during the decade 1942-1952 in international affairs, contemporary history and related fields. It is based on the notes appearing quarterly in *Foreign Affairs*, but contains several thousand additional items. In all, more than 9,000 titles in 34 languages are listed and appraised.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE ATTACK ON BIG BUSINESS. BY J. D. GLOVER. Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1954, 375 p. \$4.00.

A survey of the various prevalent economic, political and ethical criticisms of "big business," concluding with a critique of the critics.

✓ FIFTY YEARS OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. BY EDWIN A. BOCK. Chicago: Public Administration Clearing House, 1954, 65 p. \$1.50.

A concise study based on interviews "with 55 persons who have had long experience in technical assistance in less-developed countries."

LONG-RANGE ECONOMIC PROJECTION: STUDIES IN INCOME AND WEALTH. VOLUME SIXTEEN. BY THE CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN INCOME AND WEALTH. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954, 476 p. \$9.00.

A symposium of papers dealing with the problems involved in making long-term projections for the national product, labor force, agriculture, government revenues and expenditures, etc.

DIE GROSSE KRISE. BY WILHELM GROTKOPP. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1954, 408 p. DM. 18.

An analysis of the great depression in Germany; of most interest for its discussion of various proposals put forward by German economists to counter it—some of them foreshadowing the Keynesian analysis.

REGULATION OF TRADE. BY HEINRICH KRONSTEIN AND JOHN T. MILLER, JR. New York: Fallon, 1953, 1186 p. \$12.00.

Students of international law and economics will be particularly interested in Chapter 15, Special Rules on Access to the International Market. This chapter provides useful summaries of leading cases dealing with the territorial effect of U. S. anti-trust legislation and its application to the foreign trade activities of American trade associations.

WIRTSCHAFTSNACHRICHTEN IN DER WELTPRESSE. BY BURKHARDT RÖPER. Berne: Francke, 1954, 234 p. Swiss Fr. 2.80.

A useful survey of the history, organization, and methods of collection and presentation of economic and financial information in the world's press.

EXPERIMENT IN EDUCATION. BY WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING. Chicago: Regnery, 1954, 303 p. \$5.00.

Professor Hocking asks: What have we learned and what may we learn through trying to reeducate post-Hitler Germany, a "nation much older than ourselves and of deeper-rooted culture?" He concludes that teaching democracy is fruitless unless we fully understand and act upon its metaphysical basis.

The Second World War

DEFEAT AT SEA: THE STRUGGLE AND EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION OF THE GERMAN NAVY, 1939-1945. BY C. D. BEKKER. New York: Holt, 1955, 222 p. \$3.95.

A former German naval officer's rather popular account of the vicissitudes of the German fleet in the Second World War. (A translation of "Kampf und Untergang der Kriegsmarine." Hanover: Sponholtz, 1953, 278 p. DM. 15.50.)

GESCHICHTE DES LUFTKRIEGS. BY GEORG W. FEUCHTER. Bonn: Athenaeum, 1954, 441 p. DM. 18.80.

About two-thirds of this substantial history of aerial warfare is devoted to the Second World War. The last section deals with prospects for the future.

✓ NORTH AMERICAN SUPPLY. BY H. DUNCAN HALL. London: H.M.S.O., and Longmans, 1955, 559 p. 35/. (New York: British Information Services, \$6.30.)

This volume in the United Kingdom Civil Series of the official history of the Second World War deals with the economic, political and technical problems of developing and maintaining transatlantic supply.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. THE TECHNICAL SERVICES. THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS: ORGANIZATION, SUPPLY, AND SERVICES. VOLUME II. By ERNA RISCH AND CHESTER L. KIEFFER. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1955, 433 p. \$4.00.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC: SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS. By PHILIP A. CROWL AND EDMUND G. LOVE. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1955, 414 p. \$5.75.

Two further volumes in the official history.

SWEET IS WAR. By MALCOLM MUNTHE. London: Duckworth, 1954, 185 p. 15/.

A personal narrative of the war, in Finland, Norway, North Africa and Italy, by the son of the author of "The Story of San Michele."

GRIECHENLAND UND DIE GROSSMÄCHTE IM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG. By EHRENGARD SCHRAMM-VON THADDEN. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1955, 244 p. DM. 16.

A monograph primarily concerned with the diplomatic and political aspects of the Italian and German invasions of Greece in 1940-1941.

THE ARAKAN OPERATIONS, 1942-1945. By LIEUT.-COL. N. N. MADAN. New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, 1954, 371 p. Rs. 20.

This volume in the Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, Campaigns in the Eastern Theatre series, describes the operations in the coastal belt of Arakan in Burma from the close of 1942 to the end of the war.

MIDWAY, THE BATTLE THAT DOOMED JAPAN. By MITSUO FUCHIDA AND MASATAKE OKUMIYA. Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1955, 266 p. \$4.50.

A valuable account of the background and course of one of the decisive battles of the Pacific War, by two Japanese naval officers who participated in the operation.

The United States

MEMOIRS. VOLUME I: YEAR OF DECISIONS. By HARRY S. TRUMAN. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955, 596 p. \$5.00.

In this first volume of his memoirs former President Truman, after a brief review of his earlier career, writes of the first months of his Presidency—momentous months which saw the end of the Second World War, the beginning of the chill which developed into the cold war, and the first atomic explosions. Though we gain a number of new insights into the events of that period, the general impression remains of a confused interregnum in the midst of a world of new and ill-defined problems.

THE FIFTEEN WEEKS. By JOSEPH M. JONES. New York: Viking, 1955, 296 p. \$3.75.

According to Mr. Jones, the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine marks the moment at which the United States accepted world leadership. As an official of the State Department's Division of Public Affairs, he observed the process by which

the United States responded to the problems created by the British decision to withdraw from Greece and Turkey. His book carries the story down to the first formulations of the Marshall Plan, giving special attention to the activities of various groups inside the State Department.

THE AMERICAN LEGION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By ROSCOE BAKER. New York: Bookman Associates, 1955, 329 p. \$4.75.

A summary of the development of the American Legion's position on foreign policy. Useful in describing its stands on a number of issues, but does not assess the Legion's influence in determining policy.

THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, AND HOW TO RE-BUILD IT. By JOHN T. FLYNN. New York: Devin-Adair, 1955, 212 p. \$3.00.

Mr. Flynn continues his efforts to remedy the last quarter-century of American history; by now a number of constitutional amendments are called for, as well as a repudiation of the United Nations.

AMERICA AT MID-CENTURY. By ANDRÉ SIEGFRIED. New York: Harcourt, 1955, 357 p. \$5.75.

A quarter-century after his "America Comes of Age," M. Siegfried reappraises the American scene. His views are perhaps of greater interest in indicating the impact of the United States on a cultured and mature observer than as an up-to-date portrayal of the nation.

DE ROOSEVELT À EISENHOWER. By JACQUES FREYMOND. Geneva: Droz, 1953, 153 p.

A discerning and understanding appraisal of American foreign policy in the years 1945-1952, by a prominent French student of international affairs.

THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS. By PHILIP TAFT. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, 312 p. \$6.00.

A professor of economics at Brown University deals with the organization, discipline and practice in American labor unions. The first chapter, "Radicalism in American Labor," discusses the growth of the part Communism has played, or tried to play, in union activity.

IL DILEMMA DEI SINDICATI AMERICANI. By FRANCO FERRAROTTI. Milan: Edizioni di Comunità, 1954, 296 p. L. 1500.

A young Italian scholar, who spent two years in the United States as a Fulbright scholar, explores the American trade union movement and what to him is its major dilemma—political action or economic action.

FRAMEWORK FOR ATOMIC INDUSTRY. By HERBERT S. MARKS AND GEORGE F. TROWBRIDGE. Washington: Bureau of National Affairs, 1955, 272 p. \$12.50.

"A commentary on the Atomic Energy Act of 1954," with the aim of describing the changes which the Act "makes in prior law, especially as the changes affect the opportunity for private interests to take a larger part in the development of atomic energy."

Western Europe

INTEGRATED EUROPE? By MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY. New York: Macmillan, 1955, 182 p. \$3.50.

In these considerations on the movement for European economic, military and political integration, Professor Florinsky concludes that intra-European coopera-

tion efforts without supra-national features are the most promising and that the idea of integration as such is most probably a passing phase and should not be an aim of American policy.

LA FRANCE ET L'UNIFICATION ÉCONOMIQUE DE L'EUROPE. By EDMOND GISCARD D'ESTAING. Paris: Médicis, 1953, 269 p. Fr. 450.

A French banker, who has been active in the movement for European integration, advocates more extensive measures for the creation of a common market. The main need, in his opinion, is for a single currency standard as the only means of securing a true liberalization of exchanges and harmonization of national policies. While supporting the Coal and Steel Community, he disapproves of some of the controls over industry that it entails and does not favor additional integration by sectors. He also supports military and political integration.

LA PARTICIPATION DES TRAVAILLEURS À LA GESTION DES ENTREPRISES PRIVÉES DANS LES PRINCIPAUX PAYS D'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE. By MARCEL DAVID AND OTHERS. Paris: Dalloz, 1954, 249 p. Fr. 600.

A comparative study of worker participation and consultation in the management of private enterprises in Italy, France, Belgium, West Germany, Norway, Great Britain and the Netherlands.

EUROPEAN YEARBOOK: VOLUME I. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955, 584 p. Guilders 28.50.

This first volume of a bilingual, French and English, yearbook published under the auspices of the Council of Europe, includes articles on various European problems and achievements, documents and bibliography.

THE CALL TO HONOUR, 1940-1942. By CHARLES DE GAULLE. New York: Viking, 1955, 319 p. \$5.00.

The first installment of these memoirs covers the years from the fall of France to the middle of 1942. Important as a contribution to the history of France and of the Second World War, the book is also a literary achievement which fully reflects the dimensions of this proud and able leader: "France cannot be France without greatness." The translation also comes in two volumes (\$10.00), of which the second is "Documents." The documents are included in the original one-volume French edition, "Mémoires. I: L'Appel, 1940-1942" (Paris: Plon, 1954, 680 p. Fr. 1200).

LE RÉGIME POLITIQUE FRANÇAIS. By FRANÇOIS GOGUEL. Paris: Seuil, 1955, 137 p. Fr. 390.

A skillful, concise and stimulating account of the "mechanism of parliamentary democracy" in France under the Fourth Republic: the institutions, the political parties and the operation of the régime.

PIERRE LAVAL. By ALFRED MALLET. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1955, 2 v. Fr. 2000.

A lengthy and worthwhile biography of Laval's quite remarkable if disastrous political career. The author was associated with Laval for many years and is thoroughly acquainted with his subject.

FRANCE: THE FOURTH REPUBLIC. By DOROTHY PICKLES. London: Methuen, 1955, 238 p. 8/6.

A concise and exceptionally able survey of contemporary French politics.

LA MISE EN VALEUR DE L'ENSEMBLE EURAFRICAIN FRANÇAIS ET LA PARTICIPATION DES CAPITAUX ÉTRANGERS. By JEAN-MICHEL DE LATRE. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1954, 166 p. Fr. 1200.

Proposals for the economic development of a large "regional entity," from the Rhine to the Congo.

MÄNNER, MÄCHTE, MONOPOLE. BY KURT PRITZKOLEIT. Düsseldorf: Rauch, 1953, 431 p. DM. 10.80.

Although the subtitle seems to promise an exposé—"Behind the Doors of the West German Economy"—some passages rather suggest "Hero Tales from German Industry." Actually the volume is a useful and detailed discussion of some 25 leading firms or groups of companies and of the men who play or played leading parts in them. Emphasis is on coal and steel.

UNTERNEHMER IN DER POLITIK. BY HERBERT GROSS AND OTHERS. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1954, 336 p. DM. 14.80.

This book is one manifestation of a feeling among some Germans that businessmen should concern themselves more actively and more intelligently with German policy and not just with the immediate interests of their firms or industries. The first part of the book is an essay on this theme by Herbert Gross. The second half comprises sympathetic sketches of a number of businessmen, living and dead, who exemplify public spirit and breadth of interests. Considering the title, it is odd that Walther Rathenau gets only a passing mention.

WEGE ZUM SOZIALEN FRIEDEN. EDITED BY H. D. ORTLIEB AND H. SCHELSKY. Stuttgart: Ring, 1954, 316 p. DM. 12.50.

Articles by a number of authors on "co-determination" in economic and industrial enterprise.

LA SITUATION DE L'ALLEMAGNE EN 1955. BY ALFRED GROSSER. Brussels: Institut des Relations Internationales, 1955, 133 p.

The author was rapporteur of a conference on Germany's position in Western Europe, held in Bruges in April 1955, in which institutes of international affairs from ten countries participated, including the Council on Foreign Relations. Most of the book is a selective account of some of the points of view expressed at the conference, with some comments by the author. A postscript gives an analysis of events since April.

DIE NEUORDNUNG DER EISEN- UND STAHLINDUSTRIE IM GEBIET DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND: EIN BERICHT DER STAHLTREUHÄNDERVEREINIGUNG. Munich: Beck, 1954, 870 p. DM. 48.

In 1949 the American and British Military Governors appointed a group of German "trustees" to work out the reorganization of the steel industry in accordance with the decartelization and deconcentration decrees. This massive report by the trustees contains both an explanation of their work and a great deal of detailed and documented information.

THE POLITICS OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY, 1640-1945. BY GORDON A. CRAIG. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955, 536 p. \$11.50.

Covering some of the same ground as Görlitz' "History of the German General Staff," Professor Craig's study is much superior in scholarship and insight. A broadly conceived political history of the Prussian-German Army from the Great Elector to the eve of the Second World War, the core of the book is the period between the era of Prussian reform and the collapse of the Weimar Republic. A most valuable contribution.

DER STAAT AUS DEM NICHTS. BY NORBERT TÖNNIES. Stuttgart: Constantin, 1954, 253 p. DM. 8.80.

A brief sketch of Germany's tribulations since the defeat in 1945.

SORGE UM DIE DEUTSCHE LINKE. BY KLAUS-PETER SCHULZ. Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1954, 128 p. DM. 3.80.

A quite critical examination of the policies of the German Social Democratic Party since 1945.

PARTEI UND FRAKTION. BY RUDOLF WILDENMANN. Meisenheim am Glan: Westkulturverlag, 1954, 210 p. DM. 16.

An analysis of the party structure of the SPD, CDU, FDP and BHE in the Bonn Republic.

VIERMAL DEUTSCHLAND. BY WERNER FREIHERR VON RHEINBABEN. Berlin: Argon, 1954, 454 p. DM. 18.60.

Memoirs of Wilhelmian Germany, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich and Adenauer's Germany, by a former politician and diplomat.

CARL GOERDELER UND DIE DEUTSCHE WIDERSTANDSBEWEGUNG. BY GERHARD RITTER. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954, 630 p. DM. 19.80.

A leading German historian interprets the Resistance Movement through the life of Carl Goerdeler who was killed after the attempt of July 1944. A major contribution.

ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS FACTORS IN THE GERMAN RESISTANCE TO HITLER. BY MOTHER MARY ALICE GALLIN. Washington: Catholic University, 1955, 231 p. \$2.50.

A thoughtful discussion of the ethical question of resistance to a totalitarian state.

DU HAST MICH HEIMGESUCHT BEI NACHT. EDITED BY HELMUT GOLLWITZER, KÄTHE KUHN AND REINHOLD SCHNEIDER. Munich: Kaiser, 1954, 466 p. DM. 15.

A selection of letters, diary entries and poems of members of the anti-Nazi Resistance, primarily in Germany. Essentially a commemorative volume—only one of the writers included survived the end of the war.

SECHS JAHRE REICHSKANZLEI. BY MAX VON STOCKHAUSEN. Bonn: Athenaeum, 1954, 279 p. DM. 14.

Recollections and diary entries by an official in the Reichskanzlei in the years of the Cuno, Stresemann, Marx and Luther cabinets.

BAYERN ZWISCHEN MONARCHIE UND DIKTATUR. BY KARL SCHWEND. Munich: Pflaum, 1954, 590 p. DM. 28.

An extensive account of the continuing and enervating tension between Bavarian particularism and the Reich in the years of the Weimar Republic. The author, himself a member of the Bavarian People's Party, concludes that the health of the whole depends upon the vigor and autonomy of the parts.

ZWISCHEN RÄTEDIKTATUR UND SOZIALER DEMOKRATIE. BY WALTER TORMIN. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1954, 148 p. DM. 11.80.

A monograph on the German revolution of 1918-1919, centering on the background, rôle, aims and failure of the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils.

GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, 1905-1917: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCHISM. BY CARL E. SCHORSKE. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, 358 p. \$5.50.

An exceptionally fine analysis of the polarization that developed in German social democracy during the last days of the Empire—the emergence of reformists

and left radicals, presaging though not identical with the postwar split between Social Democrats and Communists.

BISMARCK ET HITLER. BY HENRY VALLOTTON. Paris: Éditions de la Table Ronde, 1954, 373 p. Fr. 960.

A comparison—not very penetrating—of Bismarck the “chess player” and Hitler “the poker player.”

SAAR ZWISCHEN OST UND WEST. BY FRITZ HELLWIG. Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1954, 219 p. DM. 12.50.

A rich collection of economic information about the Saar, in support of the author's opposition to economic union with France.

DIE RECHTLICHE, POLITISCHE UND WIRTSCHAFTLICHE LAGE DES BERLINER SOWJETSEKTORS. BY WALTER BRUNN. Berlin: Kulturbuch, 1954, 144 p. DM. 6.80.

A useful study of the way in which the Soviet sector of Berlin was put under Communist control despite the four-Power arrangement for the city.

I COMUNISTI E L'INSURREZIONE (1943-1945). BY PIETRO SECCHIA. Rome: Edizioni di Cultura Sociale, 1954, 513 p. L. 800.

A collection of articles written in the years 1943-1945, published to demonstrate the leading rôle of the Communist Party in the Resistance Movement.

CON D'ANNUNZIO E MILLO IN DIFESA DELL'ADRIATICO. BY GIOVANNI GIURIATI. Florence: Sansoni, 1954, 237 p. L. 2000.

A reëvocation of the “passione fiumana” by a participant in d'Annunzio's Fiume expedition. Includes some documents and letters.

FRANCO OF SPAIN. BY S. F. A. COLES. London: Spearman, 1955, 264 p. 21/.

A favorable appraisal of General Franco's career, but too anecdotal and episodic to serve as a biography.

NACHT ÜBER SPANIEN. BY AUGUSTIN SOUCHY. Darmstadt: Verlag Die Freie Gesellschaft, 1955, 269 p. DM. 7.80.

To a considerable extent a personal account of the Spanish Civil War by a supporter of the anarcho-syndicalists. Vigorously anti-Franco and anti-Communist.

THE PEOPLE OF THE SIERRA. BY J. A. PITT-RIVERS. New York: Criterion Books, 1955, 232 p. \$4.00.

An examination of the social structure of Alcalá, a rural community in the mountains of southern Spain.

UNIDADE E COOPERAÇÃO ENTRE A METRÓPOLE E O ULTRAMAR. BY FRANCISCO BAHIA DOS SANTOS. Lisbon: Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, 1953, 111 p. Escudos 10.

ANGOLA. BY FRANCISCO BAHIA DOS SANTOS. Lisbon: Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, 1954, 146 p.

On Portugal's mission and achievements in her territories in Africa and Asia.

Eastern Europe

THE ORIGIN OF THE COMMUNIST AUTOCRACY: POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN THE SOVIET STATE—FIRST PHASE, 1917-1922. BY LEONARD SCHAPIRO. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, 397 p. \$7.00.

A valuable account of the struggle among the various revolutionary groups—

Bolsheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, Left SR's, Left Communists and Mensheviks—in the first years after the Revolution. The author, who has a nice combination of detachment and critical insight, does a much-needed service in bringing the opposition groups to the fore and in puncturing a number of Communist legends.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN RUSSIAN AND SOVIET THOUGHT. EDITED BY ERNEST J. SIMMONS. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, 563 p. \$7.50.

An interesting symposium of papers by many leading scholars, based on a conference held in March 1954 and developing the theme of continuity and change in various aspects of Soviet philosophy, literature and behavior. A number of the pieces are exceptionally penetrating.

SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: 1928-1951. BY DONALD R. HODGMAN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, 241 p. \$5.00.

A useful contribution, one of the studies of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, to the growing body of American analysis of Soviet economic development. The present volume is an effort to construct an independent index of Soviet industrial output as a means of gauging Soviet economic growth since the beginning of the planning era.

THE HOUSING PROBLEM IN THE SOVIET UNION. BY TIMOTHY SOSNOVY. New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1954, 300 p. \$4.25.

A useful study of the urban housing situation in the U.S.S.R.: the conditions, how facilities are distributed, what the authorities have done to meet the problem.

RUSSIA'S SOVIET ECONOMY. BY HARRY SCHWARTZ. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954, 682 p. \$9.00.

The second edition of a study that first appeared in 1950; it includes material on the period between then and mid-1954.

A HISTORY OF RUSSIA. BY GEORGE VERNADSKY. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954, 499 p. \$4.00.

The fourth edition of this able general history has been considerably revised and a number of chapters rewritten.

CONCEPTIONS SOVIÉTIQUES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC. BY IVO LAPENNA. Paris: Pedone, 1954, 324 p. Fr. 1800.

A substantial review and analysis of Soviet theories concerning the nature of international law and its principal instrumentalities and institutions.

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM, 1939-1945. BY JOHN A. ARMSTRONG. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, 322 p. \$5.00.

This volume, one of the studies of the Russian Institute of Columbia University, is a scholarly sequel to Reshetar's history of the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920 (noted here October 1952). It deals with the nationalist movements during the war years and the German occupation of Poland and the Soviet Ukraine.

ESCAPE FROM PARADISE. EDITED BY C. A. SMITH. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954, 243 p. \$3.50.

The narratives of eight people of various nationalities who fled from Communist-controlled countries.

FINLAND AND ITS GEOGRAPHY. EDITED BY RAYE R. PLATT. New York: Duell, and Boston: Little, Brown, 1955, 510 p. \$9.00.

This volume, one of a new series of American Geographical Society handbooks,

is a substantial, illustrated survey of Finland's physical, economic and human geography.

POLISH POSTWAR ECONOMY. BY THAD PAUL ALTON. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, 330 p. \$5.75.

An able monograph, one of the studies of the Russian Institute of Columbia University, on Polish economic planning and development under the Communist régime. As in other areas of the Soviet orbit, marked advances in industry have been accompanied by difficulties in agriculture and a failure to bring about improvement in living standards.

DIESSEITS UND JENSEITS DER GRENZE. BY FRIEDRICH SWART. Leer: Rautenberg, 1954, 231 p. DM. 8.

A history of German trade and other associations in Poznan to the end of the Second World War.

MEMOIRS OF DR. EDUARD BENEŠ. Boston: Houghton, 1955, 346 p. \$7.50.

A long-overdue American edition of an important work originally appearing in Czech in 1947 (noted in "Foreign Affairs Bibliography, 1942-1952"). It is mainly devoted to Beneš' efforts after Munich—which is not covered—to reestablish Czech independence.

PRAGUE À L'HEURE DE MOSCOU. BY PAUL BARTON. Paris: Horay, 1954, 355 p. Fr. 900.

A former Czech trade unionist writes with knowledge and insight about recent trends in Communist Czechoslovakia. Of particular interest is his information on the internal evolution of the Party hierarchy.

THE AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY OF THE DANUBIAN COUNTRIES, 1935-45. BY S. D. ZAGOROFF AND OTHERS. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955, 478 p. \$7.50.

Essays on food and agriculture before and during the Second World War in Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

HITLER, KÖNIG CAROL UND MARSCHALL ANTONESCU: DIE DEUTSCH-RUMÄNISCHEN BEZIEHUNGEN 1938-1944. BY ANDREAS HILLGRUBER. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1954, 382 p. DM. 26.

A scholarly account of German-Rumanian relations during the Second World War, but from the German perspective and based primarily on German source material.

THE ROMANIAN OIL INDUSTRY. BY CONSTANTIN N. JORDAN. New York: New York University Press (for the Mid-European Studies Center), 1955, 357 p. \$10.00.

A detailed and rather technical analysis concerned primarily with developments since the Second World War and the Communization of Rumania.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BRITAIN—UNEASY ALLY. BY LEON D. EPSTEIN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, 279 p. \$4.00.

A perceptive analysis of "British responses to American foreign policy in the postwar years 1945 through 1952." As the title indicates, these responses are often restive and disturbed. Of particular interest is the author's coverage of the various sectors of British political opinion, from Labor left to Conservative.

THE FOREIGN OFFICE. BY LORD STRANG AND OTHERS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955, 226 p. \$2.40.

This volume, the second in the New Whitehall Series designed to "provide authoritative descriptions of the present work of the major Departments of the Central Government," was ably prepared by the former permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. An informative account, if somewhat complacent.

WINSTON CHURCHILL: BRITISH BULLDOG. BY EMRYS HUGHES. New York: Exposition Press, 1955, 346 p. \$5.00.

A crotchety and quite unnecessary attack on the former Prime Minister.

CONFLICT WITHOUT MALICE. BY EMANUEL SHINWELL. London: Odhams, 1955, 252 p. 21/.

An autobiography of the Labor M.P. and Minister. Not particularly revealing of either recent British politics or Labor Party history.

MAX HORTON AND THE WESTERN APPROACHES. BY REAR-ADMIRAL W. S. CHALMERS. London: Hodder, 1954, 301 p. 16/.

A biography of the late British Admiral, a submarine officer himself, and in charge of the campaign against the U-boats in the latter phases of the Second World War.

SCOTLAND. BY SIR ROBERT RAIT AND GEORGE S. PRYDE. New York: Praeger, 1955, 356 p. \$5.50.

A new edition of a general survey, revised to take account of the considerable changes in Scotland during the last 20 years.

QUEBEC NOW. BY MIRIAM CHAPIN. New York: Oxford University Press, and Toronto: Ryerson, 1955, 185 p. \$3.75.

A brief but sympathetic sketch of the Province of Quebec.

The Middle East

SOCIAL FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. EDITED BY SYDNEY NETTLETON FISHER. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955, 282 p. \$5.00.

A symposium of papers presented at a conference sponsored by the Committee on the Near and Middle East of the Social Science Research Council.

MIDDLE EAST TENSIONS. BY S. A. MORRISON. New York: Harper, 1954, 198 p. \$2.75.

A discussion by a British missionary, of the political, intellectual and emotional currents which are making the Middle East so eruptive these days.

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A concise and informative review of the history of the Arabic-speaking peoples to the present.

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The story of a German intelligence operator's experiences in Iran during the Second World War. Much adventure not very well told.

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A Kashmir journalist and politician takes a dim view of the policies of both India and Pakistan toward his land. He concludes, however, that independence for Kashmir is not feasible, and that accession to Pakistan is probably the best solution.

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A collection of writings by a prominent Indian economist, dealing with a variety of topics but with emphasis on the problems of economic development in India.

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A massive general history by the Professor of the History of South-East Asia in the University of London. The last 100 pages deal with twentieth century developments.

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A useful "data paper" on the structure and functioning of the régime.

INDONESIAN SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES. BY B. SCHRIEKE. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1955, 313 p. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, \$3.00.)

INDONESIAN TRADE AND SOCIETY. BY J. C. VAN LEUR. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1955, 465 p. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, \$4.00.)

Writings on Indonesia by two prominent Dutch scholars who died in the 1940's. The first includes a study of the early development of the Communist movement in Sumatra. Dr. Van Leur's writings are concerned with the earlier economic history of the Netherlands East Indies.

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NO FLIES IN CHINA. BY GEORGE STAFFORD GALE. New York: Morrow, 1955, 191 p. \$3.00.

A breezy record of impressions gained by a *Manchester Guardian* correspondent who more or less accompanied the Labor Party delegation to China in 1954. Not favorable to the régime.

JAPAN'S MODERN CENTURY. BY HUGH BORTON. New York: Ronald, 1955, 524 p. \$7.00.

A broad history of Japan's political and social evolution in the century since Commodore Perry's arrival. The author, Director of the East Asian Institute at

Columbia University, is doubtful of the prospects for continued democratization of Japan, though he does not expect an excessive reversion to authoritarianism.

DAUGHTERS OF CHANGING JAPAN. BY EARL HERBERT CRESSY. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1955, 305 p. \$4.00.

Sketches of the life and times of a number of young Japanese, based largely on narratives written by themselves.

OÙ VA LE JAPON. BY JACQUES CHÉROY. Paris: Hachette, 1954, 384 p. Fr. 750.

A useful survey of Japan since 1945—the problems of reconstruction, the aims and policies of the Occupation, and the present political and social uncertainties.

WITH THE AUSTRALIANS IN KOREA. EDITED BY NORMAN BARTLETT. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954, 294 p. 25/.

The story of the substantial Australian contribution to the Korean war.

BEYOND COURAGE. BY CLAY BLAIR, JR. New York: McKay, 1955, 247 p. \$3.50.

Some tales of escape of American airmen in the Korean war.

Africa

INSIDE AFRICA. BY JOHN GUNTHER. New York: Harper, 1955, 952 p. \$6.00.

This latest of Mr. Gunther's continental anatomies, and certainly one of his best, takes us on an extended tour through nearly all of Africa. Based in part on a long trip in 1952-53, it is at the same time a remarkable compendium of information. While the author does not overlook the exotic and the colorful, his attention is primarily directed toward Africa's staggering social, economic and political problems, which are as varied as they are refractory.

THE AFRICAN GIANT. BY STUART CLOETE. Boston: Houghton, 1955, 440 p. \$4.00.

A South African novelist's account of a trip through Central and West Africa. He sees Africa a giant, awakened, but desiring to return to his slumbers.

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An American Negro writer's account of a tour through the Gold Coast. Mr. Wright is capable of effective and vivid prose and he has much of interest to say on African politics, but the impressions that emerge are somewhat chaotic.

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An informative and jolting account of the Mau Mau organization by an Englishwoman of some years' residence in Kenya.

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An impressive physical, human and economic geography of Africa south of the Congo-Zambezi watershed, by a professor at the University of Witwatersrand.

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A report on economic achievements and potentialities, based on a trip through the Union of South Africa, Southwest Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portuguese East Africa.

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By Ruth Savord

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